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Summary  
The thesis engages in a comprehensive legal study of the fundamental rights conditionalities 
as introduced in the 2014-2020 European Structural and Investment Funds normative 
framework. It focuses on three general ex ante conditionalities in the area of anti-
discrimination, gender equality and disability.  
Conditionality in fundamental rights is a long-standing EU policy tool, used mainly to 
enforce compliance with fundamental rights values on third countries. The 2013 Cohesion 
policy reform marks a strong transition of fundamental rights conditionality to internal 
policy. The development stirred a great interest as the tool addresses directly the EU Member 
States. It conditions the access to funding on a prior fulfilment of specifically prescribed 
fundamental rights criteria.  
In this context, the thesis inquires what is the nature and reach of the novel fundamental 
rights conditionalities. To facilitate a robust understanding of the newly introduced tool, the 
thesis firstly undertakes a conceptual analysis of conditionality. It further takes an evolutive-
comparative approach, locating the fundamental rights conditionalities in the broader context 
of EU conditionality policy as well as in the context of European Structural and Investment 
Funds framework. 
Tested against the two areas, the research finds that the analysed ex ante conditionalities 
endorse the novelty claim, but, at the same time, they present similarities with the EU general 
use of conditionality in fundamental rights. Equally, fundamental rights conditionalities build 
harmoniously on the prior arrangements of European Structural and Investment Funds. 
The thesis concludes with a general assessment of the novel fundamental rights 
conditionalities’ potential and limits, primarily with regards to Cohesion policy and secondly 
with regards to the overall EU goal of promoting equality and combating status 
discrimination. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The present thesis addresses the 2013 Cohesion policy reform and its novel ex ante 
conditionality tool in the area of fundamental rights. It initiates an in depth legal inquiry on 
their genesis, nature, scope, defining features and general reach. 
Cohesion policy as implemented through the European Structural and Investment 
Funds (the ‘ESI Funds’) has been one of the most reported and evaluated policies of the 
European Union (the ‘EU’ or the ‘Union’). For decades, EU’s executive and legislators have 
been highly concerned with the allocation and performance of ESI Funds. The academic 
community has also been sensitive to the subject, however the discussions have been largely 
dominated by economic and policy scholarly contributions. Traditionally perceived as 
exceeding the ‘pure’ scope of law, ESI Funds have been ‘under-reported’ by legal scholars. 
Three main recent developments axes at the EU level have contributed to the 
conceptualization of the present thesis. First, the growing interest towards conditionality, 
which, especially on the background of the economic crisis, has dominated the EU political, 
social and legal discourse. Second, the concern with regards to the failure of several Member 
States to uphold the EU values to a sufficient level, including fundamental rights. Third, the 
much closer attention attracted by ESI Funds in times of scarce financial resources and their 
role in the discussion on EU values. 
The attention of the present research to the ESI Funds framework is much indebted to 
the peculiar mechanism included by the 2013 reform, namely the ex ante conditionality in the 
area of non-discrimination, gender equality and disability (the ‘ESI fundamental rights 
conditionalities’).  
Fundamental rights conditionality is not a new EU tool. For decades it has been the 
flagship instrument of the EU external policy to advance Union’s values worldwide. What is 
new is its use towards EU Member States ex ante, in the attempt to reinforce the efficiency of 
EU legal and policy framework on fundamental rights issues. 
Conditionality as introduced in the 2014-2020 ESI Funds programming period is a 
highly curious tool. It intends to check ex ante the effective implementation and application 
of EU equality and non-discrimination law with the aim to foster the positive impact of ESI 
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Funds operations. In Kelsen’s terms, the tool aims to ensure that ‘the ought’ prescribed by the 
EU normative framework actually translates in ‘is’ during the ESI Funds operations. Beyond 
the declared purpose, the actual practical operation of the conditionality tool however raises a 
degree of unknown and uncertainty. In this context, we aim to reveal the sensibilities of the 
tool, unwrapping its novelty, nature and scope. 
The thesis follows a close reading of the relevant Regulations and other EU normative 
acts as primary bibliographical sources. It also looks at Cohesion policy evaluations and 
studies to assess the impact of the prior arrangements in fundamental rights areas. The 
previous research of Elena Fierro, Lorand Bartels on the EU human rights conditionality in 
the external policy, as well as the 2009 independent report of Fabrizio Barca on the future of 
Cohesion policy reform have all greatly supported the present work. 
The thesis is structured in three Chapters. 
The first Chapter aims to conceptualize the conditionality tool and further look at the 
EU practice on fundamental rights conditionality from external to internal policy. The part 
examines fundamental rights conditionality as employed externally, with the aim to advance 
and compare the findings to the context of the internal Cohesion policy and its ESI Funds. 
The second Chapter tests the novelty of ESI fundamental rights conditionalities in the 
context of ESI Funds. It adopts an evolutive-comparative approach to the prior normative 
frameworks with regards to fundamental rights and conditionality arrangements. 
The third Chapter engages in a detailed analysis of the nature and scope of the novel 
ESI fundamental rights conditionalities, locating them in the broader context of EU 
conditionality fundamental rights policy and assessing its possible contribution.  
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CHAPTER I. UNWRAPPING THE EU CONDITIONALITY POLICY 
Fundamental rights1 conditionality is a largely used EU policy tool. In 2013, fundamental 
rights conditionalities have been introduced in the framework of the long established EU 
Cohesion policy. These are found directly in the text of European Structural and Investment 
Funds (the ‘ESI Funds’), which are the main financial instruments for the delivery of the 
Cohesion policy’s goal of economic, social and territorial cohesion. The ESI Funds’ 
fundamental rights conditionalities require that Member States fulfil ex ante the pre-defined 
fundamental rights criteria in order to get access to funds thereof. The identified ex ante 
conditionalities in the area of fundamental rights relate primarily to the specific areas of 
gender equality, non-discrimination, disability, social rights, health and education. This thesis 
limits the scope of analysis to the first three conditionalities – the ‘ESI fundamental rights 
conditionalities’ (see Chapter III). 
The origins of Cohesion policy date back to the 1957 founding treaties. Throughout 
time, the policy has known a growing importance and substantial financial support from the 
EU budget, especially since the 1988 landmark reform.  
One of the defining goals of the Cohesion policy - operationalised through ESI Funds - 
is the delivery of social justice. In pursuing this goal, a long-standing feature of ESI Funds 
has been their strong link to overall EU law and policies on equality and non-discrimination. 
However, fundamental rights conditionalities have not been a familiar term within the ESI 
Funds framework (see Chapter II). 
Even though fundamental rights conditionalities have not been an instrument of the ESI 
Funds until the 2013 reform, the concept is not new. Therefore, before engaging into the 
analysis of the fundamental rights conditionalities in the area of gender equality, non-
discrimination and disability, as introduced by the 2013 ESI Funds reform, this thesis has as a 
first task to establish an epistemic understanding of the concept of conditionality. In 
undertaking this task the first Chapter of the thesis essentially asks: what is conditionality and 
in particular fundamental rights conditionality; and where does it come from? In subsidiary, 
the Chapter asks: what does the EU use of fundamental rights conditionality in other policies 
tell us about the new ESI Funds conditionalities in the area of fundamental rights?  
                                                
1 For the purpose of internal coherence, the present thesis uses the term ‘fundamental rights’ as referring also to 
human rights enshrined and protected beyond the EU legal order, without attaching any particular meaning to 
the term ‘fundamental rights’ as opposed to ‘human rights’. 
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We chose to seek the answer to the questions above by having a close look at the areas 
where fundamental rights conditionality’s use towards state-type actors has been most 
common. We identified two areas: 1) The international law and relations, which offers a 
useful overview of conditionality in general and fundamental rights conditionality in 
particular; 2) At EU level, we look first at the EU external policy where fundamental rights 
conditionalities are being employed for a long time as an essential tool to advance the 
policy’s core objective of upholding and promoting EU values in the ‘wider world’ (Article 3 
paragraph 5 TEU, ex Article 2). In subsidiary, we look at the EU internal policy and analyse 
the few conditionality instruments, which touch upon fundamental rights. 
To the ends described above, the first Chapter intends to provide a general conceptual 
and contextual framework of conditionality under which the thesis shall further operate. It 
intends to lay down the basis towards the overarching discussions on ex ante fundamental 
rights conditionalities in the context of 2014-2020 ESI Funds, informing us on their main 
features, scope and place within the overall landscape of EU fundamental rights 
conditionalities. 
In the first part, the Chapter unwraps the concept of conditionality laying down a 
toolkit, which paves the way towards a deeper understanding of fundamental rights 
conditionality. It elaborates on the definition, essential features, types, functions and legal 
nature of conditionality (Section 1). 
The second part contextualises the EU fundamental rights conditionality policy looking 
primarily at where it emerged from and how it developed (Section 2). The section finds that 
the ‘cradle’ of EU fundamental rights conditionality has been the EU external policy, where it 
has prosperously extended and developed. Within the limits of EU external policy, 
fundamental rights conditionalities were initially seen purely as an attribute of international 
law and employed by EU exclusively towards third countries. Progressively, under the 
pressure of internal EU constitutional transformations, fundamental rights conditionalities 
extended closer to the border of internal policy being imposed to acceding countries in the 
form of Copenhagen criteria. More recently, fundamental rights conditionalities reached the 
EU internal policies, becoming applicable to the EU Member States themselves: first, by 
means of Article 7 TEU, introduced by the Lisbon treaty, second, by other atypical 
fundamental rights conditionality tools and finally culminating with the ESI fundamental 
rights conditionalities, which are the subject of the present thesis.
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SECTION 1. CONDITIONALITY – A CONCEPTUAL TOOLKIT 
 
1.1. Conditionality - an attempt of definition 
Conditionality is a multifaceted and continuously evolving policy tool. In spite of the large 
notoriety of the concept, providing an exhaustive generic definition may appear particularly 
difficult. The challenge of providing a strict definition of the term is further enhanced by its 
high flexibility and active employment in various internal and external policy areas, which 
are fundamentally different. The Oxford English Dictionary gives the following definition of 
the adverb ‘conditional’: ‘subject to one or more conditions or requirements being met; made 
or granted on certain terms’. The example the dictionary brings forward is worth mentioning: 
‘Western aid was only granted conditional on further reform’. This phrase presents an 
incredible telling example of what is a very common use of conditionality in international 
practice. However, in international context, conditionality comprises a much larger scope, far 
beyond the area of development aid. It is commonly used to label the conditions linked to 
bilateral or multilateral loans, international trade, international relations, as well as 
membership to international organisations. In differentiating between the active and passive 
subjects of conditionality we shall onwards use the terms ‘conditionality actor’ and 
‘conditionality recipient’.2  
As the Roman jurist, Javolenus Priscus put it: ‘in law, every definition is dangerous: for 
it is rare that it cannot be overturned’.3 Nevertheless, we shall take the risk and try to define 
the generic meaning of conditionality. 
For the purpose of this thesis, in a broad sense, conditionality might be defined as:  
An economic or political requirement attached to an agreement, with a legally binding 
or non-binding nature, pre-established by the conditionality actor or mutually agreed between 
the conditionality actor and conditionality recipient, which is accessory to the agreement and 
must be complied with by the conditionality recipient before or after the conclusion of the 
                                                
2 We borrow the terms ‘conditionality actor’ and ‘conditionality recipient’ from E. Fierro, The EU’s approach to 
human rights conditionality in practice, PhD Theses, Florence, European University Institute, 2001, p. 104. 
3 Javolenus Priscus, Digest 50.17.202: ‘Omnis definitio in iure civili periculosa est: parum est ut subverti non 
potest’, as cited by Peter Birks, ‘Definition and Devision: A Meditiation on Institutes 3.13.’ in: The 
classification of obligations, Society of Public Teachers of Law (London, England), P Birks (ed), Oxford  : New 
York, Clarendon Press  ; Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 6. 
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agreement, capable of attracting negative consequences in case of non-compliance or positive 
incentives in case of compliance, having as main functions to: secure and ensure the 
effectiveness of granted pecuniary or non-pecuniary benefits, ensure compliance or punish 
the non-compliance of the conditionality recipient. 
 In the following sub-sections we shall develop in detail each of the elements of the 
definition provided above. 
 
1.2. Conditionality types 
Conditionalities have known various adaptation and transformation over time. From the 
substantive point of view, conditionalities are classified in political and economic (Section 
1.2.1.). Furthermore, based mainly on the struggle to secure higher performance and 
compliance, both the political and economic conditionalities have developed a wide range of 
sub-classifications.4 We shall limit our analysis to: legal and non-legally binding (hard 
law/soft law) (Section 1.2.2.), positive and negative (Section 1.2.3.), ex ante and ex post 
conditionality (Section 1.2.4.). 
1.2.1. Political and economic conditionality 
From the substantive and historical perspective, the literature distinguishes between two 
major generations of conditionality: economic and political.  
The first generation - economic conditionality is understood as the practice of linking 
benefits - often of a pecuniary nature – to economic conditions, such as: transition to market 
economy 5  or the adoption of economic policies, including conditions relating to 
macroeconomic variables and structural measures.6 These shaped at the early stages of post-
bellum period. The main economic conditionality actors have been since the International 
Financial Institutions (the ‘IFIs’)7 – International Monetary Fund (the ‘IMF’) and the World 
                                                
4 Other types of conditionalities have also been analysed in the literature: performance-based conditionality, 
carrots and sticks conditionality, dilaogue. For a detailed analysis on the types of conditionality see: E Fierro, 
op.cit., note 2, supra.  
5 KE Smith, The use of political conditionality in the EU’s relations with third countries: how effective?, EUI 
Working Papers, 1997/07, Florence, European University Institute, 1997, p. 4. 
6 International Monetary Fund, ‘Guidelines on Conditionality’, September 25, 2002, available at: 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/cond/2002/eng/guid/092302.pdf> consulted on 12.01.2014. 
7 J Gold, ‘Use of the International Monetary Fund’s Resources: Conditionality and Unconditionality as Legal 
Categories’, in Journal of International Law and Economics, vol. 6, 1971, 1; SN Erbas & International 
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Bank.8 Both have been using purely ‘economic conditionality’, which did not touch upon, 
and still barely implies,9 sound political or fundamental rights considerations.10  
The second generation - political conditionality refers to the practice of linking 
conditions of political nature - democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights - to benefits of 
pecuniary or non-pecuniary nature, granted to third countries (conditionality recipients), such 
as: development aid, cooperation agreements, trade agreements and preferences, accession to 
international organisations, loans, diplomatic contacts, security.11 The political conditionality 
emerged in the 70’s in the context of development aid agreements. From this point of view, 
Tomaševski has defined political conditionality as: the “[donor states’] practice of tying aid 
to specific conventions whereby recipients remain eligible to aid”.12  At the EU level, 
‘political conditionality’ in international agreements emerged in the early 90’s and has known 
since rapid extension and dynamic transformations (Section 2.1.1. below). The conditionality 
has been onwards formalised under EU policy framework in 1995 by the Commission’s 
Communication on respect for democratic principles and human rights in agreements with 
third countries, endorsed by the Council.13 Currently, EU is one of the leading ‘exporters’ of 
‘political conditionality’, which is usually strongly interlinked to various trade incentives (see 
Section 2 below).14  
1.2.2. Legal and non-legally binding conditionality (Hard law and soft law 
conditionality)  
From the normative point of view, the generic political and economic conditionality takes in 
practice the form of legal or non-legally binding conditionality. The ‘legal conditionality’ 
                                                                                                                                                  
Monetary Fund, IMF conditionality and program ownership: a case of streamlined conditionality, IMF 
Working Paper, 03/98, Washington, International Monetary Fund, 2003. 
8 For an evolutionary historical perspective of the IMF and World Bank conditionality see: OECD, Policy 
Ownership and Aid Conditionality in the Light of the Financial Crisis, Paris, 2009, pp. 27-33, available 
at:<http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/content/book/9789264075528-en> consulted on 23 January 2014. 
9 M Darrow, Between light and shadow: the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and international 
human rights law, Studies in International Law, v. 1, Oxford  ; Portland, Or, Hart, 2003. 
10 For further discussions see: K Tomaševski, Between sanctions and elections: aid donors and their human 
rights performance, London, UK  ; Washington, D.C, Pinter, 1997.; IMF, 'Guidelines on Conditionality’, op. cit., 
note 6, supra, para. 1. 
11 Smith, op.cit., note 5, supra, p. 4. 
12 K Tomaševski, op.cit., note 10, supra. 
13 Communication from the Commission on the inclusion of respect for democratic principles and human rights 
in agreements between the Community and third countries, COM (95) 216 final, 23 May 1995, endorsed by the 
European Council on 29 May 1995. 
14 Fierro, op.cit., note 2, supra, p. 104. 
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refers to the political or economic conditionality, formalised by way of a legally binding 
instrument (hard law). In this case, the conditionality is a legal norm, included in a legally 
binding and enforceable act and, as a consequence, the conditionality recipient is bound to 
comply with the conditionality. In case of non-compliance, the conditionality actor may 
appeal to the coercion force of applicable law, subject to rules thereof.  
The non-legally binding conditionality refers to the economic or political 
conditionalities enshrined in non-legally binding instruments (soft law). In this form, the 
conditionality states the commitment of the conditionality recipient to a certain conduct, 
however there is no sanctioning regime available to the conditionality actor to enforce the 
commitment, in case of non-compliance with the prescribed conduct. Therefore, the non-
legally binding conditionality relies heavily on the good will of the conditionality recipient, 
being voluntary in nature. In practice, soft-law conditionalities are often linked to other 
leverage instruments to ensure compliance, as it is the case of soft law EU Copenhagen 
criteria which are strongly linked to hard law financial incentives or trade preferences. 
Similar to the substance, the normative form of EU conditionality has known 
tremendous transformations. From the 90s’, 15  EU soft law conditionality has been 
progressively complemented by binding hard law conditionality. Currently, EU employs both 
hard law and soft law conditionality in relationship to third countries. The legal instruments 
used have developed from traditional international agreements, to unilateral EU legal 
instruments – as EU Regulations on trade preferences (the ‘GSP’) or financial instruments - 
all varying greatly by actor and scope (see Section 2 below). 
1.2.3. Positive and negative conditionality 
From the point of view of effects – namely, the actions taken by the conditionality actor in 
case of fulfilment or, on the contrary, in case of failure to comply with the prescribed 
economic or political conditions - the conditionality is classified in: ‘positive’ and ‘negative’.  
Positive conditionality entitles the conditionality recipient to further benefits in case of 
good compliance. The conditionality actor rewards the behaviour of the conditionality 
recipient by progressively offering more incentives as a result of good performance. The 
incentives may concern: the release of loan tranches, development aid, grants, privileged 
                                                
15 Commission Communication ‘On human rights, democracy and development co-operation’, SEC (61) 91, of 
25.03.1991, endorsed by Council Resolution on human rights, democarcy and development of 28 November 
1991.  
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diplomatic and cultural ties or a mixture of various incentives.16 
Negative conditionality, on the contrary, has a punitive nature. It punishes the 
misconduct of the conditionality recipient and intends to correct its behaviour by suspension 
or reduction of the prior awarded or promised benefits. Negative conditionality often 
materialises in embargoes, suspension of loans or grants, sanctions, refusal to sign the 
agreement, suspension of diplomatic ties or condemnation by international community.17 
1.2.4. Ex ante and ex post conditionality 
From the temporal point of view, economic and political conditionality is classified in ex ante 
and ex post. 
Ex-ante conditionality refers to the conditions attached to an agreement, prior to its 
conclusion. As suggested by the term ‘ex ante’, mutually pre-agreed conditions have to be 
fulfilled before the start of a bilateral or multilateral (often contractual) relationship. The 
fulfilment of conditionality is usually a mandatory requirement for the valid formation or 
efficacy of an agreement. Per a contrario, if the conditions are not in place in the agreed time 
frame, the conditionality actor may refuse to conclude the agreement. In practice, depending 
on the area and nature of conditionality, a certain degree of flexibility might be allowed, thus 
the agreement might be concluded given that the conditionality recipient promises to fulfil 
the agreed conditions within a reasonable timeframe.18 At the EU level, the outstanding 
example of ex ante conditionality is the Copenhagen criteria.19 
The ex post conditionality refers to conditions attached to an agreement after its 
conclusion. The conditionalities may prescribe a positive act of compliance with (or 
facilitation of) a certain prescribed behaviour; or, on the contrary a negative act to refrain 
from a particular behaviour. The infringement of the duty entitles the conditionality actor to 
suspend or terminate the agreement. The most common example of ex-post conditionality in 
the EU practice is the insertion of fundamental rights clauses in the agreements with third 
                                                
16 Fierro, op.cit., note 2, supra, p. 110. 
17 Ibidem. 
18 The approach has however failed in Internaltional Financial Institution’s practice, raising strong credibility 
issues, as the recieving countries tended not to deliver on the promised committments, see: OECD, op.cit., note 
8, supra, p. 20. 
19 European Council, Copenhagen, ‘Conclusions of the Presidency’, 1993. 
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countries.20  
One hybrid variation of ex-post conditionality is the ‘ex-post selectivity’ or 
‘performance-based conditionality’ type, which determines future benefits based on the prior 
performance of the conditionality recipient. The ex-post selectivity combines ex post 
conditionality with the negative and positive conditionality schemes. In case the performance 
does not appear satisfactory, usually, the conditionality actor adopts a negative attitude with 
regards to future agreements. On the contrary, the conditionality actor may offer further 
incentives if the conditionality recipient shows high compliance. The ex-post selectivity was 
appreciated to be more successful than other forms of conditionality, because it contains 
performance and time benchmarks and empowers the conditionality recipient to take the 
lead.21 The EU is considered to be one of the leading actors in applying the ex post selectivity 
conditionality type.22 
The ex ante conditionality has been generally seen as problematic in international 
relations for several reasons. First, it was argued that its lack of flexibility limits extensively 
the scope for political manoeuvre of the conditionality actor thus restraining its possibility to 
react to changing realities.23 Second, the ex ante conditionality was seen in ‘reactive’ terms 
by conditionality recipients because of the pressure put on national sovereignty 
considerations. Third, ex ante conditionality is perceived as particularly intrusive and 
sensitive as the conditions attached have to be fulfilled prior to the start of the agreed 
arrangements. 
Traditionally, all the prior underlined factors led to a general tendency of the 
conditionality recipients to be reticent towards the ex ante conditionality. In response, 
conditionality actors, especially the IFIs, abandoned largely the use of ex-ante conditionality 
in practice.24  
 
1.3. The mutual agreement element 
All conditionality types are in principle the result of mutual agreement between the 
                                                
20 See, in extenso: L Bartels, Human Rights Conditionality in the EU’s International Agreements, Oxford 
University Press, 2005. 
21 OECD, op.cit., note 8, supra, p. 20 
22 Ibidem, p. 18. 
23 Fierro, op.cit., note 2, supra, p. 108. 
24  Paul Collier, Policy-Based Lending in: Conditionality revisited: concepts, experiences, and lessons, 
Washington, DC, World Bank, 2005, p. 114. 
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conditionality actor and the conditionality recipient. In this sense, the agreement on the 
content of conditionality might take two forms. Either conditionality actor unilaterally 
establishes the conditionalities and the conditionality recipient accedes to the proposed list – 
as it is the case of EU Copenhagen criteria; or the conditionalities are established as a result 
of direct negotiations and mutual consent between the conditionality actor and conditionality 
recipient. 
It has been argued that the agreement on conditionality, in whatever form, is merely 
formal given the inequality of the parties throughout the process of negotiation and 
implementation of conditionality.25 In case of conditionality linked to development aid, 
Tomaševski notes that even if the development aid is presented as a bilateral agreement, the 
accepted ‘gift’ is subject to conditions, for which the assessments of compliance and policy 
prescriptions are set in practice unilaterally by the donor state.26 
The content of conditionality is also an important element of the agreement. As such, 
the conditionality must be proportionate, meaning that the fulfilment of conditionality must 
not be excessively burdensome compared to the overall set of obligations and rights 
prescribed in the agreement. In other words, conditionality must remain an accessory 
element, subsidiary not the main object of the agreement.  
As well, the conditionality must be possible, meaning that: first, it must fall directly or 
indirectly within the area of control of the conditionality recipient and second, the latter is 
able to reasonable comply with or fulfil the conditionality. This is a crucial point for a valid 
agreement. If it is not the case, the agreement is void, even if consented, as it constitutes a 
requirement impossible to fulfil - obligatio ad impossibilum. 
 
1.4. Functions of conditionality 
Several functions of conditionality have been pointed out in the literature, which we find 
pertinent for our further discussion. As such, we note that conditionality has as main 
functions to: secure the granted pecuniary or non-pecuniary benefits, to ensure the efficiency 
of the benefits, to influence the behaviour of the conditionality recipient and to act as a 
                                                
25  JT Checkel, Compliance and conditionality, Working Papers, 18/2000, Advanced Research on the 
Europeanisation of the Nation-State, Oslo, ARENA, 2000. available at: 
<http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-publications/workingpapers/working-
papers2000/wp00_18.htm>, consulted on 06.02.2014. 
26 Tomaševski, Between Sanctions and Elections, op.cit., note 10, supra, pp. 9–10. 
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coercive or punitive factor. We shall onwards analyse each function. 
1.4.1. Securing the granted benefits 
Firstly, one function of conditionality is to secure the granted benefits. It is particularly the 
case where conditionality is linked to pecuniary benefits as loans, development aid, financial 
instruments or grants. As such, the conditionality may aim to address the risks of insolvency 
of the conditionality recipient or it may discourage the misuse of funds.27 From this point of 
view, conditionality highlights a certain degree of mistrust towards the conditionality 
recipient and subsequently a need for additional guarantees to ensure the security of deployed 
resources. The function is however equally valid with regards to non-pecuniary benefits, such 
as diplomatic relations, when the conditionality actor may seek to secure the established 
diplomatic ties. 
1.4.2. Effectiveness function 
Secondly, it has been argued that another function of conditionality is to ensure the 
effectiveness of the agreement.28 To this aim, the conditionality actor makes sure that the 
necessary incentives for a successful implementation of the agreement are in place and 
encourages the conditionality recipient to adopt the prescribed behaviour. The conditionality, 
in this view, behaves as a risk-based conditionality. It anticipates the risk factors capable of 
hindering the effective operation of the agreement and conditions the contractual relationship 
on their fulfilment. 29 
1.4.3. Behavioural function  
Thirdly, a behavioural function of conditionality can be identified. This implies the 
commitment of the conditionality recipient to a certain behaviour, which would not have 
been adopted otherwise, or which would have been achieved considerable later: “requiring 
governments to do things they wouldn’t otherwise do, or to do things more quickly than they 
would choose to do”.30 On the other hand, rather than intending to dramatically change the 
                                                
27 P Mosley, Aid and power: the World Bank and policy-based lending, London, Routledge, 1991, p. 66. 
28 Chhibber, Ajay, ‘Policy-Based Lending, Conditionality and Development Effectiveness’ in: Conditionality 
Revisited, op.cit., note 24, supra, p. 111. 
29 See further on the effectiveness: L Bartels, 'The application of human rights conditionality in the EU’s 
bilateral trade agreements and other trade arrangements with third countries', study requested by the European 
Parliament, November, 2008, pp.10-13. 
30 Killick, Tony, Did Conditionality Streamlining Succeed? in: Conditionality Revisited, op.cit., note 24, supra, 
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existing arrangements, behavioural function may also seek to maintain a certain status-quo – 
for instance, human rights protection - or progressively enhance it.31 To attain this function, 
conditionality implies a cost-benefit analysis from the part of conditionality recipients - in 
Bentham’s words: an analysis of ‘units of pleasure and pain’. As such, a reasonable cost-
benefit analysis between the benefit of compliance and the cost of non-compliance must 
necessarily ‘tip the balance’ towards the former. If the cost of non-compliance is marginal, 
the incentives of compliance are missing, therefore compliance shall be difficult to achieve. 
1.4.4. Punitive or coercive function 
Lastly, the conditionality implies a punitive or coercive function.32 As discussed above, 
the inclusion of conditionalities usually offers conditionality actors the tools to induce 
compliance of the conditionality recipient and in case of misconduct to correct the deviations 
by imposing punitive measures.33 As such, the conditionality recipient is first constrained to 
comply with the requirements resulting from conditionality given the likelihood of negative 
consequences - coercive function. Second, when the conditionality has not been observed, the 
punitive function is enforced and, in result, compliance is re-established. The two functions 
are very much inter-dependent, as the coercion depends to a large extent on the imminence of 
punitive measures. However, in practice it might not always be the case. Other factors might 
be used as leverage to induce coercion, for instance the willingness of the conditionality actor 
to impose sanctions or the economic, political, diplomatic and similar costs involved. 
 
1.5. Legal obligation and legal condition 
Another essential point in the analysis of fundamental rights conditionalities is the 
conceptualisation of a clear demarcation line between the obligation (or agreement as the 
source of obligations) and the conditionality attached to it.  
As such, the legal obligation is defined as a legal bond - ‘iuris vinculum’ or ‘lien de 
droit’ – which ties its subject to a given conduct.34 The conduct might prescribe for a positive 
                                                                                                                                                  
p. 93. 
31 Fierro, op.cit., note 2, supra, p. 106. 
32 Mosley, op.cit., note 27, supra, p. 68. 
33 Tomaševski, op.cit., note 10, supra. 
34 H Kelsen, General theory of law and state, 20th Century Legal Philosophy Series, 1, New York, Russell and 
Russell, 1961, 40 pp. Kelsen ties the idea of a legal obligation to the notion of legal norm, delict and sanction: 
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action of adopting a certain behaviour (to do, to give, to follow a certain conduct or to uphold 
a certain policy line);35 or negative action of abstaining from a given behaviour (not to do).36 
The obligation as legal bond may have its source directly in the letter of law stricto sensu, or 
might as well find its basis in a mutually consented agreement, which is concluded within the 
limits of law and public order imperatives.37 
In defining the condition, first a distinction must be drawn between the ‘condition’ as 
constitutive element of the valid formation of an agreement and ‘condition’ as a modality of 
an obligation.38 In its first acceptation, the condition refers to the elements necessary for the 
validity of an agreement, including for instance: the legal capacity, competence, consent, a 
valid object, cause or form (the ‘condition-validity’). 
In the present thesis, we examine the condition in its second acceptation, which refers 
to the condition as a modality of the legal obligation (hereinafter the ‘condition-modality’ or 
‘condition’). In this sense, the ‘condition’ is a modality - an accessory element of the 
obligation, which affects the very existence or the continuation of a legal obligation.39 It must 
be stressed that in this acceptation the condition is an accessory not necessary element of the 
agreement. If a condition-modality does not exist, the validity of the agreement is not 
impaired. Absence the condition-modality we are in presence of a pure and simple obligation. 
If a condition modality exists we are in presence of a conditional obligation. 
Similarly to the obligation, the condition may materialise in an active or passive 
behaviour. The active behaviour asks for a particular action to be fulfilled accessory to the 
obligation, whereas the passive behaviour consists in omission or abstention from a given 
behaviour. 
Once agreed between the parties, both the legal obligation and the legal condition have 
in principle binding nature. In consequence, the obligated subject must comply with both - 
                                                                                                                                                  
“to be legally obliged to a certain behaviour means that the contrary behaviour is a delict” and entails a 
sanction. Also in Kelsen’s view “[t]he legal duty is nothing apart from the legal norm [...] in relation to the 
individual [...]”. 
35 Dictionnaire de la terminologie du droit international, J Basdevant (ed), Paris, Sirey, 1960, p. 423. 
36 To put it into Kelsen’s words: “if the delict is a certain positive action, [the subject] is obliged not to 
undertake the action; if the delict is an omission of a certain action [the subject] is obliged to undertake that 
action”. Kelsen, op.cit., note 34, supra, p. 40. 
37 G Samuel, Law of obligations and legal remedies, 2d ed, London, Cavendish Pub, 2001, p. 250. See also: 
HLA Hart, The concept of law, Clarendon Law Series, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1972. 
38 G Marty, Droit civil, Les Obligations, 2e éd, Paris, Sirey, 1987, p. 63. 
39 In civil law terms - suspensive and resolutive condition, see: Marty, op. cit., note 38, supra, pp. 62-63. 
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the obligation and the condition - in their entirety. 
When it comes to the differences, the first differential element is that the condition is an 
accessory element of the legal obligation. The condition is an additional element, which 
affects the existence or continuation of legal obligation, determining its legal efficacy. In 
other words, the condition is an element built upon a legal obligation – accessory and 
additional to it. Secondly, with regards to the sanctions regime, in case of the obligation, the 
act of non-compliance with a legal obligation has as consequence the enactment of the 
sanction prescribed for by law or provided for in the agreement. In the case of condition, the 
sanction of realisation or non-realisation of the condition is the suspension or termination of 
the legal obligation itself. Therefore, the realisation or non-realisation of the condition has a 
direct impact on the efficacy of the obligation. The reciprocal is not valid. 
Going back to fundamental rights conditionality, we first note that in very simplistic 
terms the legally binding conditionality is, in fact, a legal condition attached to a legal 
obligation (agreement as source of obligations). Furthermore, if we apply the distinction 
above to the concept of legal conditionality, we find that the conditionality is an accessory 
requirement built upon the agreement between the conditionality actor and conditionality 
recipient prescribing for an active or passive behaviour. The non-fulfilment of a legally 
binding fundamental rights conditionality might impair the very efficacy of the agreement, 
leading to its suspension or termination.  
 
1.6. Further reflections on the nature of the agreement 
The nature of the agreement is as well an important point of reflection for our future analysis 
as it impacts directly on the effects of agreements (as sources of obligations) and as a 
consequence, on the effects of conditionalities contained therein.  
1.6.1. Hard law and soft law 
As seen above (Section 1.2.2.), from the normative point of view, political and economic 
conditionalities may be legally binding or non-binding according to the nature of the legal 
instrument they are included in. As a general rule, these shall follow the legal regime of the 
obligation they are attached to. If the obligation is binding (hard law), the sanction of non-
fulfilment of the conditionality will be the suspension or termination of the agreement. 
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However, if the obligation is non-binding (soft law) the non-fulfilment of conditionality will 
have in principle no legal effects. 
 In principle, ‘hard law’ refers to a legally binding instrument, which bounds the subject 
to a given conduct and has the authority to impose compliance. Per a contrario, when we 
refer to ‘soft law’ we traditionally understand ‘a variety of non-legally binding instruments’.40 
Soft law guides the conduct of the legal subject, without binding the subject to the conduct 
and without prohibiting an opposite conduct. With regards to compliance, soft-law 
mechanisms require by nature voluntary compliance. Therefore they rely largely on the 
goodwill of the addressee and lack formal legal enforcement mechanisms. 
i. Twilight areas between hard and soft law 
Despite the apparent clarity, in practice it is far more complicated to draw a strict line 
between soft law and hard law instruments. The two types of instruments are seldom mixed 
and intertwined, taking the form of hybrid norms of peculiar character. As scholars noted: ‘it 
is not always clear where the law [hard law] ends and the non-law [soft law] begins’.41  
In this sense, ‘soft law’ may often be seen as quasi-law. Even if not formally binding, 
soft law may create ‘certain quantum of legal normativity’. 42 It may also ultimately lead to 
legally binding obligations as the regulator might take the soft law instruments into account 
when enacting binding law.43 The opposite is also valid. ‘Hard law’ instruments are often 
constructed in a way that suggests the lack of intention to bind its subjects. These usually 
prescribe for general or broad obligations allowing for large discretion of the obliged party. 
The hard law instruments might also depend on further implementing procedures, which 
equally rely on the discretion of the obliged party. These obligations have been called ‘hard 
law with a soft character’.44 They are not soft law instruments, because they are formally 
legally binding, Nevertheless, they do not fully meet the ‘hard law’ requirements as their 
                                                
40 Boyle, Alan, Soft law in international law-making, in: International law, MD Evans (ed), 3rd ed, Oxford  ; 
New York, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 122. 
41 Ibidem, p. 142. 
42 SH Nasser, Sources and norms of international law: a study on soft law, Mobility and Norm Change, v. 7, 
Glienicke [Germany]  ; Madison, Wis, Galda + Wilch, 2008, pp. 126–127. 
43 Ibidem. 
44 P Wahlgren & Stockholms universitet, Soft law, Scandinavian Studies in Law, 58, Stockholm  : Stockholm, 
Stockholm Institute for Scandinavian Law, LawFaculty, Stockholm University  ; Jure Law Books, distr, 2013. 
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authority is partly neutralised by the large marge of manoeuvre of the obliged party.45 
Furthermore, it is important to stress that hard law and soft law instruments are often 
interlinked and tied by mutual references to each other. This means that in fact the non-
legally binding instrument may produce in practice legal consequences, not per se, but via the 
hard law instrument that conditions the efficacy of a legally binding agreement upon 
compliance with the soft law instrument. Here, we reiterate again the classic example of 
linking the soft law Copenhagen criteria to the hard law financial instrument for pre-
accession. The latter conditions the financial assistance, inter alia, on good performance 
towards achieving the criteria of the first (see Section 2 below). 
This distinction is important for our further discussions on ESI Funds’ ex ante 
fundamental rights conditionalities and we shall return to it when we shall analyse their 
nature and scope (Chapter III). The importance results from two main reasons. First, one of 
the specificities of the EU equality and non-discrimination law and policy is the intertwining 
nature between hard law and soft law mechanisms used cumulatively by a wide variety of 
public and private actors in pursuing the goal of equality and non-discrimination. Second, in 
the context of ESI Funds’ implementation both, hard law instruments in the form of ESI 
Regulations and soft law mechanisms in the form of guidance, communications, dialogues 
and recommendations are used extensively by/between the EU institutions (mainly the 
Commission) and the Member States. 
ii. Binding and enforceable law 
In the context of hard law, another pertinent distinction refers to binding and enforceable 
norms. A binding norm is not always synonym to an enforceable norm. If a norm is binding it 
does not follow automatically that it would always be enforceable. On the contrary, if the 
norm is enforceable it is always binding.46 
As such, in order for an obligation to become enforceable the relevant procedures and 
bodies must be put in place. A binding norm lacking enforcement mechanisms shall be also 
at the crossroads between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law. In other words, we are in the presence of a 
‘hard’ obligation with ‘soft’ enforcement instruments. The obligation prescribes for a legally 
                                                
45 For a comprehensive analysis see: F Terpan, ‘Soft Law in the European Union—The Changing Nature of EU 
Law’, in European Law Journal, , 2014. 
46 Marise Cremona, Structural Principles in EU External Relations Law, seminar 2014, European University 
Institute.  
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binding behaviour but does not put in place the enabling procedural framework to restore 
compliance in case of opposite behaviour. It follows that, even if the obligation is formally 
binding, from a procedural point of view, direct compliance cannot be imposed. Compliance 
might nevertheless be incentivized indirectly by use of the ‘soft law’ proxy mechanisms, as 
declarations, recommendations or condemnation in international fora, or by attaching a hard 
law tool to reinforce it. 
1.6.2. Imperium and dominium 
Besides hard law and soft law tools as methods to impose compliance with a prescribed 
conduct, Daintith identifies another important modern technique of government, namely the 
‘dominium’ method.47 The dominium technique supposes the deployment of public funds to 
attain a certain policy objective. The method differs from the traditional, purist legal 
conception, of ordering a conduct by linking it to a coercive act or sanction (imperium or 
hard law).  
In the case of dominium measures, the main concern of government is not to attach a 
sanction to the opposite conduct, but rather to set the right criteria governing the expenditure 
and tools to ensure that these are respected and ultimately lead to the attainment of the 
proposed policy goal.48 
Daintith’s distinction, is especially topical in the context of ESI Funds. The ESI Funds 
are designed according to the governance by ‘dominium’ technique. By deploying EU budget 
resources through ESI Funds, EU strives to first achieve the Cohesion policy goals as 
prescribed by the treaties, which translate in reducing economic, social, and territorial 
disparities between EU’s regions. In any case, achieving EU Cohesion policy goals by use of 
‘imperium’ measures would be particularly difficult, if not completely unfeasible. In 
designing the dominium action, ESI Funds prescribe for investment priorities and eligibility 
criteria. Moreover, they put in place mechanisms to ensure respect of the criteria as 
monitoring, reporting, audit and control (see Chapter II, Section 1 and 3).  
Even if distinct from hard law and soft law stricto sensu, dominium measures may be 
linked to the overall set of hard law and soft law tools in a policy area, serving as a 
                                                
47 Daintith, Terence The Techniques of Government in: The changing constitution, JL Jowell & D Oliver (eds), 
3rd. ed, Oxford  : New York, Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 209–236. We borrow the 
author’s ‘dominium’ and ‘imperium’ clasification.  
48 Ibidem, p. 218. 
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reinforcement bridge between the two. 49  
The dominium measures are increasingly topical beyond the internal governance 
borders. These are being used in international relations by states and international 
organisations to incentivize compliance and promote policy priorities. In the EU external 
policy there is an extending practice of deploying grants, financial instruments resources and 
non-refundable support to third countries in pursuing the goals of external policy such as the 
promotion of fundamental rights, democracy, rule of law, security and peace. The 
representative example of deploying EU budgetary resources to attain the goal of 
fundamental rights promotion is the external action Instrument for Democracy and Human 
Rights.50  
Summing up: 
In this section we approached the concept of conditionality as a policy tool and laid the 
theoretical foundations of the concepts linked to it. From the above discussions we can form 
a bone-structure of the fundamental rights conditionality. As such, we have seen that from the 
substantive point of view, fundamental rights conditionalities feed into the political type of 
conditionalities. These are used by conditionality actors as soft law or hard law tools to 
advance commitment to fundamental rights criteria on conditionality recipients by linking 
them to benefits of pecuniary or non-pecuniary nature. The legally binding fundamental 
rights conditionalities are accessory elements to the main hard law agreement, which might 
be imposed before (ex ante) or after the conclusion of the agreement (ex post) and may 
prescribe for negative consequences in case of non-compliance (negative conditionality) – 
termination or suspension of the agreement prescribing benefits – or positive incentives in 
case of good performance (positive conditionality). Fundamental rights conditionalities have 
generally the aim of ensuring the security and effectiveness of the granted benefits, 
encouraging compliance with a prescribed conduct as well as punishing the opposite conduct. 
In analysing fundamental rights conditionalities an important point of departure is the legal 
nature of the agreement, which might have a hard law, soft law or mixed character. 
Dominium tools of governance are increasingly important in encouraging compliance with 
fundamental rights conditionality and may be often used to support hard law and soft law 
                                                
49 For an analysis on the interplay between the hard law, soft law and dominium measures in the EU Social 
policy see: Kilpatrick, Claire, New EU Employment Governance and Constitutionalism, in: De Búrca and Scott, 
pp. 121–152. 
50 Regulation (EU) 235/2014, OJ L77 of 15.03.2014. 
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measures. 
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SECTION 2. EU FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS CONDITIONALITY IN CONTEXT: 
FROM EXTERNAL TO INTERNAL POLICY 
Having established the theoretical conceptual framework of conditionality, this section 
intends to illustrate the contextual evolution of EU fundamental rights conditionality in 
practice. In doing so we ask essentially: how did EU fundamental rights conditionalities 
develop? and: what have been their main features and evolution both in external and internal 
policy? The contextual analysis is of crucial importance for our further analysis of ex ante 
fundamental rights conditionalities as introduced in the 2013 ESI Funds’ reform (Chapter 
III). It is meant to provide a deep comparative understanding of EU ‘modus operandi’ in 
fundamental rights conditionality policy, its dynamic and challenges, underlining the 
similarities of mechanisms used and their adaptation from external to internal policy. The 
lessons learned shall be subsequently applied to assess the novelty, patterns and the overall 
potential of ex ante fundamental rights conditionalities. 
To this end, we shall first provide a snapshot of fundamental rights conditionalities as 
applied by EU externally to third countries and candidate states. Subsequently, we shall 
present the EU use of fundamental rights conditionality internally, to its Member States, first 
prior the EU accession via Copenhagen criteria, onwards via article 7 TEU and other 
emerging conditionality-type mechanisms. We shall analyse the Copenhagen ex ante criteria 
together with the conditionality as used internally, due to the general strong link to EU 
internal values, non-pecuniary nature of the benefits as well as due to the recent tendency of 
upholding a certain degree of Copenhagen conditionality ex post. 
 
2.1. EU External policy 
In EU external policy, the legal fundamental rights conditionality is used from the early 90s’ 
and has known ever since dynamic and rapid developments. 
Two main groups of EU fundamental rights conditionality externally can be identified 
based on the nature of the legal instruments used. As such, fundamental rights 
conditionalities are included in bilateral and unilateral agreements. The first group, refers to 
the long-established practice of inserting a fundamental rights conditionality pursuant to the 
essential clause doctrine in the context of bilateral or multilateral international agreements, 
especially in the area of trade and development cooperation – the so called ‘human rights 
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clause’. The clause enables any party to suspend the agreement in case of fundamental rights 
violations (Section 2.1.1.). The second group refers to fundamental rights conditionalities as 
inserted in the EU unilateral regulations, as it is the case of internal ESI Funds’ ex ante 
fundamental rights conditionalities. The group of external unilateral instruments includes the 
Generalised System of Preferences (the ‘GSP’) and the EU Financial Instruments for external 
action. The GSP fundamental rights conditionality scheme links the requirement of 
fundamental rights protection and advancement to unilateral trade preferences (Section 
2.1.2), whereas fundamental rights conditionality within the financial instruments for external 
action is attached to unilateral EU financial incentives (Section 2.1.3.). 
The essential difference between the categories described above concern the consent 
element and the form of the conditionality.  
In case of bilateral (or multilateral) international agreements, ‘human rights clauses’ 
are in principle commonly consented between the parties during negotiations.51 Traditionally, 
we identify two parts of the clause. First, the provision enshrines fundamental rights as the 
‘essential element’ of the agreement. Second a ‘non-execution’ provision is attached to the 
essential element, allowing the suspension of the agreement in case fundamental rights’ 
violations. The GSP fundamental rights conditionality, unilaterally prescribes a list of 
conditionalities, the eligible third countries having the option to accede (or not) to the 
proposed list by submitting an application to the Commission. In the context of external 
financial instruments, in 2007-2013 financial period fundamental right conditionalities were 
unilaterally included in the Regulation in the form of a complete ‘human right clause’ 
implicitly accepted by the third country together with the financial assistance. It must be 
stressed that, contrary to the 2007-2013 financial period, the 2014-2020 Financial 
Instruments for external action failed to maintain an express ‘non-execution’ provision. 
However the suspension may still be ordered unilaterally on the basis of the treaty. 
It is worth mentioning that all three fundamental rights conditionalities are attached to 
financial benefits. However, if in the case of bilateral agreements and the GSP scheme the 
link to financial benefits is rather indirect, in the case of Financial Instruments we find a 
strong direct link, these being designed as ‘dominium’ measures. As such, in the latter case, 
                                                
51 In practice, it has been argued that the third countries do not enjoy equal footing in negotiations with the EU, 
as such, the fundamental rights conditionality is more of a ‘a take it or leave it’ clause. See: Tomaševski, op.cit., 
note 10, supra, pp. 9-10. 
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non-compliance with conditionality has as immediate result the suspension of the committed 
assistance to the third country. 
The three conditionality areas above overlap greatly. The consequence is that the 
same third country may be subject to one or several conditionality schemes.52 In principle, 
fundamental rights conditionalities would be first applicable in the ambit of the general 
framework cooperation agreement between the EU and third country, onwards being 
reiterated in the content of sector agreements, unilateral GSP schemes or pursuant to financial 
instruments assistance programmes. 
2.1.1. Bilateral agreements  
In the context of EU international agreements, fundamental rights conditionality takes the 
form of a ‘human rights clause’.  
’The ‘human rights clause’ is an ex-post negative type conditionality. It mandates third 
countries to uphold fundamental rights after the conclusion of the agreement, sanctioning the 
lack of compliance with unilateral suspension of the agreement. These prescribe for a general 
and broadly framed negative requirement to abstain form fundamental rights violations (not 
to do) but, in principle, do not put in place monitoring mechanisms to supervise compliance.53 
The development emerged in response to the unrest and human rights atrocities of late 
70s’, in several African states54 party to 1975 Lomé I Convention, which completely lacked 
any possibility of suspension based on fundamental rights considerations.55 After more than a 
decade of negotiations, Lomé IV Convention of 1989 (replaced by Cotonou Agreement),56 
managed to insert an explicit and elaborate ‘human rights clause’,57 which allows the parties 
to suspend or terminate the treaty in the event of fundamental rights violations, pursuant to 
the ‘essential clause’ doctrine of Vienna Convention of 1969.58  
The inclusion of a human rights clause was a major step in the EU external 
                                                
52  L Bartels, The European Parliament’s Role in Relation to Human Rights in Trade and Investment 
Agreements, study at the request of European Parliament, February 2014, p. 8. 
53 Ibidem, p.10. 
54 Fierro, op.cit., note 2, supra, p. 52. The human rights violations mainly occured in states as: Uganda, 
Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Central African Republic.  
55 African Caribbean Pacific (APC)-EEC Convention of Lomé, Official Journal L 025 of 30.01.1976 
56 Cotonou Agreement of 23 June 2000 or "ACP-EC Partnership Agreement", subsequently revised in 2010. 
The human right clause stands at article 9.  
57 Fourth ACP-EEC Convention signed at Lomé on 15 December 1989 OJ L 229 of 17/08/1991, Article 5. 
58 Vienna Convention on the law of the treaties, article 60 (3) b) 
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fundamental rights policy: first, because of the amplitude of the Lomé IV Convention 
concluded with 70 African Caribbean Pacific (APC) states and second, because the moment 
marked the transition from the political to legally binding fundamental rights conditionality.59  
Shortly after, a comprehensive use of the conditionality was favoured by the Council in 
early 90’s60 and onwards formalised by the 1995 Commission Communication, which put the 
basis of the EU fundamental rights conditionality policy in relationship to third countries.61 
Since then, the Union has been including (almost) systematically the ‘human rights clause’ in 
all the framework agreements with third countries including development, cooperation, 
association, partnership and neighbourhood policy, as well as sector-specific agreements 
relating mainly to external trade.62  
From the very origins, thematically the ‘human rights clauses’ were primarily linked to 
trade or implying trade considerations. Recent, 2009 developments show a preference shift 
for maintaining the ‘human rights clauses’ solely in framework cooperation agreements with 
third countries, considered by the Council as better suited for political considerations.63 
However, the practice is still much incoherent. Whereas on the one hand the latest ‘pure’ 
trade agreements lacked a ‘human rights clause’, other recent sector-specific agreements on 
fisheries have an express reference to the ‘human rights clauses’ in other applicable 
agreements.64 It is further important to mention that pursuant to the new EU post-Lisbon 
competences in the area of foreign direct investment ‘human rights clauses’ are further 
expected to shape in the future agreements currently under negotiation.65 
Notwithstanding the impressive thematic reach, in practice the ‘human rights clause’ 
has been enforced only with regards to APC countries party to Cotonou agreement, in highly 
                                                
59 Fierro, op.cit., note 2, supra, p. 115. 
60 Resolution of the Council and of the Member States meeting in the Council on human rights, democracy and 
development, 28 November 1991, Bull. EC 11/1991. 
61 Communication from the Commission on the inclusion of respect for democratic principles and human rights 
in agreements between the Community and third countries, COM (95) 216 final, 23 May 1995, endorsed by the 
European Council on 29 May 1995. 
62 For a detailed historical perspective on the evolution of human rights conditionality in the EU see: L Bartels, 
op.cit., note 20, supra, and E Fierro op.cit., note 2, supra, 105 pp. 
63European Council, Discussion Document, ‘Common approach on the use of political clauses’ 10491/1/09 
REV 1 EXT 2 of 2 June 2009, Annex. See also, Bartels, op.cit., note 52, supra, p. 7. 
64 As it is the case of 2013 Protocols to the EU-Morocco and EU-Cote d’Ivoire Fisheries Partnership 
Agreements. See: Bartels, op. cit, note 52, supra, pp. 6–7. 
65 Bartels, op. cit, note 52, supra, p. 7. See further: M Jacob, ‘International Investment Agreements and Human 
Rights’, INEF Research Paper Series Human Rights, Corporate Responsibility And Sustainable Development 
03/2010. 
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extreme cases.66 From this point of view, Bartels argues that the clause even if legally binding 
has been used rather as a political than a legal instrument, as suggested also by the last 2009 
Council reflection document on ‘political clauses in agreements with third countries’.67 
Moreover, The EU practical use of ‘human rights clause’ has often been criticised by scholars 
for lack of consistency and ‘double standards’,68 absence of legal standards of enforcement 
procedure69 and more generally inefficiency.70 
2.1.2. Unilateral Generalised System of Preferences 
EU employs the GSP preferential trade scheme towards third countries since 1971.71 The 
practice is one of the most telling examples of EU’s use of trade to advance fundamental 
rights conditionality on third countries. The conditionality scheme is established through an 
autonomous, unilateral EU Regulation. It provides for one standard (‘GSP’) and two special 
arrangements (GSP+ and Everything but Arms ‘EBA’) on preferential customs tariff duties 
for certain products originating from developing countries. 
In terms of reach, the present GSP scheme, applicable as of 1 January 2014, is a highly 
sophisticated conditionality system.72  
Similar to the ‘human rights clause’ system above, all three GSP arrangements are 
subject to a negative ex post conditionality, allowing for temporary withdrawal of preferences 
in case of ‘serious and systematic violation’ of the fifteen core human and labour rights 
conventions listed in the Regulation.73 
                                                
66 The conditionality was enforced in twenty three cases. Bartels, op. cit, note 52, supra, p. 12. 
67 Ibidem. 
68 Tomasevski, for instance, argues that the EU applies the sanctions arbitrary and inconsistently. For instance 
the sanctions imposed on China lasted a considerable less amount of time than the ones applied to Haiti with no 
particular reasonable justification. See further: K Tomaševski, Development aid and human rights revisted, 
London  ; New York  : New York, Pinter Publishers  ; Distributed in the United States and Canada by St. Martin’s 
Press, 1993, p. 71. 
69 Fierro op. cit, note 2, supra, p. 115. 
70 Smith op. cit, note 5, supra. 
71 GATT Waiver Decision on Generalized System of Preferences of 25 June 1971, BISD 18S/24. The scheme is 
based on the ‘enabling clause’ of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (the ‘GATT 1994’) concluded 
between the parties of World Trade Organization (the ‘WTO’), GATT 1994, Part IV, Article XXXVI. The 
‘enabling clause’ is an exception from the most-favoured-nation (the ‘MFN’) obligation and allows for 
deferential and more favorable treatment of developing countries (GATT Article I:1). 
72 Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 applying a 
scheme of generalised tariff preferences and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008, OJ L 303/1 of 
31.10.2012. 
73 Regulation (EU) No 978/2012, Article 19 and Annex VIII, part A. 
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Additionally, the GSP scheme puts in place an ex ante positive conditionality named 
‘GSP+’ special arrangement. The conditionality is both positive and ex ante, as it entitles the 
eligible GSP+ beneficiaries to further tariff preferences once they have ratified and 
effectively implemented all twenty-seven conventions in the area of fundamental rights listed 
in the GSP Regulation (jointly, the ‘Relevant Conventions’). 74  The ratification and 
implementation is checked against the reports of the monitoring bodies of the relevant 
conventions. Once the European Commission appreciates that the compliance criteria is 
fulfilled, it grants the third country access to the ‘GSP+’ arrangement.  
Prior to 2005, the GSP conditionality was referred to as ‘the social clause’75 because it 
mainly required the ratification and enforcement of the core ILO conventions as well as the 
obligation not to observe social rights thereof.76 Since 2005 we speak about a comprehensive 
fundamental rights conditionality, reaching far beyond the scope of social rights. 
Compared to the ‘human rights’ clause, the GSP scheme is a more complex and 
dynamic arrangement. Indeed, similar to the ‘human rights clause’ it binds the fundamental 
rights conditionality to trade benefits and sanctions the violations of fundamental rights by 
negative ex post sanctions. However it goes further, and offers positive trade incentives for 
ex ante higher compliance. In contrast with the general ‘human rights clause’, the scheme is 
unilaterally established by the EU and does not imply any negotiations. Moreover, the GSP 
scheme contains a specific and clear list of conventions the third party has to observe, 
whereas the compliance is monitored by the Commission, which drafts a report on the status 
of ratification, compliance and effective implementation of the Relevant Conventions, in the 
attention of the Council and the European Parliament.77 
It must be stressed that under the generic GSP Regulation, autonomous unilateral trade-
preferences based on the GSP+ scheme can be put in place, as for instance the stand alone 
Regulations concerning certain European Neighbourhood Policy (the ‘ENP’) partners. These 
                                                
74 The conventions cover the core United Nations (the ‘UN’) and International Labour Organisation (the ‘ILO’) 
conventions, as well as other international conventions in the area of environmental protection and good 
governance principles, see: REGULATION (EU) No 978/2012, Annex VIII, part A and B. 
75 Fierro op. cit, note 2, supra, p. 352. 
76 See Council Regulation (EC) No 3281/94 of 19 December 1994 applying a four-year scheme of generalized 
tariff preferences (1995 to 1998), Article 7; Council Regulation (EC) No 1256/96 of 20 June 1996, Article 7; 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2501/2001 of 10 December 2001 applying a scheme of generalised tariff 
preferences, Article 14. These refer to ILO Conventions No 29 and No 105 on forced labour, No 87 and No 98 
on the freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining, No 100 and No 111 on non-discrimination 
in respect of employment and occupation, and No 138 and No 182 on child labour.  
77 Regulation (EU) No 978/2012, Article 15. 
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establish the same GSP+ scheme ex ante positive conditionality and a general GSP ex post 
negative conditionality. Additionally, these insert another ex post negative conditionality, 
allowing EU to suspend unilaterally the GSP trade preferences in case of poor performance in 
implementing the ENP Action Plan.78 This is a telling example of linking soft law tools, as 
ENP action plans, to hard law instruments and conditioning the latter on the fulfilment of the 
first.79  
Finally, as to the practical effectiveness of the GSP scheme, the conclusions of the mid-
term evaluation report as well as the Special Report of the Court of Auditors appreciate that 
the GSP scheme has not attained it’s full potential.80 In the particular case of GSP+ scheme, 
while positive impact in terms of ratification of the Relevant Conventions has been observed, 
the implementation of the convention was found weak.81 Nevertheless, GSP+ has proved to 
be an energetic and credible tool, which was actually used by EU, even in case of failure to 
ratify one out of the twenty-seven prescribed conventions.82  
2.1.3. Unilateral EU financial instruments for external action 
The closest comparator to 2014 ESI Funds externally are the six 2014 EU financial 
instruments for external action (jointly the ‘Financial Instruments’) governed for the first 
time by an umbrella Common Rules Regulation.83 The Financial Instruments set the rules for 
EU financial assistance operations in the EU external action in the framework of: 
enlargement policy (Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance - the ‘IPA II’); neighbourhood 
policy (European Neighbourhood Instrument - the ‘ENI’); development and cooperation 
policy (Development Cooperation Instrument - the ‘DCI’); cooperation with highly 
industrialised partners (Partnership Instrument for cooperation with third countries - the ‘PI’); 
democracy and human rights (European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights - the 
                                                
78 Council Regulation (EC) No 55/2008 of 21 January 2008 introducing autonomous trade preferences for the 
Republic of Moldova, Article 2(1) and 10. 
79 The GSP+ scheme for Georgia seems as well to be increasingly linked to the ENP action plan, see: Mid-term 
Evaluation of the EU’s Generalised System of Preferences, CARIS, University of Sussex, p.163.  
80 The European Court of Auditors has found in its 2014 Report that the GSP policy has largely failed to attain 
its intended benefits. See further: Special Report 2/2014, Are preferential trade arrangements appropriately 
managed? 
81 Mid-term Evaluation of the EU’s Generalised System of Preferences, op. cit, note 79, supra, point 
7.1.:”While there is some evidence that the GSP+ scheme may have a positive impact on the ratification of 
given conventions, the evidence that there is actual active implementation of the relevant conventions is much 
weaker”.  
82 As the 2009 case of Venesuela shows. See: Ibidem, p.156-158.  
83 Regulation (EU) No 236/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 laying down 
common rules and procedures for the implementation of the Union's instruments for financing external action.  
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‘EIDHR’); stability and peace (Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace - the ‘ISP’).84 
Similar to ESI Funds, these are designed as dominium measures, by which EU deploys 
budget resources to pursue the objectives of external policy, enshrined in each fund-specific 
regulation.  
All the financial instruments (except ISP) put in place an ex post negative 
fundamental rights conditionality, entitling the EU to suspend unilaterally the assistance in 
case of non-compliance with fundamental rights principles. Beyond the negative ex post 
conditionality, each Financial Instrument adopts a highly distinct approach.  
The ISP lacks a fundamental rights conditionality, as it is designed to provide 
assistance in case of high political instability and crisis situations. Therefore its objectives are 
often incompatible with fundamental rights conditionalities. Such a conditionality could not 
be reasonable complied with and would constitute a condition impossible to fulfil. Under the 
ISP, assistance shall be granted to the third country even if EU has invoked the essential-
elements clause. Nevertheless the instrument mandates for active inclusion of and respect for 
fundamental rights standards in implementation process, which shall be closely monitored by 
the Commission. 
The PI, supports the partnership with high and medium income countries and contains 
usually an incomplete conditionality clause, which states the commitment to fundamental 
rights but lacks a ‘non-execution’ provision. This reflects the sensibilities of highly 
industrialised countries towards EU fundamental rights conditionality, as well as the EU’s 
increased interest in maintaining healthy economic and/or diplomatic ties with the first.85  
In 2014-2020 period, as opposed to the previous financial period, the IPA II ENI and 
DCI, also feature an incomplete conditionality. Namely, these lack an express ‘non-
                                                
84 Regulation (EU) No 230/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing 
an instrument contributing to stability and peace; Regulation (EU) No 231/2014 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing an Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II); Regulation 
(EU) No 232/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a European 
Neighbourhood Instrument; Regulation (EU) No 233/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
March 2014 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation for the period 2014-2020; 
Regulation (EU) No 234/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a 
Partnership Instrument for cooperation with third countries; Regulation (EU) No 235/2014 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a financing instrument for democracy and human 
rights worldwide; OJ 77 of 15.03.2014. 
85 As the prior attempts to include a ‘human rights clause’ in agreements with highly industrialised third 
countries as Australia and New Zealand failed. In case of China there is apparently a mutual unwillingness to 
address the fundametal rights conditionality issue, see further: Fierro, op. cit, note 2, supra,  p. 191 and p. 287. 
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execution’ provision allowing suspension, as the European Parliament and the Council failed 
to reach an agreement on the suspension procedure.86 As such, the conditionality is limited to 
the essential elements clause, which mentions fundamental rights as principles of the 
assistance. Nevertheless, suspension can still be unilaterally enforced if the third country fails 
to observe the fundamental rights principles, based on the treaty.  
One novelty of the financial period is a more robust and flexible positive and negative 
ex post conditionality for IPA II and ENI based on candidates’ or partners’ performance. The 
Regulations refer to it as – ‘principle of differentiation’. As such, similar to ESI Funds, the 
IPA II puts in place a positive conditionality in the form of performance reserve.87 The 
reserve rewards the good progress of (potential-)candidate countries towards meeting the 
accession Copenhagen criteria – positive performance-based conditionality. If the 
performance is ‘significantly below the agreed levels’ the Commission may enforce the 
negative performance-based conditionality and adjust proportionately the assistance. 88 
Similarly, the ENI puts in place a reserve amounting to 10% of the ENI financial envelope, to 
be awarded, inter alia, based on the partner’s ‘level of ambition’.89 The ENI performance-
based conditionality prescribes for higher financial benefits if the ENP partner showed in the 
previous period higher progress towards the mutually agreed reforms according to the ENP 
action plans. The amount of assistance can be further increased or decreased ex post, 
proportionately to the performance.90 In the worst-case scenario of ‘serious or persistent 
regression’, support may be completely reconsidered.91  
As mentioned above, the distinctive feature of the fundamental rights conditionality 
as provided by the Financial Instruments is a clear, better-emphasised and immediate link to 
pecuniary benefits. Each instrument has a financial envelope attached. It follows that the non-
                                                
86 The European Parliament insisted that as co-legislator, post-Lisbon it should be involved on equal footing in 
the suspension decision. The Council, on the other hand, argued in favour of the treaty procedure (Article 215 
TFEU), which allows the Council alone to take appropriate measures acting with qualified majority upon a joint 
proposal of the Commission and High Representative. See the Statement by the European Parliament on the 
suspension of assistance granted under the financial instruments Regulation (EU) No 231/2014, Regulation 
(EU) No 232/2014, Regulation (EU) No 233/2014, Regulation (EU) No 234/2014. 
87 Regulation (EU) No 231/2014, Article 14. 
88 Regulation (EU) No 231/2014, Article 14 (2). 
89 Regulation (EU) No 232/2014, Article 4. 
90 Regulation (EU) No 232/2014, Article 4 (1)-(2). 
91 Regulation (EU) No 232/2014, Article 4 (2). 
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fulfilment of the conditionality necessarily impacts on the continuation of EU Funds’ award.92 
In the particular case of IPA II and ENI, the level of compliance reflects directly on the 
intensity of pecuniary benefits.  
The variations described above do not come without reason. First, it can be easily 
observed that the closer the partnership with third countries or closer the candidate to the 
accession, the more conditionality becomes positive and dynamic, pursuing a behavioural and 
effectiveness function. In the case of far-away partners, the conditionality is mainly negative 
and static, exercising a punitive function in case of non-compliance with fundamental rights. 
Second, as the political ties with the third country get stronger the fundamental rights 
conditionalities tend to be increasingly complemented by fundamental rights specific action 
and fundamental rights mainstreaming, which are explicitly stated in principles, scope and 
objectives of financial assistance – reminding to a large extent internal ESI Funds’ 
architecture. Equally it is only in case of privileged countries (candidates or ENP partners), 
where the hard law conditionality of the Financial Instruments is strongly linked to soft law 
conditionality as Copenhagen criteria or ENP action plans. 
 
2.2. EU Internal policy 
In contrast with external fundamental rights conditionality, the internal conditionality 
traditionally is not linked to pecuniary benefits. Internally, first the benefits are seen in non-
pecuniary terms of acceding to the EU - a space of security, liberty and prosperity. Onwards, 
conditionality pursues a behavioural function of upholding the achieved status quo and 
securing the EU constitutional values.  
2.2.1. Copenhagen ex ante conditionality 
Internally, starting with early 90s’, the fundamental rights performance of the Member States 
is secured first and foremost by fulfilment prior to EU accession of the ‘Copenhagen 
criteria’.93 The Copenhagen ex-ante conditionality states that:  
“[m]embership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of 
                                                
92 Fierro, op. cit, note 2, supra, p. 351. We borrow the ‘dynamic’ and ‘static’ distinction from Fierro, op. cit, 
note 2, supra. Also see for instance on the suspension of all bilateral programmes founded from ENI with 
Syrian authorities as of 25 May 2011, Council conclusions on Syria, 3091st Foreign Affairs Council meeting 
Brussels, 23 May 2011. 
93 European Council, ‘Conclusion of the Presidency’, 21-22 June 1993, para. 7. 
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institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect 
for and protection of minorities”.94  
The applicant countries therefore have to prove ex ante the accession a high level of 
commitment to fundamental rights - as cornerstone principles of the EU constitutional 
architecture.  
The benefit – ‘golden carrot’ – is ultimately the accession to the EU, with all the rights 
and privileges deriving thereof. The fulfilment of Copenhagen criteria conditionality relies 
largely on soft law instruments and does not link any direct pecuniary benefits. Nevertheless, 
the progress towards Copenhagen milestones opens the third countries’ vocation to direct or 
indirect financial and trade benefits provided for in hard law instruments, which additionally 
condition and encourage compliance. As such, the performing candidate may benefit from 
preferential trade agreements, free access to the internal market or increased share of EU pre-
accession funds’ assistance. 
The Copenhagen conditionality refers both to the respect and promotion of human 
rights, including the rights of minorities. It materialises in dynamic and progressive 
conditionality benchmarks towards meeting EU values, monitored and reported by the 
Commission. However, Copenhagen criteria have been judged as falling short in ensuring a 
sound assessment of the candidate state’s performance.95 Moreover, it has been argued that 
the accession criteria is based on rather economic and political grounds and lacks clear legal 
and judicial criteria to assess compliance with fundamental rights standards.96 
2.2.2. Article 7 ex post conditionality 
The commitment to fundamental rights must be upheld also after accession. Following the 
enforcement of Amsterdam Treaty, the Article 7 ex-post negative fundamental rights 
conditionality mechanism was introduced.97 Article 7 TEU legally binds the Member States 
                                                
94 Article 49 TEU.  
95 For a discussion on the paractical application of the Copenhagen ex ante conditionality during the last 
enlargements see: D Kochenov, EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality: Pre-accession 
Conditionality in the Fields of Democracy and the Rule of Law, Kluwer Law International, 2008, , pp. 297–313, 
The author argues that the conditionality was used inconsistently by the Commission, lacking clear performance 
benchmarks and often leading to contraditory conclusions with respect to different candidates. 
96 Nowak, Manfred, ‘Human Rights Conditionality in Relation to Entry and Full Perticipation in the EU’ 
Alston, The EU and human rights, Oxford, England  ; New York, Oxford University Press, 1999, 698 p. 
97Article 7 TEU. 
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to observe the EU values committed to by joining the Union.98 In case of a ‘risk’ or actual 
‘serious and persistent breach’ of EU values, the Member State might have certain rights 
derived from the Treaties suspended, including voting rights in the Council. Given the vague 
formulation: “suspend certain of the rights”, it has been appreciated that the suspension might 
have a far-reaching potential, encompassing, for instance, the suspension of ESI Funds or 
other financial instruments.99  
However, the effectiveness of Article 7 conditionality as an operational tool in securing 
fundamental rights as enshrined and protected at the EU level is questionable. The 
enforcement of conditionality is shielded by multi-layered preliminary and alternative 
procedures. First, the Council may issue a recommendation addressing the Member State 
presumed in breach of EU values. Second, the Council may establish a ‘clear risk’ of 
violation acting by four-fifths quorum, after obtaining the consent of the Parliament, on the 
proposal of one third of Member States, the Commission or the Parliament. Third, the 
Council may decide on the actual ‘existence of a serious and persistent breach’ by unanimity 
on the proposal of one third of Member States or the Commission after obtaining the consent 
of the Parliament. Finally only in case of a decision finding the ‘existence of a serious 
breach’ the Council acting by a qualified majority may impose sanctions. 
Having seen the procedure above, it is not surprising that the tool has never been used 
in practice. The guarantees provided by article 7 TEU set a high threshold, making it 
particularly hard to enforce in practice. The political nature and the need for high voting 
quorum are strongly deterrent factors, suggesting that the tool is rather conceived as an ultima 
ratio solution. The limited practical role of Article 7 conditionality has favoured in practice 
the use of alternative ‘soft’ tools, as dialogues or political statements.100 In 2014, the 
Commission’s Communication on ‘A new EU framework to strengthen the Rule of Law’ 
provided another explicit confirmation of the limited practical impact of Article 7 procedure 
and the need for a complementary ‘early warning’ procedure to address the threats of 
                                                
98 Nowak, op.cit., note 96, supra. 
99 Ibidem, p. 690. 
100 See for instance: The ‘Statement from the President of the European Commission and the Secretary General 
of the Council of Europe on the vote by the Hungarian Parliament of the Fourth amendment to the Hungarian 
Fundamental Law’, Brussels, 11 March 2013; ‘Statement by the European Commission on Romania’ Brussels, 
6 July 2012. 
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‘systemic nature’ before an actual ‘clear risk’ or ‘breach’ has occurred.101  
2.2.3. Emerging internal conditionality-type instruments 
More broadly, recently we notice a general shift to a conditionality culture in the framework 
of EU internal policy. One should especially mention the conditionality mechanisms emerged 
in the context of the last 2007 and 2013 enlargements, as well as the extensive crisis-driven 
conditionalities, attached to the economic adjustment packages. 
First, in 2007 a monitoring instrument – Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (the 
‘CVM’) – was put in place for Bulgaria and Romania, with the aim to monitor the Member 
States’ post-accession performance in areas as: judicial system independence and reform, 
fight against corruption and administrative reforms. The mechanism acts as an ex post 
Copenhagen conditionality, accessory to the accession agreement and mandates the Member 
States to fulfil a set of unilaterally prescribed criteria. Similar to the pre-accession criteria, the 
CVM conditionality materialises in soft law instruments, monitored by Commission. 
However, the conditionality does neither envisage benefits for compliance nor does it 
sanction the failure to comply with the unilaterally established criteria, thus lacking a 
coercive enforcement element. In this sense it is interesting to note that, the ESI Funds ‘hard 
law’ instruments are increasingly used as leverage to reinforce the CVM ‘soft law’ targets. 
For 2014-2020 programming period, both Bulgaria and Romania in dialogue with 
Commission have identified the improvement of administrative and judiciary capacity as 
main ESI Funds’ investment priorities, whereas ESI Funds’ resources shall also aim at 
implementing the CVM recommendations.102 
In case of Croatia, the accession treaty includes a legally binding and mutually agreed 
fundamental rights conditionality by which, the Member State has committed ‘[t]o continue 
to strengthen the protection of minorities’ and to ‘to improve the protection of human 
                                                
101 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 
“A new EU framework to strengthen the Rule of Law”, COM(2014) 158 final/2, pp.5-7. 
102Position of the Commission Services on the development of Partnership Agreement and programmes in 
Romania for the period 2014-2020, 19.10.2012, p.13. Position of the Commission Services on the development 
of Partnership Agreement and programmes in Bulgaria for the period 2014-2020, 26.10.2012, p.13, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/what/future/program/index_en.cfm, consulted on 01.02.2014. European 
Commission, country factsheet, Cohesion Policy and Future Investment, Romania. European Commission, 
country factsheet, Cohesion Policy and Future Investment, Bulgaria, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/information/cohesion-policy-achievement-and-future-investment/index.cfm, 
consulted on 01.06.2014. 
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rights’.103 The conditionality is applicable since the signature of the treaty in 2011, however 
as the text does not distinguish any time frame, it is reasonable to presume that the 
conditionality shall apply also after accession - ex post. 
Secondly, recently, conditionality has been abundantly present in the area of crisis-
driven measures, such as the economic adjustment programmes addressing Member States.104 
These concerned mainly economic, but also political, conditionality attached to the 
Memoranda of Understanding (the ‘MoU’), requiring ex ante and ex post fulfilment of pre-
defined criteria, which condition the disbursement of the bailout funds. The MoU 
conditionality is negative as it sanctions the failure of compliance with the suspension of 
financial assistance. Often the criteria include provisions on administrative and judicial 
capacity, where underperformance is seen as a major obstacle for the well functioning of the 
markets.105 
Finally, it seems that the increased conditionality use and the concern for the 
appropriate administrative and institutional capacities raised during the economic adjustment 
reforms had a spill over effect on the 2014-2020 ESI Funds framework. In this sense, the 
Fifth Report on Cohesion Policy states that based on the past experiences the sound 
regulatory framework, institutional and administrative capacities are crucial for any 
successful financial intervention, the newly introduced ex ante conditionalities being key to 
address the challenges identified in the area.106 In the same line, the ESI Funds ex ante 
conditionalities in the area of gender equality, non-discrimination and disability which are the 
subject of our further analysis mandate the Member States to show sound administrative 
capacity to effectively implement and apply the EU law and policy in the respective areas, 
before the conclusion of the agreement on ESI Funds. The conditionality is negative as it 
conditions the disbursement ESI Funds resources, sanctioning the lack of compliance.107 
                                                
103 Croatia Treaty of Accession, Act concerning the conditions of accession of Croatia Article 36 – Specific 
commitments undertaken by Croatia during negotiations, Annex VII, point 7-8. 
104 von Bogdandy, A & Ioannidis ‘Systemic Deficiency in the Rule of Law’, CMLR, 59–96, p. 88.  
105  See for instance the Economic Adjustment Programme for Portugal 28.06.2011, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2011/pdf/ocp79_en.pdf, consulted on 
01.06.2014. 
106  Fifth Report on Economic, Social and Territorial Cohesion, Conclusions, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/official/reports/cohesion5/pdf/5cr_en.pdf 
107 Regulation (EU) 1303/2014, Article 19, Annex XI, OJ L347 of 20.12.2013.  
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INTERIM CONCLUSIONS 
This Chapter laid down the conceptual and contextual basis of the fundamental rights 
conditionality.  
To this aim, the first part has established that a fundamental rights conditionality may 
be defined as a political requirement, with a legally binding or non-binding nature, accessory 
to the agreement, pre-established by the conditionality actor or mutually agreed between the 
conditionality actor and the conditionality recipient, which must be fulfilled before or after 
the conclusion of an agreement, capable of attracting further incentives in case of compliance 
or negative consequences in case of non-compliance.  
The second part inquired on the EU practical use of fundamental rights conditionalities 
from external to internal policies.  
First, the findings show that, externally, conditionality is largely linked to pecuniary 
benefits. As such, EU is ‘buying compliance’, with fundamental rights via trade incentives, 
development aid and ‘dominium’ financial assistance. Internally, conditionality has been in 
principle oriented towards embracing and upholding the Union’s values, by advancing 
reforms based on voluntary compliance. However, the use of pecuniary benefits should not 
be completely dismissed in the internal policy. As seen above, the late developments revel a 
tendency to impose some financial pressure on the Member States to advance compliance 
with EU law or policy priorities.  
Second, in the EU external policy the conditionality inserted in the body of bilateral 
agreements has generally a static and uniform nature, often symbolic. It imposes a negative 
ex post requirement, subject to punitive measures in case of non-compliance. On the 
contrary, the unilateral instruments include a more dynamic, progressive conditionality, 
which frequently implies incentives in case of good performance and mandates for positive 
action.  
Third, EU largely uses a highly differentiated conditionality approach towards third 
countries. The closer the external ties, the higher the incentives offered but, equally, 
fundamental rights conditionality criteria become more demanding. As the conditionality 
approaches EU boarders, more positive specific action, tailored on the example of ESI Funds 
is observed, complementing the traditional negative conditionality.  
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Fourth, both in external policy (notably with regards to candidates and privileged 
partners) and in internal policy there is a general EU effort to link, in as much as possible, 
hard law conditionality to soft law conditionality or measures. 
Finally, it should be stressed that if externally linking fundamental rights considerations 
to pecuniary benefits has been the main mechanism to impose compliance, internally the EU 
has a broader toolkit to advance promotion of fundamental rights, ranking from binding 
legislation to a variety of soft law instruments. Moreover, if externally third countries are 
often sensitive to fundamental rights considerations, Member States should be in principle 
more determined to comply, given the mutual trust and common values, strong economic 
interests, constitutional ties and other incentivizing (or deterrent) factors. However, neither in 
external nor in internal policy does the EU enjoy a complete discretion. The EU still relies 
strongly on the good will of the third countries and its own Member States to promote 
fundamental rights at the national level.
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CHAPTER II. ESI FUNDS AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS CONDITIONALITY 
The first claim of the present thesis is that the introduced ESI fundamental rights 
conditionalities, in the form and substance they stand today have never been present before in 
the ESI Funds landscape. The purpose of this chapter is therefore to test the novelty of the ex 
ante conditionalities in the area of gender equality, non-discrimination and disability by 
taking a comparative historical legislative perspective. The analysis of the precedent ESI 
Funds’ regulatory frameworks could better inform the claim of novelty and highlight the ESI 
fundamental rights conditionalities’ distinctive characteristics and possible added-value in the 
2014-2020 reformed architecture of ESI Funds (Chapter III).  
The retrospective analysis of the ESI Funds’ legislative framework shows that until 
2014-2020 programming period, the ex ante fundamental rights conditionalities with regards 
to gender equality, non-discrimination and disability were not present in the Cohesion Policy 
framework. 
However, if we dissociate the two notions: ‘fundamental rights’ considerations from 
‘conditionalities’, the ESI Funds offer an interesting perspective. 
Both concepts, separately, are very much present throughout the ESI Funds normative 
frames. On the one hand, non-discrimination, accessibility of persons with disabilities and, 
notably, gender equality were promoted through ESI Funds’ specific actions and 
mainstreamed in ESI Funds’ operations. On the other hand, conditionalities have been 
employed as both ex ante and ex post functional tools, linked mainly to the sound 
implementation of the Funds. 
The evolution of fundamental rights and conditionalities, as well as the newly 
introduced ex ante fundamental rights conditionalities, must be read alongside the legislative 
and political transformations towards a ‘wider and deeper’ Union. This is especially 
important in the context of Cohesion policy, which is extremely permeable towards other EU 
policies and highly interlinked with the EU and national developments. 
The 1988 reform shall be referred to as the starting point of reference for our analysis, 
as it constituted the ‘new era’ of the EU Cohesion policy and ESI Funds. The reform – 
known as Delors I package – was driven by the firm treaty basis of the Single European Act 
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and the return to European integration idea.108 It shaped to a large extent the architecture of 
today’s policy, introducing its core principles: programming, partnership, additionality, 
concentration;109 increasing substantially its financial allocation,110 enhancing the financial 
assistance to multi-annual programming periods and bringing for the first time the funds 
under a single common provisions regulation.111  
The following reforms built upon the achievements of the 1988 historical turn. As such, 
the 1993 reform – Delors II package – was driven by the important changes of Maastricht 
Treaty and the completion of the single market. It almost doubled the budgetary allocation of 
the policy,112 established a new European Cohesion Fund113 and introduced the Financial 
Instrument of Fisheries Guidance.114 Further on, the 1999 reform responded to the envisaged 
enlargement and to the new objective of achieving the European Monetary Union (the 
‘EMU’).115 The 2006 reform marked the second important turn of the policy after 1988 
reform, bringing more concentration within ESI Funds priorities and consistency with 
relevant EU priorities, notably with Lisbon Strategy.116 Finally, the last 2013 reform aims to 
respond to the greatest recession EU has experienced over the last fifty years. It sets the ‘jobs 
and growth’ goal as the period’s top priority, further targets the policy action towards Europe 
2020 strategy and incorporates the territorial cohesion as introduced by the treaty of Lisbon. 
In the following sections we shall first provide a general overview of ESI Funds 
implementation procedure and the actors involved (Section 1). Onwards, we shall separately 
analyse the evolution of both concepts: fundamental rights promotion (Section 2) and 
conditionality (Section 3) in the four previous programming periods of ESI Funds, starting 
with the 1988 major reform. 
                                                
108 J Bachtler, EU cohesion policy and European integration: the dynamics of EU budget and regional policy 
reform, Farnham, Surrey, England  ; Burlington, VT, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2013, pp. 45–49. 
109 See on the principles: M Jouen, La politique européenne de cohésion, Réflexe Europe, Paris, Documentation 
française, 2011, pp.19-21. 
110 MA Pollack & E Hafner-Burton, ‘Mainstreaming gender in the European Union’, in Journal of European 
Public Policy, 2000, 432–456, p. 440. 
111 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 of 24 June 1988 on the tasks of the Structural Funds and their 
effectiveness and on coordination of their activities between themselves and with the operations of the European 
Investment Bank and the other existing financial instruments, OJ L 185 of 15.07.1988. 
112 Bachtler, op.cit., note 108, supra, pp. 49–54. 
113 Council Regulation (EC) No 1164/94 of 16 May 1994 establishing a Cohesion Fund, OJ L 130 of 
25.05.1994. 
114 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2080/93 of 20 July 1993 laying down provisions for implementing Regulation 
(EEC) No 2052/88 as regards the financial instrument of fisheries guidance, OJ L 193 of 31.07.1993 
115 Bachtler, op.cit., note 108, supra, pp. 54–58. 
116 C Mendez, GP Manzella, The Turning Points of EU Cohesion Policy, Working-Paper, 2009, p.19. 
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SECTION 1: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ESI FUNDS: STATE OF PLAY 
ESI Funds are the primary EU instruments to support economic social and territorial cohesion 
as provided by the treaties.117 The 2014-2020 ESI Funds’ framework comprises five ESI 
Funds: the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and European Social Fund (ESF) 
- commonly referred to as ‘EU Structural Funds’- the European Cohesion Fund, the European 
Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and European Maritime Fisheries Fund 
(EMFF).  
Since 1988, the ESI Funds’ operation is regulated by a Common Provision’s 
Regulation (the ‘CPR’), which sets the general rules and principles applicable to all funds. 
Equally, each Fund’s operation is regulated by a fund specific regulation, which adds to the 
general applicable rules. The budgetary allocations of the ESI Funds amount currently to 
34% of overall 2014-2020 EU budget commitments, holding the largest budget portfolio of 
the Multiannual Financial Framework.118 ESI Funds resources are distributed to Member 
States and their regions according to the pre-established eligibility criteria based on GDP per 
capita (ESF, ERDF) or GNI per capita (Cohesion Fund), surface, population, unemployment 
rate, et al. 
The ESI Funds have been constantly sensitive to fundamental rights concerns. Within 
the limits of EU competence, ESI Funds have actively integrated the EU fundamental rights 
agenda in the areas of social rights, gender equality, environment, public health, social 
inclusion of persons with disabilities, elderly, youth, migrants, asylum seekers and other 
vulnerable groups. The equal opportunities policy goal119 has been particularly visible in ESI 
Funds’ interventions. The goal has a triple dimension (Figure II.1. below). First, equal 
opportunities are implemented though specific actions, following the ESI Funds’ 
implementation cycle (Section 2.1.). Equally, Member States must mainstream and promote 
equal opportunities throughout all the stages of ESI Funds implementation (Section 2.2.). In 
addition, both, the Commission and the Member States are bound to ensure compliance with 
                                                
117 Titlte XI and XVIII TFEU. 
118 The total commitment appropriations for 2014-2020 constitute 325 145 694 739 euro. See Council 
Regulation (EU, EURATOM) No 1311/2013 of 2 December 2013 laying down the multiannual financial 
framework for the years 2014-2020, OJ 347 of 20.12.2013, Annex I. 
119 Equal opportunities shall be referred to as comprising both: a positive, active (equality specific action and 
mainstreaming) and a negative, passive angle (equal treatment). 
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the EU law on equal treatment and non-discrimination of all ESI Funds’ related actions 
pursuant to the imperatives of applicable primary and secondary law. 120 
 
Figure II.1.: Three dimensions of equal opportunities goal in ESI Funds 
 
In the framework of ESI Funds, the specific action measures are first and foremost 
undertaken at the national, cross-border or regional level under the shared supervision of the 
national managing authorities and the Commission, according to the agreed programming 
documents - also referred to as ‘national initiatives’ (Figure II.2. below). National initiatives 
retain the vast majority of ESI Funds’ allocations. In subsidiary, from 5% to 10% of ESI 
Funds’ resources are dedicated to specific action at EU level (the ‘EU Initiatives’) designed 
and proposed by the Commission.121 As opposed to national initiatives, which tend to support 
mainly the national investment needs, the EU Initiatives address Union-wide concerns, 
particularly difficult to achieve at the national level.122 
                                                
120 Corrections may be imposed if the ESI action does not comply with the public procurement legislation and 
EU law on non-discrimination and equal treatment particularly during selection and award of contracts, see: 
European Commission, Decision of 19.12.2013 on the setting out and approval of the guidelines for determining 
financial corrections to be made by the Commission to expenditure financed by the Union under shared 
management, for non-compliance with the rules on public procurement. See also: Financial Regulation (EU, 
EURATOM) 966/2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, Article 80(4) and 
Article 135.  
121 EU Initiatives have been set in 1989 as special financing instruments of ESI Funds under the direct 
management of the Commission. The development was possible due to 1988 reform, which enabled the 
Commission “to propose [unilaterally] to the Member States that they submit applications for assistance in 
respect of measures of significant interest to the Community” by way of implementing decisions, see: Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88 of 19 December 1988, laying down provisions for implementing Regulation 
(EEC) No 2052/88 as regards coordination of the activities of the different Structural Funds between themselves 
and with the operations of the European Investment Bank and the other existing financial instruments, Article 
11 and Regulation (EEC) No 4254/88 laying down provisions for implementing Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 
as regards the European Regional Development Fund, Article 3(2). 
122 EU Initiatives must endorse three key requirements: transnationality, complementarity and EU added-value. 
Several other traits are specific for the EU initiatives, namely these: have a genuine EU dimension; are 
particularly flexible and, constitute a catalyst for ESI Funds innovation, as they might become an ESI funding 
priority in the following financing period. EU Initiatives have known a fast development in the 1994-1999 
programming period. The following periods have been characterised by a continuous limitation and 
concentration of the EU Initiatives by the Member States. First, the direct managing role of the Commission has 
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Figure II.1: Implementation procedure of ESI Funds period 2014-2020123 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
been limited as the Member States interposed themselves between the Commission and beneficiaries. In 2000-
2006 we observe a considerable decrease of EU initiatives followed by a complete disappearance as a result of 
their inclusion in the ESI Funds operations during the 2007-2013 period. The current, 2014-2020, programming 
period brings a revival of the EU Initiatives. See: Green Paper, Commission of the European Communities, 
‘Communication of the Commission: The Future of Community Initiatives under the Structural Funds', COM 
(93) 282 final, Brussels, 1993, pp. 3-4. See further on EU Initiatives in: Jouen, op.cit., note 108, p. 28.  
123 Personal adaptation of Figure 2, Court of Auditors, Special Report 17/2009, p.11. 
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The implementation process of ESI Funds starts with the design and adoption of the 
strategic framework document on the use of ESI Funds for each Member State during the 
whole programming period. 124 In 2014-2020 period, the document is called Partnership 
Agreement (the ‘PA’). 125 The PA establishes the overall strategic allocation, investment 
thematic objectives126 and national arrangements for ESI Funds’ implementation. It is drafted 
by each Member State in close dialogue with the Commission, involving the regional, local 
authorities and other relevant partners. The Commission approves the PA by means of 
implementing act decision. 
Based on the approved PAs, ESI Funds are implemented through multiannual 
Operational Programmes (OPs), drafted by the Member States. 127 They detail the thematic 
objectives identified by the PAs into concrete investment priorities, according to each Fund-
specific Regulation. Subsequently, each investment priority is further detailed into specific 
objectives, which are the results to be attained by the ESI Funds intervention negotiated 
between each Member State and the Commission.128 The Commission approves the OPs after 
assessing their consistency with the ESI Funds’ Regulations, the PA, the ESI Funds’ thematic 
objectives and the overall EU priorities.129 
After the adoption of the programming documents (PA and OPs), Member States and 
their responsible national and regional authorities undertake the implementation of OPs, 
including the selection of the project beneficiaries. Under the principle of shared 
management, Member States hold the primary responsibility for sound financial management 
and control of the ESI Funds’ expenditure, subject to Commission’s supervision, which 
remains responsible for the overall implementation of the EU budget. 
                                                
124 The strategic approach to Cohesion policy was adopted in the 2006 reform, whereby Member States 
committed to submit a National strategic reference framework which aimed to ensure that the national strategies 
are consistent with the EU strategy. The 2014-2020 programming period replaces the National Strategic 
frameworks with a Common Strategic Framework (CSF) for all ESI Funds actions, Member States being 
required to show in their PAs how the national strategy on ESI Funds investment complements the CSF. 
125 Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, CPR, Article 2 (20): 'Partnership Agreement' means a document prepared by a 
Member State with the involvement of partners in line with the multi-level governance approach, which sets out 
that Member State's strategy, priorities and arrangements for using the ESI Funds in an effective and efficient 
way so as to pursue the Union strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, and which is approved by 
the Commission following assessment and dialogue with the Member State concerned’. It shall contain the list 
of Operational Programmes and fund-related actions. 
126 The thematic objectives correspond generally to ‘priority axes’ as defined in Art. 2 (8) and 96(1) CPR 
127 Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, CPR, Article 2 (6): 'programme' means an 'operational programme' as referred 
to in Part Three or Part Four of this Regulation (Article 96) and in the EMFF Regulation, and 'rural development 
programme' as referred to in the EAFRD Regulation. 
128 The sub-classification is important as the applicability of ESI Funds ex ante conditionalities shall be assessed 
with regards to each specific objective of an investment priority, see further Chapter III. 
129 Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, CPR, Article 29. 
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In case of EU Initiatives, the implementation process follows closely the steps 
described above. However it is the Commission alone that defines the investment priorities 
and proposes a detailed strategy for action at the EU level, Member States being required to 
design implementing documents alongside the proposed EU Initiative. 
The steps of the ESI Funds implementation show that Member States play an 
important role in the distribution of more than 90% of ESI Funds’ allocations. It is first for 
the Member States to define the investment priorities and include (or not) equal opportunities 
related action into the identified national priorities. However, the Commission and Council 
also have an important say. First the Commission exercises a ‘shadow role’, by maintaining a 
close dialogue with each Member State during the negotiation and design of the 
programming documents. Second, it holds the last decision in confirming or rejecting 
Member States’ investment choices, making sure that Member States had dully taken into 
account, inter alia, the Council recommendations on economic and/or social policies pursuant 
to article 121(2) and 148(4) TFEU. 
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SECTION 2. ESI FUNDS AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: Specific action and 
equality mainstreaming 
Fundamental rights related actions, both as EU and national initiatives, have been a constant 
finding in the ESI Funds architecture. Already in 1989 Commission guides the Member 
States on fundamental rights eligible investment actions.130 Further on, the fundamental rights 
specific actions were expressly supported by ESI Funds regulations, in particular under ESF 
priorities.  
Especially since 1999 reform, EU’s ‘double approach’ to equality and non-
discrimination policy131 was mirrored largely into the Cohesion Policy and ESI Funds’ 
normative structure and operation.132 The ‘double approach’ combines the specific action and 
mainstreaming models. On the one hand, specific action materialises through ESI Funds’ 
direct interventions explicitly targeting equality (Section 2.1.), while on the other hand, 
equality mainstreaming translates into the obligation for the EU and Member States to adopt 
an equality perspective during all ESI funds-related operations irrespective of the area of 
investment (Section 2.2.).  
The equality mainstreaming approach has favoured a stronger ‘push’ of the equal 
opportunities goal beyond the ESF operations. Nevertheless, the actual implementation of an 
equality perspective in other ESI Funds, as for instance in ERDF interventions, has not 
achieved its full potential. Even if ERDF resources have been constantly employed to support 
fundamental rights related actions, these had rather an ancillary nature, being still largely 
seen as the main attribute of ESF. 
                                                
130 European Commission, ‘Guidelines concerning European Social Fund intervention in respect of action 
against long-term unemployment and occupational integration of young people (Objectives 3 and 4 in the 
context of the reform of the structural funds)’, OJ C 45, 1989.  
131 Since 1996, EU has adopted a ‘double approach' to attaining equality and non-discrimination policy goal, 
which translates into a parallel use of two models: specific action and equality mainstreaming. While specific 
action targets the achievement of more equality through dedicated initiatives, the equality mainstreaming 
bounds the competent EU and national actors to adopt an equality perspective into all EU activities, particularly 
when defining and implementing EU policies. The mainstreaming model was inspired by gender equality 
strategy as agreed in 1995 at the World Conference on Women, Beijing. The Beijing Platform for action and 
Declaration strategy was upheld as a core element of EU policy on gender equality. The double-approach 
strategy was taken up by Amsterdam treaty which first enforced equality between men and women as a task for 
the EU (Article 2) and created primary law obligations for the EU to mainstream the gender perspective into all 
its activities (Article 3 paragraph 2). The Lisbon treaty continues the initiative and enshrines equality between 
men and women as a value of the EU (Article 2) and further extends the gender-mainstreaming obligation to 
non-discrimination mainstreaming (Article 8 and 10 TFEU). See: ‘Communication on Incorporating Equal 
Opportunities for Women and Men in all Community Policies and Activities, COM (96) 67 final (1996).  
132 ‘Council Resolution of 2 December 1996 on mainstreaming equal opportunities for men and women into the 
European Structural Funds OJ C 386 of 20.12.1996.  
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2.1: ESI Funds and fundamental rights: Specific action 
ESI Funds’ specific action in fundamental rights is pursued through national and EU 
Initiatives. Based on the ex-post evaluation studies, it is generally very difficult to assess the 
quantitative impact these had on the EU equal opportunities agenda. If one compares to the 
national budgetary machineries with ESI Funds financial allocation, it could be argued that 
the ambition of a sizeable quantitative impact is merely illusory. However, it is commonly 
agreed that specific actions have proved rather a positive qualitative impact, stirring 
innovation and ‘creating conditions’ for further national expenditure. This is especially true 
due to their spill-over effect in the national policies and action, which is particularly visible in 
gender equality policy.133 As to budgetary allocations committed to the priority, these did not 
show a radical evolution. Moreover, the strong shift from specific action to equality 
mainstreaming in 2007-2013 period decreased considerably the specific action financial 
commitments for equal opportunities goal.134  
In terms of specific actions, one should also underline the important contribution of 
the EU Initiatives (Table II.1 below). Notwithstanding the modest financial allocation to EU 
Initiatives (5-10%), these have proved an important, complementary tool to the OPs’ 
investment priorities in tackling the transversal Union’s problems affecting all or the majority 
of the Member States in the area of equal opportunities, non-discrimination, disability and 
more broadly, social inclusion. 135 
                                                
133 See for example, European Commission, Fourth report on economic and social cohesion, 30 May 2007, 
p.113. 
134 Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini, European Parliament Information note PE 462.426, The multi-annual 
financial framework 2014-2020 from a gender equality perspective, 2012, p. 43. 
135 European Commission, First Cohesion Report, 1996, p.109. 
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Table II.1.: EU Initiatives on equality and non-discrimination 1990-2020136 
Period EU Initiative Target group Fund resources Amount 
1990-1993 NOW Women ESF, ERDF 153 mln Ecu 
HORIZON Disabled, minorities ESF, ERDF 305 mln Ecu 
1994-1999 EMPLOYMENT EMPLOYMENT NOW -women 
ESF 500 mln 
*initially 370 
mln Ecu further 
supplemented 
EMPLOYMENT HORIZON- 
disabled and disadvantaged 
groups 
ESF 730 mln Ecu 
EMPLOYMENT Youthstart- 
youth 
ESF 300 mln Ecu 
EMPLOYMENT INTEGRA 
(from 1997)- persons at risk of 
social exclusion, racism and 
xenophobia 
ESF 400 mln Ecu 
ADAPT Adaptation of immigrants, 
refugees and persons at risk of 
social exclusion to the 
industrial change  
ESF, EBRD Total Ecu 2.9 bln of which 1.4 
bln from 
Structural Funds 
2000-2006 EQUAL  Discrimination  ESF 3 bln Euro 
2007-2013 EU Initiatives internalised into mainstream Operational Programmes 
2014-2020 YEI mainstreamed 
into ESF OPs  
Young persons under the age 
of 25 
  
ESF and 
dedicated 
budget line 
3 bln ESF  
3 bln EU budget 
                                                
136Source: European Commission, Cohesion Policy Evaluation reports 
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2.1.1. Programming period 1989-1993: the reform 
During 1989-1993 programming period, the direct action in fundamental rights was strongly 
linked to labour market integration and essentially financed from ESF resources. Whereas the 
ESI Funds regulations were still silent on the equality-related action, the 1989 Commission’s 
guidelines on ESF established a list of equality-eligible interventions. These included training 
and occupational integration of young people, women and persons with disabilities. Member 
States were further incentivised to pursue operations targeting the labour market integration 
of migrant workers, women in under-represented sectors, persons with disabilities, which 
were given ‘preferential treatment’.137 
EU Initiatives (‘Community Initiatives’ at that time),138 promoting equal opportunities 
have also shaped shortly after the start of the programming period. Already in 1990, the 
second EU Initiatives package included two initiatives: New Opportunities for Women (the 
‘NOW Initiative’)139 targeting equal opportunities for women into the labour market and 
HORIZON Initiative, addressing labour market accessibility for persons with disabilities and 
minority groups.140 Both initiatives were funded from the ESF and ERDF Funds resources 
and were designed to complement related EU action on equal opportunities, notably the third 
action programme on equal opportunities for men and women.141 
With regards to gender equality, in the 1989-1993 programming period the change 
brought by the 1988 reform generated delays in the programmes’ operation. Notably, the 
significant delays in start-up of the ESF specific actions and NOW operations resulted in re-
distribution of gender-committed funding to other priorities. As well, unwarranted training 
                                                
137 European Commission, ‘Guidelines Concerning European Social Fund Intervention in Respect of Action 
against Long-Term Unemployment and Occupational Integration of Young People (Objectives 3 and 4 in the 
Context of the Reform of the Structural Funds)’. It is interesting to note that the Guidelines call the eligible 
actions general and specific conditions, as for instance: training of women wishing to return to the labour 
market (specific condition) and operations addressing women (general condition). The respect for a specific 
conditions was “necessary and sufficient to get access the funding”, while the respect for a general condition 
would entitle ‘preferential treatment’. However, the language was changed onwards from ‘condition’ to 
‘investment priorities’. 
138 Decided on 22 November 1989. The financial allocation of the five Community Initiatives amounted to 5.8 
billion, nearly 10% of the ESI Funds commitments. 
139 NOW and HORIZON Community initiatives, Commission Decision of 2 May 1990, not published. Notice to 
the Member States laying down guidelines for operational programmes/global grants, which Member States are 
invited to establish, within the framework of a Community initiative to promote equal opportunities for women 
in the field of employment and vocational training — NOW INITIATIVE, OJ C327 of 29 December 1990, p.5. 
140 Notice to the Member States laying down guidelines on HORIZON INITIATIVE, Ibidem., p.9. 
141 Commission, Green paper ‘The Future of Community Initiatives under the Structural Funds’, Annex 1, COM 
(93) 282 final, 16 June 1993, p.32. Council Resolution of 21 May 1991 on the third medium-term Community 
action programme on equal opportunities for women and men (1991 to 1995), OJ C142, of 31 May 1991, p.1.  
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and lack of harmonised data were reported.142 
2.1.2. Programming period 1994-1999: the extension 
During the 1994-1999 programming period, equal opportunities actions continued to address 
mainly gender equality, which were seen as an ESF priority, rather than an overall ESI Funds 
concern.143 As a novelty, ESI regulations refer expressly to equal opportunities objective. As 
such, ESF has the express task to promote ‘equal opportunities in the labour market’.144 
Similarly, the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund establishes support for 
“farmers of either sex”.145  
The period has known an important extension of EU Initiatives. Thirteen EU 
initiatives have been adopted, out of which two - Employment146 and Adapt147 - were 
dedicated to equal opportunities. The Employment Initiative was sub-divided in four 
investment stands: NOW designed to promote equal opportunities for women in the labour 
market and to complement the Fourth Equal Opportunities Action Programme 1996-2000; 148 
HORIZON for inclusion of persons with disabilities; YOUTHSTART for integration of 
young people in the labour market and INTEGRA targeting people at risk of social exclusion. 
Later in the period ADAPT stand was set up, supporting adaptation of the workforce to 
industrial change. 
With regards to ESF, the allocations dedicated to equality specific action during the 
programming period amounted to around 3.1% of the fund’s commitments, whereas the 
action on integration of persons at risk of social exclusion amounted to 10.8%.149 The late 
                                                
142 Court of Auditors, Annual Report concerning the financial year 1991, Chapter 8, Community Action to 
promote equal opportunities for men and women., OJ C 330 of 15.12.1992, p. 161-168. 
143 European Commission, Second Cohesion Report, 2001, p. 151. 
144 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2081/93, Article 3(2).  
145 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2085/93 of 20 July 1993 amending Regulation (EEC) No 4256/88 laying 
down provisions for implementing Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 as regards the European Agricultural 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) Guidance Section  
146 European Commission, Communication to the Member States laying down guidelines for operational 
programmes or global grants which Member States are invited to propose within the framework of a 
Community initiative on Employment and Development of Human Resources aimed at promoting employment 
growth mainly through the development of human resources, OJ C 180, 01.07.1994. 
147 Ibidem. 
148 Council Decision of 22 December 1995 on a medium-term Community action programme on equal 
opportunities for men and women (1996 to 2000) OJ L 335 of 30/12/1995. 
149 Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, The European Social Fund an overview of the 
programming period 1994-1999, Luxembourg, 1998, p. 30. 
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start-up of programmes and initiatives remains a weak point.150 
2.1.3. Programming period 2000-2006: the concentration 
In line with the Amsterdam Treaty and secondary law developments,151 the 2000-2006 
programming period reinforced the equal opportunities goal. First, ESF included for the first 
time specific action on women access and participation in the labour market as a stand-alone 
investment priority.152 Second, the period adopted a concentration strategy for the ESI Funds 
assistance, limiting the EU Initiatives on equal opportunities to one – EQUAL – promoting 
an integrated approach to non-discrimination.153 
During the period, ESI Funds equal opportunities action of the policy was highly 
reported and evaluated. The studies show that the ESF specific action measures were 
increasingly budgeted under OPs’ priorities.154 The financial allocation has also known a 
slightly larger share.155 Generally, around a half of the total national interventions committed 
to equal opportunities aim were supported by ESF, the rest of expenditure was complemented 
from national public or private resources.156 In the case of gender equality specific action, the 
vast majority of measures were targeted at training (over 75%) whereas the rest of 
expenditure was directed at reconciliation of family and professional life. 157  
EQUAL Initiative has proved particularly effective. It managed to complement harmoniously 
                                                
150 European Court of Auditors, ‘SPECIAL REPORT No 22/98 concerning the management by the Commission 
of the implementation of measures to promote equal opportunities for women and men’, OJ 393/24, 1998, para. 
9. 
151 Article 3(2), now article 8 TFEU: ‘In all the activities referred to in this Article, the Community shall aim to 
eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality, between men and women.’ 
152 Regulation (EC) No 1784/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 1999 on the 
European Social Fund, Art. 2 (1) e): “specific measures to improve women's access to and participation in the 
labour market” 
153 Commission Decision – C(2000) 1382, not published and Decision C/2000/1221 of 12.05.2000 establishing 
an indicative distribution by Member State of the commitment appropriations under the Community initiative 
EQUAL for 2000-2006.  
154 ASBL ENGENDER, Integration of Equal Opportunities Between Men and Women in Objective 1 and 2 
Structural Funding Programming Documents 2000-2006, available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/studies/pdf/integration_equal.pdf> consulted on 
02.05.2014. 
155 Between 2000-2006 some € 9.3 billion were affected to actions promoting gender equality, € 8.5 billion 
addressed the needs of persons with disabilities and € 8.5 billion were directed at social inclusion. Bernard 
Brunhes International, Studies at the request of European Commission under contract ‘Reporting on ESF 
Interventions in the EU’: The European Social Fund: Women, Gender mainst reaming and Reconciliation of 
work & private life, 2010, Summary Fiche p. 6. The European Social Fund and Disability, 2010, p. 40. The 
European Social Fund and Social Inclusion, 2010. 
156 The European Social Fund: Gender, Summary fiche, p.5. The European Social Fund and Disability, 2010, p. 
40. The European Social Fund and Social Inclusion, Summary fiche, 2010, pp 7-8.  
157 European Court of Auditors, Special Report 17/2009, Vocational training actions for women co-financed by 
the European Social Fund, 26 January 2010, p. 9. 
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the European Employment Strategy, to bring EU added-value, innovation and a transnational 
comprehensive approach to non-discrimination and inclusion of vulnerable groups.158 
2.1.4. Programming period 2007-2013: the shift to mainstreaming 
During the 2007-2013 programming period, we notice a general stagnation of equality 
specific action. The ESI Funds financial commitments targeted at direct interventions 
decreased under the pressure of a strong equality mainstreaming commitment (Section 2.2. 
below). In the specific area of gender equality, the committed finances constituted 2.6 billion 
from the overall ESI Funds allocation, compared to 4.6 billion committed in 2000-2006 only 
from ESF resources.159  
The equality-related EU Initiatives are completely lacking from the ESI Funds’ 
framework. Instead, dedicated programmes financed directly from the EU budget have been 
set, such as PROGRESS.160 
2.1.5. Programming period 2014-2020 
The 2014-2020 programming period adopts a targeted approach to equal opportunities. The 
CPR includes a dedicated thematic objective which mandates ESF to promote social 
inclusion, combat any discrimination and poverty. As well, gender equality specific actions 
are supported under the employment thematic objective.161 According to the initial data, over 
18 out of 28 Member States are expected to include social inclusion action in their investment 
priorities, whereas other 3 Member States plan additionally to address poverty reduction 
goal.162 
The period makes a return move towards EU Initiatives in the area of equality, which 
target especially: youth unemployment, persons at risk of poverty and labour market 
                                                
158 Metis, Ex post evaluation of the EQUAL Community Initiative (2000-2006), 17 March 2010, p. 16. 
159 Advisory Committee on Equal Opportunities for women and men, Opinion on gender equality in the 
cohesion policy 2014-2020, 2012. European Parliament, Information Note, PE 462.426, op.cit., note 134, supra, 
p. 43. 
160 Decision No 1672/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 2006 establishing a 
Community Programme for Employment and Social Solidarity — Progress, The programme was divided in five 
action areas: Employment; Social protection and inclusion; Working conditions; Antidiscrimination and 
diversity; Gender equality. See Article 3 therein.  
161 Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, article 9. Regulation (EU) 1304/2013 on ESF, article 3.  
162  European Commission, Cohesion Policy 2014-2020, Country Factsheets, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/information/cohesion-policy-achievement-and-future-investment/index.cfm, 
consulted on 01.06.2014. 
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inclusion of the vulnerable groups.163 In the framework of ESI Funds, youth employment 
initiative (‘YEI’) targets active inclusion of young persons in the labour market.164 The YEI 
Initiative is partially supported from ESF resources and mainstreamed in the Member States’ 
OPs. 
 
2.2. ESI Funds and fundamental rights: equality mainstreaming 
Compared to other EU policies, Cohesion policy has been, since the very early stages, 
one of the policies most open to equality mainstreaming, especially in terms of gender 
equality.165 The comparative historical perspective underlines the evolutionary change of the 
ESI Funds in terms of equality mainstreaming. First, one could notice the shift from the 
worker rationale - “women returning to labour market”, “farmers of either sex”- towards the 
general principles of gender equality and non-discrimination as fundamental values of the 
Union. Second, whereas initially equality provisions were mainstreamed in the fund-specific 
regulations, progressively, the principle of equality has shifted horizontally becoming 
applicable to all ESI Funds. Thirdly, the evolution underlines a clear departure from the sole 
concern of gender equality towards a general principle of equality, non-discrimination, 
protection of persons with disabilities as enshrined in the Treaties and secondary legislation. 
Furthermore, the comparative perspective highlights, the evolution from the reactive 
‘conformity’ obligation to a pro-active ‘promotion’ of the principles in all the ESI Funds-
related activities (Annex I).  
2.2.1. Programming period 1989-1993 
During the financial period 1989-1993, the first Common Provisions Regulation166 
brought for the first time the Structural Funds: ESF, ERDF and other financial instruments 
under a single common legislative framework, which set the general principles and rules 
applying to all the ESI Funds (the ‘CPR’). The CPR did not explicitly include any 
                                                
163 See, inter alia: "Agenda for New Skills and Jobs", "Youth on the Move", and the "European Platform against 
Poverty and Social Exclusion". 
164 Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, Article 92 (4) and (5). 
165 Pollack and Hafner-Burton, 432–456, op.cit., note 110, supra. 
166 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 as regards coordination of the activities of the different Structural 
Funds between themselves and with the operations of the European Investment Bank and other existing 
financial instruments OJ L 185 of 15.07.1988. 
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fundamental rights’ consideration. However, in the fund-specific rules, the ESF Regulation167 
required for desegregated data on ‘female unemployment’ to be provided ‘as far as possible’ 
in the country-specific social conversion plans. As well, already in 1991, following the 
adoption of the Community Social Charter, 168  the Third Action Programme on Equal 
Opportunities for women and men 1991-1995,169 laid the positive policy background for 
equality mainstreaming in the future programming period.170 
2.2.2. Programming period 1994-1999 
In the next programming period - 1994-1999 - the newly established Cohesion Fund is 
added to the existing Structural Funds: ESF and ERDF. In the context of Maastricht Treaty, 
gender equality considerations started to shape in the ESI Funds Regulations. The first 
mainstreaming developments were further supported by the Council, who ‘invited’ Member 
States to observe, promote and take ‘full account’ of the principle of equality between men 
and women during all the activities financed by the Structural Funds.171 Equality is however 
limited to the gender perspective and builds very much on the functional, worker rationale. 
As such, the CPR refers in its considerations to ‘the principle of equal opportunities for men 
and women on the employment market’ as to a Community goal. 172  Moreover, full 
conformity with the ‘principle of equal opportunities for men and women’ has to be 
observed.173  
2.2.3. Programming period 2000-2006 
Starting with 2000-2006 programming period, the principle of equality between men and 
women gains a strong normative presence. Based on the high commitment from both the 
                                                
167 Council Regulation (EEC) No 4255/88 of 19 December 1988, laying down provisions for implementing 
Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 as regards the European Social Fund   OJ L 374 of 31.12.1988 
168 The Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, 9 December 1989. 
169 Commission Communication COM (90) 449 final endorsed in the Council Resolution of 21 May 1991 on the 
third medium-term Community action programme on equal opportunities for women and men (1991 to 1995) 
OJ C 142 of 31.05.91 
170 J Brine, The European social fund and the EU: flexibility, growth, stability, Contemporary European Studies, 
11, Sheffield, Sheffield Academic Press, 2002, p. 73. 
171 Council Resolution of 22 June 1994 on the promotion of equal opportunities for men and women through 
action by the European Structural Funds (94/C 231/01). 
172 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2081/93 of 20 July 1993 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 on the tasks 
of the Structural Funds and their effectiveness and on coordination of their activities between themselves and 
with the operations of the European Investment Bank and the other existing financial instruments. 
173 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2081/93 of 20 July 1993, Ibidem, Article 7.  
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Council174 and the Commission175 and following the express mandate of the Amsterdam 
Treaty176 the CPR Regulation of 1999 takes a better-targeted approach towards gender 
equality mainstreaming.177  The principle is reflected in 10 out of 56 core articles of the 
Regulation. These require that: The ESI funds contribute to the elimination of inequalities 
and to the promotion of equality between men and women; the ESI Funds operations are in 
conformity with Community’s actions and policies on gender equality; statistics broken down 
by sex for the purpose of monitoring where the nature of the assistance permits; ex ante 
evaluations on the situation of equality between men and women on the labour market; the 
managing authorities provide information to organisations or bodies promoting equality, the 
monitoring committee ensures a balanced gender representation.178 Compared to the previous 
programming period, a shift to pro-active language was introduced. The funds were to 
contribute also to the ‘elimination of inequalities’ complementary to the ‘promotion of 
equality between men and women’. The fund-specific provisions of ESF required Member 
States to describe in the content of each OP the way in which gender equality was taken into 
consideration during all programme-related actions. 179  ERDF for the first time refers 
expressly to gender equality.180 As an innovation, the principle of non-discrimination also 
makes its way in the Structural Funds architecture, marking the departure from the 
dominating gender equality concern. Building on the newly introduced Article 13 of the 
Amsterdam Treaty,181 the Regulation recitals mention for the first time that: “the Funds' 
operations may also make it possible to combat any discrimination on the grounds of race, 
ethnic origin, disability or age.”182 Non-discrimination however remained limited to the 
preamble. In comparison with the previous programming periods, quite extensive legislative 
                                                
174 Council Resolution of 2 December 1996 on mainstreaming equal opportunities for men and women into the 
European Structural Funds OJ C 386 of 20.12.1996. 
175 European Commission, ‘Incorporating Equal Opportunities for Women and Men in all Community Policies 
and Activities', COM (96) 67 final, 21.02.1996. 
176 Article 3(2), now Article 8 TFEU: ‘In all the activities referred to in this Article, the Community shall aim to 
eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality, between men and women.’ 
177 Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 of 21 June 1999 laying down general provisions on the Structural 
Funds, OJ L 161 of 26.06.1999. 
178 Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999, Articles 1, 2, 3, 8, 12, 20, 29, 41, 46 thereof. 
179 Regulation (EC) No 1784/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 1999 on the 
European Social Fund, OJ L213 of 13.08.1999, Article 8. 
180 Regulation (EC) No 1783/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 1999 on the 
European Regional Development Fund, OJ 213 of 13.08.1999, Article 2. 
181The newly introduced Article 13 provided that:“[...]the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the 
Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may take appropriate action to combat 
discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.” 
182 Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999, recital 5. 
      
 61 
progress was made. The developments were seen at that time as ‘the first major break-though 
for the Commission’s mainstreaming mandate’.183 
2.2.4. Programming period 2007-2013 
The 2007-2013 programming period continues the positive developments. 184  The most 
important achievement is the inclusion of a stand-alone article on both, gender equality non-
discrimination (Article 16).185 Article 16 brings the long expected clarity and visibility to the 
equality principle, which before was dispersed and hard to filter from the various provisions 
of the ESI Funds Regulations. It reads:  
“The Member States and the Commission shall ensure that equality between men 
and women and the integration of the gender perspective is promoted during the 
various stages of implementation of the Funds. 
The Member States and the Commission shall take appropriate steps to prevent 
any discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, 
disability, age or sexual orientation during the various stages of implementation of 
the Funds and, in particular, in the access to them. In particular, accessibility for 
disabled persons shall be one of the criteria to be observed in defining operations 
co-financed by the Funds and to be taken into account during the various stages of 
implementation.” 
Compared to the previous programming period, the article calls for integration of a gender 
perspective during all Funds’ implementation stages, given the ‘need’186 to promote gender 
equality.187 Also, the grounds of discrimination have been extended to ‘religion or belief and 
sexual orientation’, according to the EU non-discrimination directives,188 bringing the ESI 
Funds in line with the EU non discrimination law and policy developments. However, article 
16 limited the scope of non-discrimination to ‘prevention’ of discrimination and targeted in 
particular the equal access to funding.189 Thus, no mandate to combat discrimination is given. 
The equality partnerships, 190  sex-desegregated monitoring, 191  ex-ante evaluation of the 
situation between women and men and equality-targeted information are further encouraged.  
                                                
183 Pollack and Hafner-Burton, 432–456, op.cit., note 110, supra, p. 442. 
184 Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 of 11 July 2006 laying down general provisions on the European 
Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) 
No 1260/1999, OJ L210 of 31.07.2006. 
185 Ibidem, Article 16. 
186 Ibidem, Article 11.  
187 Ibidem. 
188 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000, OJ L 180 of 19.07.2000; Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 
27 November 2000, OJ L 303 of 02.12.2000. 
189 Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006, Article16. 
190 Ibidem, Article 10.  
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2.2.5. Programming period 2014-2020 
Returning to 2014-2020 programming period, two additional funds are brought under 
the umbrella of the CPR: the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) 
and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF). The general principles of gender 
equality and non-discrimination192 maintain largely a similar textual wording of the 2007-
2013 period, but are better articulated in the light of the positive obligations imposed on the 
Member States. As such, Member States shall ensure that the PAs mention the principles’ 
application during the implementation of the funds. As well, each OPs shall include a 
description of the concrete actions undertaken to take into account the principle of equality 
and non-discrimination.193 Moreover, the principles are reflected in the Common Strategic 
Framework,194 which lines up the ESI Funds to Europe 2020’s targets.195 
 
2.3. Promoting equality via ESI Funds: how effective? 
Cohesion policy (and ESI Funds) is probably one of the most reported and evaluated 
EU policy. Yet not also from the legal point of view. The multitude of reports on impact, 
outcome, ex ante and ex post evaluations, policy and economic analysis papers, generate a 
great amount of information. Nevertheless, assessing ESI Funds’ impact is generally a 
challenging task. The ex-post evaluations and studies reveal a highly puzzled picture. The 
specific evaluations related to equal opportunities are not an exception.  
Overall, one could safely claim that ESI Funds had a positive impact on the equal 
opportunities policy goal, both through specific action and equality mainstreaming measures. 
However, the positive developments have been balanced by challenges, especially with 
regards to equality mainstreaming. 
When it comes to the achievements, one must stress that over the last programming 
periods, equal opportunities specific action interventions have been increasingly budgeted 
under ESI Funds programmes by the absolute majority of Member States.196 Similarly, the 
                                                                                                                                                  
191 Ibidem, Article 66.  
192 Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, CPR, Article 7. 
193 Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, CPR Article 15 
194 Common Strategic framework, Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, Annex I, point 5.3. 
195 European Commission, ‘Communication - Regional Policy contributing to smart growth in Europe 2020', 
COM(2010) 553 final, 2010. 
196 In the 2000-2006 22 Member States have designed ESF measures to address gender equality in 2007-2013 
the number raised to 25 Member States, see: The European Social Fund: Gender, op.cit., note 152, supra, p.6. 
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importance of the equal opportunities and non-discrimination principle was acknowledged 
almost universally (equality mainstreaming) in the ESF Operational Programmes in the last 
programming period, 2007-2013.  
Most importantly, one should stress the positive impact of the ESI Funds equal 
opportunity goal on the national policy developments. The obligation to integrate an equality 
perspective and the specific ESF interventions, have often constituted an important and 
essential ‘push’ on the national equal opportunities agenda.197 In some Member States the ESI 
gender equality objectives have constituted for important time the only driving force for 
promoting equal opportunities, as no national equivalent agenda was present.198  
The added value generally translates in three core criteria: innovation, introducing gender 
equality national policies where these have not been in place before and reinforcing or 
complementing the existing policies.199 As ESI Funds’ related actions couldn’t compete 
quantitatively with the national government’s expenditure, these have nevertheless 
compensated on the qualitative criteria and spill over effect. Surveys show that the ESI 
Funds’ equality-related actions enjoy the highest visibility and are perceived as having the 
greatest impact on national policies,200 (however, there is little evidence of a tangible impact 
on the public discourse and public opinion).201 In some cases, the national institutional or 
administrative arrangements on gender equality have been the direct result of the ESF 
interventions.202 
As to the challenges, first, evaluations find a constant lack of comprehensive, comparable and 
reliable data and indicators, which make it difficult to assess the ESI Funds direct action 
                                                
197 Ex-Post Evaluation of Cohesion Policy programmes 2000-06 co-financed by the ERDF (Objective 1 & 2), 
Synthesis Report, European Commission, March 2010, p. 109.  
198 Fondazione G Brodolini, Evaluation of the European Social Fund’s Support to Gender Equality, 24 January 
2011, commissioned by European Commission, pp. 138-139: "In Bulgaria, as well as the Czech Republic and 
Estonia, ESF interventions are the main driving force for gender equality as they do not mirror similar existing 
national structures/processes. In Cyprus and Latvia, the gender-equality policy development and implementation 
is mostly fuelled and driven by the EU agenda. In Poland, much of the discussion and actions on gender equality 
were initiated by the projects funded within the ESF. In Slovakia, the ESF has been important to support the 
adoption of the national legislation especially during the present programming period, which is paving the way 
for gender-sensitive policy implementation. [...] In Romania, ESF is a critical funding source for gender 
sensitive policies as national and local authorities are mainly concerned with the implementation of traditional 
social welfare policies, embracing only to a limited extent a gender perspective in their policies.". 
199 Fondazione G Brodolini, Evaluation of the European Social Fund’s Support to Gender Equality, op.cit., note 
198, supra, p. 142. 
200 European Commission, Third Report on Economic and social cohesion, 2004, p. 132. 
201 Metis, Ex Post Evaluation of the EQUAL Community Initiative (2000-2006), p.14. 
202 European Commission, Fourth Cohesion Policy Report, p.113. Such was the case of Italy, Germany, Ireland. 
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contribution. 203  Another persisting drawback was the weak link between the ex-ante 
assessment and the ESI funds operations.204  
Second, throughout the four analysed programming periods, ESI specific action 
interventions and equality mainstreaming were mostly limited to gender equality and were 
mainly attached to ESF interventions. Equal opportunities actions have been more openly 
accepted in human resources development, whereas in areas attracting the highest support, as 
ERDF financed infrastructure operations, the equality perspective was heavily opposed.205 
The ex-post evaluation of the ERDF even expressed doubt on the feasibility and suitability of 
a gender mainstreaming as a horizontal principle in the existing format.206  
Third, in terms of equality mainstreaming, the performance of the mainstreaming 
approach did not show satisfactory results. Even if the OPs acknowledge almost universally 
the importance of equal opportunities and non-discrimination principles, the acknowledgment 
remains often formal. Evaluations and studies undertaken at the request of European 
Commission relative to 1994-1999, 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 programming periods show 
that good progress has been made in raising awareness of principles of gender equality and 
non-discrimination, accessibility of persons with disabilities during funds implementation.207  
Nevertheless, they show a mainly ‘declaratory’ and inconsistent conformity with the 
principles and lack of a systematic approach throughout the programmes’ activities. The 
programmes incorporated mainly ‘standard clauses’ declaring compliance with the EU 
equality law.208 In the last 2007-2013 period only 8% of the programmes took due account of 
the principles during the fund’s preparation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of 
                                                
203 European Court of Auditors, Special Report concerning vocational training actions for women co-financed 
by the European Social Fund, 26 January 2010, paras. 32-44. 
204 ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Implementation of gender mainstreaming in the 
Structural Funds programming documents 2000-2006 COM(2002) 748 final’, , 2002;  
205  M Braithwaite, ‘Mainstreaming Gender in the European Structural Funds'. Paper prepared for the 
Mainstreaming Gender in European Public Policy Workshop, University of Wisconsin-Madison, October 14-15 
2000. 
206 Ex-Post Evaluation of Cohesion Policy programmes 2000-06 co-financed by the ERDF, op.cit. note 197, 
supra: "Simply including an issue a horizontal priority, therefore, does not ensure that it actually has a 
significant effect on policy unless it is perceived as being important, in which case action would probably be 
taken irrespective of whether it is a horizontal priority or not". 
207 European Court of Auditors, Special report No 22/98; ASBL ENGENDER, op. cit., note 154, supra; Public 
Policy and Management Institute, Study on the Translation of Article 16 of the Regulation (EC) N 1083/2006 on 
the Promotion of Gender Equality; Non-discrimination and Accessibility for Disabled Persons into Cohesion 
Policy Programmes 2007-2013, 2009. 
208 J Bachtler & S Taylor, Objective 2: Experiences, Lessons and Policy Implications, European Policies 
Research Centre University of Strathclyde, 1999, p. 195. 
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ESI Funds actions.209  
In the light of the above-mentioned findings we might conclude that the attainment of 
equal opportunities goal through the ESI Funds’ interventions has been a partially won and 
partially lost ‘battle’.  
The recently enforced 2014-2020 legislative framework seems largely responsive to the 
above underlined challenges. First the reform put a great emphasis on clear and reliable 
indicators and targets to measure performance. 210  Additional accent is put on targeting the 
ESI Funds assistance towards the areas most in need for each Member States, as identified in 
the ex-ante assessment, under the supervision of the Commission. The consistency between 
the EU strategy on equality and non-discrimination and national priorities must be reflected 
in PAs and OPs, which take the form of binding agreements. As well, the principles of equal 
opportunities and the specific action interventions have been reinforced by the ex ante 
conditionalities in the area of fundamental rights (we shall develop on these in Chapter III). It 
remains to be seen how the new arrangements will develop within the ESI Funds operations. 
 
2.4. Promoting equality via ESI Funds: what obligation? 
In Chapter I we have seen that the ESI Funds are by nature ‘dominium’ measures, by 
which EU deploys budgetary resources in order to pursue the Cohesion policy goal of 
decreasing economic, social and territorial disparities within Member States and their 
regions.211 In contrast with the ‘imperium’ legislative measures, which order a conduct and 
secure the compliance with a sanction, the ESI Funds’ ‘dominium’ measures are ‘buying 
compliance’ by deploying EU budget resources to attain the Cohesion policy objectives.212  
In pursuing the goal of dominium measures, the main concern of a government is to set 
adequate criteria for expenditure and appropriate tools to ensure the attainments of the 
proposed result.213 
                                                
209 See: Public Policy and Management Institute, op.cit, note 207, supra, p. 4. Out of 50 OPs only 4 (8%) 
contained a comprehensive integration of the principles; other 22% of the OPs contained a declaratory 
integration. 
210 Regulation (EU) 1304/2013, Annex 1: ‘All data shall be broken down bu gender’. Regulation (EU) 
1303/2013, Annex II. See also: European Court of Auditors, Special Report 25/2012, ‘Are tools in place to 
monitor the effectiveness of European Social Fund spending on older workers?, reply of the Commission. 
211 Daintith, Terence, ‘The techniques of Government’ in: Jowell and Oliver, op.cit, note 47, supra, p. 218. 
212 Ibidem, p. 214. 
213  Ibidem, p. 218. 
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As noticed above, the ESI Funds did not limit the policy expected results at the 
attainment of specific action priorities as prescribed by the ESI regulatory framework. In 
addition to specific investment priorities (as inclusion of women, youth, persons with 
disabilities into labour market), we find that ESI Funds attempted – and partially managed – 
to attach the EU policy on gender equality, non-discrimination and disability in the form of 
equality mainstreaming. As a result, ESI Funds were progressively designed to act as an 
engine and driving force for EU equal opportunities policy, mainstreaming the latter towards 
all the ESI Funds related activities. 
In Chapter I, we have also defined the legal obligation as a legal bond ‘iuris vinculum’ 
that binds a subject to a certain active or passive conduct usually tied to a sanction. When 
applied to the obligation of equality promotion in the ESI Funds operations the question that 
arises is: whom does the legal bond bind?  
First we note that the Union and its institutions are bound by a primary treaty 
obligation, to aim at ‘eliminate[ing] inequalities, and to promote[ing] equality, between men 
and women in all its activities’ (article 8 TFEU), as well as to combat any discrimination ‘in 
defining and implementing its policies and activities’ (article 10 TFEU). From the point of 
view of the Union and its institutions the fulfilment of obligation was satisfactory. The ESI 
Funds legislative framework incorporated the principle of equality and non-discrimination, 
further mainstreaming equality through ESI Funds’ regulations. However, when we look at 
the picture from the point of view of the Member States the image shapes differently. These 
have been bound by the general principles of equality and non-discrimination as prescribed 
by the ESI Funds’ Regulations. Moreover, as illustrated above, Member States accepted to a 
little extent the equality agenda as a priority of the ESI Funds (except ESF) and largely failed 
to implement in a comprehensive manner the equality and non-discrimination principles in 
ESI Funds related interventions. 
In response, the Commission did not have any ‘imperium’ tools to sanction Member 
States for failing to mainstream the equality and non-discrimination principles. As such, the 
Commission exercised mainly the role of what Barca called ‘moral suasion’,214 through soft-
                                                
214 F Barca, An agenda for a reformed cohesion policy. A place-based approach to meeting European Union 
challenges and expectations, 2009, p.50. 
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law instruments as guidelines,215 methodological and technical documents on integration of 
equality perspective during funds’ operations, communications and working papers.216  
The limitations of equality promotion and equality mainstreaming obligations in the 
ESI Funds operations highlight the gap in ESI Funds effort of promoting an integrated 
approach towards equal opportunities and their actual delivery. The challenges in 
implementing the related equal-opportunities obligations should be also analysed going back 
to structural and contextual weaknesses, as for instance: lack of institutional capacity, social 
context, superficial political commitment or insufficient knowledge.217 
The 2014-2020 legislative framework adds the ex ante fundamental rights 
conditionalities tool. In Chapter III we shall further ask to which extent the newly introduced 
ex-ante conditionalities in the area of fundamental rights have the potential to fil the gap and 
address the limitations of the previous programming periods? Or, on the contrary, how likely 
is it that they are downgraded to additional administrative burdens in the process of ESI 
Funds implementation?
                                                
215 ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Implementation of gender mainstreaming in the 
Structural Funds programming documents 2000-2006' COM(2002) 748 final, 2002; ‘Commission 
Communication concerning the Structural Funds and their coordination with the Cohesion Fund Guidelines for 
programmes in the period 2000 to 2006’, Official Journal of the European Union C 267, 1999; ‘Communication 
from the Commission - The structural funds and their coordination with the cohesion fund - Revised indicative 
guidelines’, Official Journal of the European Union C, 2003. 
216 See for instance: European Commission, Technical paper 3: Mainstreaming Equal Opportunities For Women 
And Men In Structural Fund Programmes And Projects, March 2000. 
217 A Woodward, ‘European Gender Mainstreaming: Promises and Pitfalls of Transformative Policy’, in Review 
of Policy Research, vol. 20, 2003, 65–88, pp. 70–74. 
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SECTION 3: THE ESI FUNDS AND CONDITIONALITY - BEFORE AND AFTER 
2013 REFORM 
The present section analyses the use of conditionality in the ESI Funds’ framework. As 
mentioned above, before the 2014-2020 programming period, the ex ante fundamental rights 
conditionalities were not present. Nevertheless, other types of conditionalities were present 
and had an essential role in the ESI Funds’ implementation process. Thus, the aim of this 
section is first to depict the existing conditionality schemes prior to the 2013 reform, 
highlighting at the same time their development in the 2014-2020 period and their possible 
interlink with fundamental rights (Section 3.1.). Second, the section intends to briefly 
introduce the novel ex ante conditionality spectrum as regulated in the 2013 reform (Section 
3.2.) setting the scene for a broader inquiry on the newly introduced ex ante fundamental 
rights conditionalities (Chapter III).  
For the purpose of this section, the concept of conditionality shall be similar to the one 
defined in Chapter I of the thesis, namely: a requirement pre-established by the ESI 
Regulations or mutually agreed in the programming documents (the ‘agreement’) between 
the Commission and the Member States, accessory to the agreement, which must be complied 
with before (ex ante conditionality) or after (ex post conditionality) the conclusion of the 
agreement on ESI Funds’ allocations, which might be subject to negative consequences in 
case of non-compliance (negative conditionality) or to further incentives in case of good 
performance (positive conditionality). 
 
3.1. The development of conditionalities in the framework of ESI Funds: an 
evolutionary overview 
The ESI Funds’ use is highly conditional. Since 1988, conditionality within the ESI Funds 
has been an ever-changing policy tool. The Commission’s approach to conditionality 
fluctuated from strong to loose rules in an attempt find the right balance between 
conditionality and subsidiarity.218  The changes in the ESI Funds’ conditionality architecture 
have been equally much influenced by the Member States’ struggle to limit the 
Commission’s discretion in the process. 
                                                
218 F Barca, An agenda for a reformed cohesion policy, op.cit., note 214, supra. For an analysis of the Principle-
agent theory in the Cohesion Policy, see also: J Blom-hansen, ‘Principals, agents, and the implementation of EU 
cohesion policy’, in Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 12, 2005, 624–648. 
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During the first two programming periods from 1989 to 1999, we witness a strong 
empowerment of the Commission - especially during the programming stage - followed by a 
progressive decentralisation in favour of the Member States and a shift towards a 
compliance-based conditionality. The, 1988 and 1993 reforms brought more robust 
conditionalities mainly related to programme content, evaluation, additionality and 
compatibility with EU priorities. Further on, during 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 programming 
period Member States arrogated the main responsibility for OPs strategic design and 
priorities.219 The Commission’s role in the Monitoring Committee was downgraded to an 
advisory one from the full veto-right member. As well, we notice a decline of the EU 
Initiatives, which were reduced in 2000-2006 to four from thirteen under the primary 
responsibility of Member States and ultimately suppressed in 2007-2013 period.220 The 
decentralisation developments were balanced by stronger supervisory role of the 
Commission221 and strengthened conditionalities attached mainly to monitoring, audit and 
control procedures.222 The 2014-2020 programming period internalised the long debate on the 
need for more conditionality, bringing a strong and comprehensive set of ex ante and ex post 
conditionalities throughout all stages of ESI Funds’ implementation.223  
Before 2014-2020 programming period, conditionalities did not refer expressly to 
fundamental rights, meaning that they did neither limit before the access to ESI Funds - ex 
ante, nor did they demand after the adoption of Operational Programmes (OPs) fulfilment of 
accessory specific fundamental rights criteria subject to suspension or termination of the 
agreement - ex post. Equally, these did not imply negative nor positive consequences for 
compliance or failure to comply with specific fundamental rights requirements accessory to 
the main obligation of implementing ESI Funds in line with the investment priorities, in the 
sense we have highlighted in Chapter I.  
Member States and the Commission were nevertheless (and still are), as a general rule, 
                                                
219 Barca, op.cit, note 214, pp. 75–76. 
220 C Mendez & GP Manzella, The Turning Points of EU Cohesion Policy, Report, Working-Paper, 2009, p. 26.  
221 See: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the Court of 
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held to comply with EU law on equal treatment and non-discrimination, subject to financial 
corrections especially during access to ESI Funds and allocation of public procurement 
contracts, pursuant to public procurement Directives.224 Moreover, equal opportunities were 
mainstreamed in the context of some conditionalities related to ex-ante evaluations, 
monitoring and reporting indicators and partnership principle. These indirectly supported the 
progress of equal opportunities goal within the ESI Funds operations as they asked for sex-
segregated data225 and inclusion of private and public actors with fundamental rights remit 
during the implementation of ESI Funds (see Section 2.2. above). 
Generally, ESI Funds conditionalities concern: additionality, thematic concentration 
and consistency, partnership, monitoring and evaluation, performance review, management 
and control (Figure II.2). These are imposed both before (ex ante) and after (ex post) the 
conclusion of the programming documents - the ‘agreement’. Often, the same conditionality 
is found both, ex ante and ex post.  
Ex ante conditionalities are imposed during the programming phase, when Member 
States have to provide ex ante strong guarantees on conditionality fulfilment, making the 
corresponding indications in the programming documents. Once found fulfilled, the 
Commission adopts the programming documents.226 After the conclusion of the ‘agreement’ – 
PA and OPs – Member States are obliged first, to fulfil the main obligation undertaken the 
implementation of ESI funds according to committed priorities. Additionally, they have to 
comply with the ex post conditionalities according to the applicable ESI Funds provisions.
                                                
224 Commission Decision of 19.12.2013 on the setting out and approval of the guidelines for determining 
financial corrections to be made by the Commission to expenditure financed by the Union under shared 
management, for non-compliance with the rules on public procurement, Annex. 
225 Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006, Article 66 (2). 
226 See further on the weakness of the programming documents in the 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 programming 
periods, in: P Casavola, Operational Rules and Results in Cohesion Policy Programmes: Analysis and 
Proposals for Conditionalities, pp. 7–10.  
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Figure II.2.: Conditionality in ESI Funds implementation 
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3.1.1. Additionality - ex ante, ex post, negative 
Additionality is a founding principle of Cohesion policy. It ensures that the ESI Funds 
resources do not merely replace national expenditure, but bring enhanced added value. To 
this aim, Member States are required to secure sufficient resources necessary to co-finance 
ESI Funds expenditure. The conditionality corresponds both to an ex ante and ex post 
negative conditionality. As such, Member States have to prove first ex ante that the national 
funds have been secured before the approval of programming documents. The compliance is 
checked also ex post, during mid-term and ex post verifications. The fulfilment of 
conditionality ex post entitles Member States to further interim payments and final balance. 
Since 2007-2013 period, the conditionality became also negative, as the Commission has 
been entitled to apply corrections when sufficient resources have not been secured under the 
convergence objective.227 In the current 2014-2020 period, the ex post corrections have been 
extended to three ESI Funds – ERDF, ESF, Cohesion Fund - except the territorial 
cooperation goal.228 
3.1.2. Thematic concentration and consistency - ex ante 
The thematic concentration and consistency requirement conditions ex ante the adoption of 
the programming documents.  
Accordingly, when designing the investment priorities, Member States are required to 
concentrate the ESI Funds’ support to the areas that ensure most added-value. In the 2014-
2020 period, OPs have to feed into eleven general thematic objectives set under the Common 
Provisions Regulation (the ‘CPR’) and the subsequent investment priorities identified by the 
each fund-specific ESI Regulation.  
Equally, ESI Funds’ operations must prove consistency with relevant EU policies and 
create synergies with other relevant EU Instruments and national actions, especially by 
integrating the principles of equality, non-discrimination and sustainable development. In 
2014-2020 consistency requires Member States to show ex ante in the programming 
documents (especially in PAs) the way they plan to implement the Common Strategic 
Framework of the ESI Funds, as well as the overall EU strategy for growth and jobs.  
 
                                                
227 Regulation (EC) 1083/2006, Article 15. 
228 Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, CPR, Article 95(5), Annex X. 
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3.1.3. Partnership - ex ante 
The principle of partnership ensures that the most representative actors at the national, 
regional or local level have been involved in the design and implementation of the ESI Funds 
assistance. These actors include bodies and actors responsible for the promotion of equality, 
non-discrimination and social inclusion. The conditionality is checked ex ante and conditions 
the approval of the programming documents.229 In 2014, a European Code on partnership 
guides further the Member States to indicate the list, role, actions and results of the 
consultation with partners in the programming documents. 230 Information on consultation of 
relevant partners is required in particular concerning the implementation of the horizontal 
principles of equality and non-discrimination. The code further sets as a good practice the 
involvement of partners during monitoring, evaluation and progress of OPs. 231 
3.1.4. Macroeconomic conditionality - ex post, negative 
Since 1994, the Cohesion Fund enforced the macroeconomic conditionality, allowing for 
suspension of payments in case of excessive deficit level.232 The 2014-2020 programming 
period enlarged the scope of the macroeconomic conditionality to all ESI Funds when the 
economic disbalances of a Member State would jeopardise the impact of ESI Funds’ 
assistance.233 The imperative of sound economic governance allows the Commission to 
request the amendment of the adopted PA and OPs in line with the Council recommendations 
adopted pursuant to article 148(4) TFEU. In case of non-compliance, the Commission may 
propose the Council to suspend all or part of the ESI Funds’ commitments or payments.234 
3.1.5. Monitoring and Evaluation - ex ante, ex post, negative, positive 
Monitoring - ex post, negative. The ESI Funds’ implementation is conditioned on the 
existence of sound monitoring arrangements. First, the ESI Funds’ operations are supervised 
                                                
229 Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, CPR, Article 5. 
230 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 240/2014 of 7 January 2014 on the European code of conduct 
on partnership in the framework of the European Structural and Investment Funds, OJ L 74/2 of 14.02.2014.  
231 Ibidem. 
232 Council Regulation (EC) No 1164/94 of 16 May 1994 establishing a Cohesion Fund, OJ L 130 of 
25.05.1994, Article 6. The Council Implementing Decision 2012/156/EU suspended for the first time since the 
establishment of the European Cohesion Fund in 1994 the financial commitments for Hungary, which failed to 
redress the excessive deficit. The suspension was sortly lifted due to satisfactory guarantee of deficit level 
adjustment. 
233 The conditionality was initially proposed as an ex ante conditionality, but was amended to an ex post 
conditionality due to the strong opposition of the EU legislators. See further on marcoeconomic conditionality: 
Egmont, European Economic Governance and Cohesion Policy, European Parliament, Information note 
474.552, p. 42. 
234 Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, CPR, Chapter IV, Article 23.  
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by the monitoring committee, which must be put in place by the Member States for each or 
all OPs. The Commission further supervises the performance of the OPs on an annual basis, 
through the annual implementation reports. In 2014-2020 period, the conditionality is also 
negative. As such, in case of the ‘serious deficiency’ in the monitoring system, the 
Commission may suspend the interim payments. As well, after the adoption of the 
programming documents the Commission may suspend the interim payments if it finds 
‘serious deficiency’ in the quality and reliability of the data on common and specific 
indicators in the annual implementation reports. In 2014-2020 period all data on indicators 
included in the annual implementation reports on ESF operations must be broken down by 
gender.235 
With the view to increase the democratic accountability of the policy, Member States 
are required additionally to submit a progress report at three-yearly intervals, describing the 
achievements of all programmes. The Commission summarises the progress reports in a 
strategic report submitted to the debate of the Council, Parliament and the European 
Economic and Social Committee.236  
Evaluation - ex ante, negative. Impact evaluations are carried out by independent experts ex 
ante, during the implementation and ex post. These assess the effectiveness, efficiency and 
overall impact of the ESI Funds assistance also testing its coherence and consistency with 
ESI Funds’ tasks and overall EU strategy. Programming documents shall be approved by the 
Commission only if they address to a sufficient extent the challenges identified in the ex ante 
evaluation,237 thus corresponding to an ex ante conditionality. The on-going and ex-post 
evaluations do not behave as conditionalities but rather as assessment exercises meant to 
detect the good practices and challenges, informing the Commission on the strategic direction 
of the following programming period. 
3.1.6. Performance review - ex post, positive, negative. 
A positive ex post conditionality in the form of ‘national performance reserve’ has been 
further introduced, starting with 2000-2006 programming period. The tool was left at the 
                                                
235 Regulation (EU) No 1304/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on the 
European Social Fund and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1081/2006, OJ L347/470 of 20.12.2012, 
Annex II. 
236 In 2014-2020, the Strategic reports shall be submited in 2017 and 2019. Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, CPR, 
Chapter IV, Article 53. 
237 Regulation (EU) 1303/21013, Article 15(1), a) ii and Article 16 (1).   
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discretion of the Member States and randomly used.238 In 2014-2020 programming period, 
the ‘performance reserve’ commitment was doubled to 6% from 3% and its allocation shifted 
from national to EU level, under the responsibility of the Commission, which shall award at 
the end of the programming period (in 2019) the reserve to the programmes and priorities that 
have successfully reached the priorities and milestones. The performance review may attract 
negative consequences in case of ‘serious failure’ to attain the milestones due to the 
implementation weaknesses. 239  The scheme reminds us to a certain extent the ex-post 
selectivity conditionality scheme of EU as employed in the external policy. However, here it 
does not condition the conclusion of the further agreement but entails the Member State to 
further incentives. The outcome-based conditionality was proposed during debates on the 
2013 reform, however the proposal did not make it in the final ESI Regulations.240 
3.1.7. Management and control - ex ante, ex post, negative 241 
Before the conclusion of the programming documents, Member States have to show ex ante 
sufficient institutional arrangements of the management, certifying and audit authorities, in 
line with the pre-established criteria of the ESI Regulations and Commission’s implementing 
acts. After the conclusion of the programming documents, Member States have to observe the 
conditionalities attached to sound financial management and control. These include audits 
carried out by independent auditors, annual implementing reports and a final implementing 
report. The procedure is structured in a three-layered system. According to the principle of 
shared management it is first the responsibility of the Member States to ensure sound ESI 
Funds’ expenditure. The Commission checks at least once a year the correctness of the 
payments and may suspend the interim payments or apply corrections in case of ‘significant 
deficiencies’. Ultimately the Court of Auditors reviews the sound implementation of the ESI 
Funds in its annual reports. The conditionality is negative, as the Commission would refuse 
the release of the first interim payment until Member States prove that the designated 
managing and certifying authorities fulfil the criteria established by the ESI Regulations. 
Moreover, the release of the next interim payments is conditional upon the submission of the 
annual implementing reports.242 In the 2014-2020 period, the conditionality has maintained 
                                                
238 F Barca, An agenda for a reformed cohesion policy, op.cit., note 214, supra, p.75. 
239 Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, CPR, Article 21, 22, Annex II.   
240 Barca, op.cit., note 214, supra, p.105. 
241 Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, CPR, Article 21, 22, Annex XIII. 
242 Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, CPR, Article 135, paras. 3-4. The scheme of the conditionality is similar to the 
one in 2007-2013 period. 
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similar features. 
 
3.2. Short assessment of existing conditionalities and the introduction of 2014-2020 ex 
ante conditionalities 
Throughout the last programming periods, the lack of clear tangible objectives, broad targets 
and vagueness with regards to the expected results were generally seen as the main 
drawbacks in the ESI Funds’ conditionality.243 Based on the analysis of ESI Funds framework 
from 1988 to 2009, Barca argues that conditionalities were generally perceived by the 
Member States as a mere “compliance exercise”; these “were often turned into 
‘homogeneous prescriptions’ liable to be bypassed or downplayed”.244 Furthermore, the 
balance between conditionality and subsidiarity was found unsatisfactory.245 The suspension 
and corrections were enforced in case of ‘serious deficiencies’, ‘significant deficiencies’, 
‘serious failure’, ‘serious breaches or irregularities’.246 It was further argued that due to the 
exceptional nature of the sanctions, the burdensome procedure and the lack of discretional 
power, the Commission rather exercised ‘moral suasion’ than enforcement power.247 The 
concerns stirred a vast debate on the need for more robust conditionality and for stronger 
contractual commitments, which was largely reflected in the final outcome of the 2013 
reform. First, as seen above, the already existing conditionalities have been reinforced and 
shifted progressively into the sphere of Commission discretion.248 In 2014-2020 period, the 
programming documents have a more evidenced character of binding obligation as both –
PAs and OPs – have been designed as binding agreements adopted by means of 
implementing act decision. A general concern towards a preventive rather than reactive 
approach to ESI Funds delivery is noticed. In addition to the highlighted reforms, a new 
heavy wave of ex ante conditionalities made their way into the ESI Funds’ scheme.249 
                                                
243 P Casavola, Operational Rules and Results in Cohesion Policy Programmes: Analysis and Proposals for 
Conditionalities, p. 27. 
244 F Barca, op.cit., note 214, supra; for an economic perspective see also: J Blom-hansen, ‘Principals, agents, 
and the implementation of EU cohesion policy’, in Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 12, 2005, 624–648. 
Blom-Hansen argues that the lose tools at the disposal of the Commission allow the memeber states a large 
marge of manouver to ignore the objective set, and thus by-pass the principle of additionality. He argues in 
favour of ex-ante contractual arrangements and a stronger accountability of the memeber states.  
245 Barca, op.cit., note 214, supra, p. 95. 
246 Ibidem, p. 75. 
247 Ibidem. 
248 Fifth Report on Economic, Social and Territorial Cohesion, 9 November 2010. 
249 Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013, CPR, Annex XI. 
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The ex ante conditionalities 2014-2020 – ex ante, negative 
Forty-seven250 ex ante conditionalities have been introduced by the ESI Funds regulations, 
representing one of the ‘major hallmarks’ of the 2013 reform.251 They aim at bringing higher 
effectiveness and efficiency to the ESI Funds investment ensuring that the right pre-requisites 
are in place before the ESI Funds are disbursed. The ex ante conditionalities prescribe for 
already existing commitments of the Member States, appreciated as crucial for the efficient 
ESI Funds delivery. The ex ante conditionalities are classified in: general and thematic and 
are clustered around three core targets: 1) effective application of EU regulatory framework, 
2) administrative/institutional capacity building, 3) EU policy/strategy objectives.  
The general ex ante conditionalities apply in principle to all five 2014-2020 ESI Funds. 
In addition to the general ex ante conditionalities, thematic conditionalities apply to each 
fund according to the fund-specific provisions, being attached to thematic objectives and 
investment priorities. The conditionalities cover a wide range of EU action areas appreciated 
as crucial for the efficient absorption of the ESI Funds. They address, inter alia, institutional 
capacity of public administrations, R&D, ICT, competitiveness of small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs), transport and infrastructure, water and waste management, low carbon 
economy, resource efficiency, state aid, public procurement, statistical and indicators 
systems.252 
The ESI Funds ex ante conditionalities address also fundamental rights areas. The 
thematic conditionalities, even though more indirectly, also touch upon important 
fundamental rights considerations, in the area of: social rights, inclusion of marginalised 
communities - such as Roma, poverty reduction, environmental protection, education and 
health.253 Three general ex ante fundamental rights conditionalities, in the area of: non-
discrimination, gender equality and disability are introduced (Chapter III, below). 
                                                
250 Regulation (EC) No 1303/2013, Annex XI, includes thirty six conditionalities, out of which seven general 
and twenty nine thematic. The twenty-nine thematic conditionalities apply to ERDF, ESF and Cohesion Fund. 
Additionally, EAFRD provides for seven thematic conditionalities, see: Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013, Article 
9, Annex V and EMFF Regulation (EU) 508/2014 introduces other four fund-specific conditionalities. 
251 COM (2011) 615 final/2, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying 
down common provisions on the ERDF, the ESF, the Cohesion Fund, the EAFRD and the EMFF and repealing 
Regulation 1083/2006. 
252 Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013, CPR, Annex XI, part I and II. 
253 Ibidem.  
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INTERIM CONCLUSIONS 
This Chapter aimed to provide a retrospective analysis of the ESI Funds legislative 
frameworks as of 1988 reform with respect to fundamental rights and conditionality concepts.  
We did that first, by analysing the evolution of fundamental rights specific action and 
equality mainstreaming and second, the conditionality attached to ESI Funds’ operations.  
The analysis has revealed the following findings:  
ESI Funds’ specific actions have generally contributed positively to the EU policy goal of 
promoting equal opportunities and combating discrimination. The impact is rather qualitative 
than quantitative as the ESI Funds’ financial allocations are very limited in comparison to the 
national budgets of the Member States. Generally ESI Funds’ equality-related obligations 
complemented, reinforced or encouraged national policies on equal opportunities. In some 
cases, ESI Funds contribution to the equal opportunity goal constituted the only financial 
resource supporting the equality-related actions, as a national budget line was missing. Even 
if the equality related operations were increasingly complemented from ERDF resources, 
these remained substantively linked to ESF. 
The legislative frameworks, as well as the programming documents, have been 
progressively more open to equality mainstreaming perspective. The programming period 
2007-2013 reveals an almost universal acknowledgment of the importance of the principles 
of equality and non-discrimination in ESF programming documents. However, a general 
tendency to a formal acknowledgment and lack of a comprehensive equality mainstreaming 
approach of the equality and non-discrimination principles is characteristic for the majority of 
the ESI-funded actions. Also, the strong emphasis on equality mainstreaming led to a 
significant decrease of spending for specific action interventions, without increasing 
accordingly the spending for mainstreaming.  
Conditionalities, before 2013 reform, were not specifically affected to any area of 
fundamental rights, but had as a primary aim to secure the ESI Funds sound operation. 
However, the equality perspective was mainstreamed in the context of several 
conditionalities related to ex-ante evaluations, monitoring and partnership principle, 
contributing indirectly to the delivery of equal opportunities goal.  
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CHAPTER III. THE ESI FUNDS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS CONDITIONALITIES  
The third Chapter is the denouement of the present thesis. It first aims to respond to the long-
expected question: what are fundamental right conditionalities as introduced in 2014-2020 
ESI Funds? How are they different from prior arrangements? and, most importantly: what do 
they bring to the social inclusion and equal opportunities goal of the ESI Funds and more 
broadly to the EU goal of promoting equality and combating status discrimination? 
Three explicit ex ante conditionalities in the area of fundamental rights have been 
introduced in the 2013 ESI Funds’ reform package in the area of non-discrimination, gender 
equality and disability (the ‘ESI fundamental rights conditionalities’ or ‘ex ante fundamental 
rights conditionalities’).254 The ESI fundamental rights conditionalities are general, meaning 
that in principle they shall apply to all five ESI Funds and equally to all twenty-eight EU 
Member States.  
As already mentioned in Chapter II, based on the criteria to be fulfilled, all forty-seven 
ESI Funds ex ante conditionalities are clustered around three main areas: 1) sound 
implementation and application of EU regulatory framework; 2) institutional or 
administrative capacity; 3) implementation of EU policies and strategies.255 ESI fundamental 
rights conditionalities address mainly the first two groups. These aim at securing a sound EU 
regulatory framework and administrative capacity. 
Building on the previous findings, the present Chapter aims to introduce in detail the 
ESI fundamental rights conditionalities. It elaborates on their scope and nature; their 
specificity and reach compared to the existing EU conditionality policy arrangements. 
Finally, several concluding thoughts on ESI fundamental rights conditionalities’ potential 
shall be briefly discussed. 
To this aim, the Chapter first presents the scope of conditionalities as regulated by the 
ESI Funds 2014-2020 legislative framework, their applicability, criteria for fulfilment, as 
well as the suspension procedure (Section 1). Onwards the nature of ESI fundamental rights 
conditionalities is examined in the light of the conceptual toolkit presented in the first 
Chapter of the thesis (Section 2). The third section tests the novelty of ESI fundamental rights 
                                                
254 In this Chapter, the term ‘ex ante conditionalities’ shall refer to all forty-seven ESI Funds ex ante 
conditionalities, including the three fundamental rights conditionalities in the area of anti-discrimination, gender 
equality and disability. The term ‘ESI fundamental rights conditionalities’ shall refer exclusively to the three 
general ex ante conditionalities in the area of anti-discrimination, gender equality and disability. 
255 European Commission, Guidance on Ex Ante Conditionalities for the European Structural and Investment 
Funds, Part I, Draft, 13 February 2014, p.4. 
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conditionalities by comparing them to the existing conditionality arrangements of EU 
external and internal policy (Section 3.1.) as well as with the previous arrangements of ESI 
Funds frameworks (Section 3.2.). Finally, the Chapter intends to briefly question the potential 
and limits of the ESI fundamental rights conditionalities: primary, in the context of ESI 
Funds equal opportunities action; and, in subsidiary, in the broader context of EU law on 
equality and non-discrimination (Section 4). 
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SECTION 1. ESI FUNDS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS CONDITIONALITIES – 
WHAT SCOPE? 
The three general ESI fundamental rights conditionalities had a hard journey in the 2014-
2020 ESI Funds framework. These have been the object of tight disputes as to their 
appropriateness and necessity in the ESI Funds’ context. First ESI fundamental rights 
conditionalities have been completely set-aside during the Danish presidency negotiations.256 
Later on these have been re-inserted under the Lithuanian presidency compromise on ex ante 
conditionalities,257 substantially changed compared to the initial Commission’s proposal.258 
In the aftermath of long negotiations, Member States accepted ex ante conditionalities, 
however established a clear and well-delimited scope for their applicability and for 
Commission’s discretion in the process.259 First, the 2013 Common Provisions Regulation 
(the ‘CPR’) introduces a stand-alone definition on applicable ex ante conditionalities.260 
Second, a detailed procedure as to Commission’s role in the assessment on the fulfilment and 
suspension of ESI Funds has been put in place.261 Third, specific guidance have been drafted 
(the ‘Commission Guidance’) to help Member States with the correct identification of 
applicable conditionalities and assessment of compliance, further developing the provisions 
of the regulations.262 
Analysing the outcome of negotiations, one cannot but notice how the apparent 
extensive scope of the ESI Fundamental conditionalities announced in the 2014-2020 ESI 
Funds proposals has been counter-balanced by the introduced applicability test. As such, the 
ESI Fundamental rights conditionalities shall apply only subject to multiple applicability 
benchmarks, given that they prove a sizeable impact on the ESI Funds’ operation.  
The result is much of a paradox: conditionality conditions Member States, but, at the 
same time, Member States have conditioned conditionality itself. 
                                                
256 Council of the European Union, ‘Cohesion Policy Legislative Package. Presidency compromise on ex ante 
conditionalities, no 12543/2/11 REV 2, 2012, Annex IV, p. 20. 
257 Council of the European Union, ‘Cohesion Policy Legislative Package. Presidency compromise on ex ante 
conditionalities', no 12383/13 ADD 2, 22.07.2013. 
258 See: COM (2011) 615 final/2, Annex IV. 
259 The thematic ex ante conditionalities have been as well subject to substantive changes. These have been 
expressly attached to specific thematic objectives and investment priorities corresponding to the relevant ESI 
Funds, see: Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, CPR, Annex XI, Part I. 
260 Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, CPR, Article 2(1), point (33).  
261 Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, CPR, Article 19. 
262 European Commission, Guidance on Ex Ante Conditionalities for the European Structural and Investment 
Funds, Part I and Part II, Draft, 13 February 2014, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/information/guidelines/index_en.cfm#2, consulted on 01.06.2014.  
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1.1. Applicable ex ante conditionality - a first definition 
For the first time, the 2014-2020 ESI Funds framework brings an expressis verbis definition 
of ‘applicable ex ante conditionality’, which applies equally to the ESI fundamental rights 
conditionalities. The definition is a novelty not only for the ESI Funds, but also for the 
overall EU conditionality policy. It does not define the concept of conditionality per se, but 
illustrates key features, which constitute applicability benchmarks and help us subsequently 
deduce the defining elements of ex ante conditionalities, in general and ESI fundamental 
rights conditionality, in particular.  
The primary effect of the definition is that it limits the ex officio application of ESI 
fundamental rights conditionalities. This means that, in principle, any of the three 
fundamental rights conditionalities has the vocation to potentially apply, however, the actual 
applicability is decided in concreto on a case-by-case basis by Member States in close 
consultation with the Commission. 
As such, Article 2 CPR, defines the ‘applicable ex ante conditionality’ as:  
“a concrete and precisely pre-defined critical factor, which is a prerequisite for 
and has a direct and genuine link to, and direct impact on, the effective and 
efficient achievement of a specific objective for an investment priority or a 
Union priority.263  
We shall onwards unfold the given definition and read it alongside the overall CPR 
normative framework and Commission’s Guidance to better delimit the scope and features of 
fundamental rights conditionalities in the context of ESI Funds’ scheme. 
1.1.1. Applicability test  
The introduced applicability test described below corrects the claimed extensive application 
of the ESI fundamental rights conditionalities and limits their scope to the areas where a 
substantive direct link and a direct positive impact on the financial allocation can be proven. 
The practical outcome is that the ESI fundamental rights conditionalities are more likely to be 
found applicable primarily in the areas of ESF operations rather than in interventions 
budgeted from other ESI Funds, continuing the trend of the previous programming periods. 
According to the definition, for an actual application of any ex ante conditionality, including 
the ESI fundamental rights conditionalities, two consecutive applicability steps must be met. 
                                                
263 Regulation 1303/2013, CPR, Article 2 (33). 
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i. Concrete and precisely pre-defined factor 
Initially, it must be shown that conditionality is a: concrete and precisely pre-defined critical 
factor. This first step is substantially eased by the CPR, which has already undertaken this 
assessment and pre-identified in an express and precise manner the conditionalities of 
potential critical importance for ESI Funds.264 It follows that, even if other critical factors are 
identified at a later stage, these shall not be compulsory on the Member States unless the 
regulation is amended. The EU legislator is presumed to have taken a proper assessment of 
what are the critical factors necessary for ESI Funds successful implementation. One should 
note nevertheless that Member States could additionally identify further critical factors in 
their state-specific programming documents, however the Commission shall not require it.265  
ii. A pre-requisite for, a direct and genuine link to, a direct impact on the effectiveness 
and efficiency of the ESI Funds specific objective 
Secondly, once identified, such a concrete and precisely pre-defined factor should: 
-­‐ constitute a pre-requisite for, and 
-­‐ have a direct and genuine link to, and, 
-­‐ have a direct impact on,  
the effective and efficient achievement of a given specific objective for an investment priority 
in case of the ERDF, ESF and Cohesion Fund or a given specific objective for a Union 
priority, in case of the EMFF and EAFRD. 
For the purpose of the ESI Funds framework, the ‘specific objective’ is defined as: 
“the result to which an investment priority or Union priority contributes in a specific national 
or regional context through actions or measures undertaken within such a priority”.266  
In other words, the conditionality must constitute a decisive factor for the successful 
attainment of the result aimed by a given fund-specific investment priority or Union 
priority.267  
Hence, the second step implies three additional applicability requirements. These 
constitute the core of ex ante conditionality applicability analysis. One should stress that the 
                                                
264 Regulation 1303/2013, CPR, Annex XI. 
265 Declaration of the Commission, European Parliament debates on EMFF, file 2011/0380(COD), 16 April 
2014, Strasbourg. 
266 Regulation 1303/2013, CPR Article 2, point (33).  
267 For an overview of investment and Union prioritites see Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013, CPR, Article 9, 
detailed in the corrsponding fund-specific regulations. 
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conjunction ‘and’ suggests that all the above-mentioned requirements have to be met 
cumulatively not alternatively.  
First, it must be shown that the ex ante conditionality is a prerequisite. In other words, 
the conditionality must be a ‘sine qua non’ factor, conditional for the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the ESI Funds investment. If one adopts a per a contrario reasoning, it follows 
that that absence the ‘concrete and precisely pre-defined critical factor’ the achievement of a 
specific objective shall be neither effective nor efficient, or at least one of the two results 
shall be seriously impaired. 
Second, a direct and genuine link - must be established between the fulfilment of the 
ex ante conditionality and the effectiveness and efficiency of the specific objective. The 
direct and genuine link suggests that an immediate, clear and close link must be identifiable 
between the non-fulfilment or fulfilment of conditionality, on the one hand, and the 
efficiency and effectiveness of ESI Funds’ operations, one the other hand.  
Finally, the failure to fulfil the conditionality should have a direct impact on both, the 
effectiveness and efficiency of a specific objective. Thus, it must be also shown that the non-
fulfilment of the ex ante conditionality could impact on the effectiveness of the ESI Funds 
specific objective, which translates in an actual or potential risk of not achieving the result of 
an investment objective. At the same time, it must be proven that the non-fulfilment could 
impair the efficiency of investments, which translates in higher material, administrative or 
management costs, implementation delays or other related costs.268  
The Commission’s Guidance recommends Member States to start the applicability 
assessment with the third requirement, namely the existence of a direct impact on the 
effective and efficient attainment of an investment priority. If no such impact is identified the 
conditionality should be deemed non-applicable. 269
                                                
268Comission Guidance, Part I, op.cit., note 262, supra, p. 9.  
269Ibidem. 
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Table III.1: Applicability assessment of ESI Funds fundamental rights conditionalities270 
Area Ex ante Conditionality Applicability key-questions 
1. Anti - 
discrimination 
The existence of administrative 
capacity for the implementation and 
application of Union anti-
discrimination law and policy in the 
field of ESI Funds 
-­‐ Do the anti-discrimination directives constitute 
applicable Union law for the interventions which 
will be supported under the relevant priority of a 
programme co-financed by the ESI Funds? 
-­‐ Does the achievement of the specific objective 
require the effective implementation and 
application of anti-discrimination directives? 
-­‐ Is there a link between the effective 
implementation and application of anti-
discrimination directives and the achievement of 
the specific objective? 
-­‐ Will ineffective implementation and application 
of anti-discrimination directives lead to a 
potential risk of not achieving results 
(effectiveness) or high costs/administrative 
burden/delays to implementation (efficiency)? 
 
2. Gender 
Equality 
The existence of administrative 
capacity for the implementation and 
application of Union gender equality 
law and policy in the field of ESI Funds 
In order to achieve the specific objectives for all or 
part of the investment or Union priority: 
-­‐ Does the achievement of the specific objective 
require the effective implementation of Union 
gender equality law?  
-­‐ Is there a link between the effective 
implementation of EU gender equality law and 
policy and the achievement of the specific 
objectives?  
-­‐ Will ineffective implementation of gender 
equality law and policy lead to a potential risk of 
not achieving results (effectiveness) or high 
costs/administrative burden/delays to 
implementation (efficiency)?  Examples: risk of 
non-achievement for certain target groups.  
 
3. Disability The existence of administrative 
capacity for the implementation and 
application of the United Nations 
Convention on the rights of persons 
with disabilities (UNCRPD) in the field 
of ESI Funds in accordance with 
Council Decision 2010/48/EC 
-­‐ Does the UN Convention constitute applicable 
Union law for the interventions to be supported 
under the relevant priority of a programme co-
financed by the ESI Funds? 
-­‐ Does the achievement of the specific objective 
require the effective implementation and 
application of the UN Convention on the rights 
of persons with disability? 
-­‐ Is there a link between the effective 
implementation and application of the UN 
Convention and achievement of the specific 
objective? 
-­‐ Will ineffective implementation and application 
of the UN Convention lead to a potential risk of 
not achieving results (effectiveness) or high 
costs/administrative burden/delays to 
implementation (efficiency)? 
 
 
                                                
270 As set in Commission Guidance, Part I, op. cit., note 259, supra, pp.11-12. 
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iii. Applicability key-questions 
Coming back to the specific case of ESI fundamental rights conditionalities, the Commission 
Guidance proposes several ‘operational’ key-questions to the attention of the Member States 
during the applicability assessment exercise (Table III.1, above). 
These suggest another starting point than the ‘direct impact’ one. As such, Member 
States are guided to appreciate firstly whether the EU law in the area of non-discrimination, 
gender equality and disability constitutes applicable law in the ESI Funds operations and 
subsequently, whether a weak EU law implementation would result in a risk to the ESI Funds 
investment, in particular where EU law rules are part of the selection criteria.271  
Whereas the first recommendation can easily be fulfilled, as one could hardly think 
about an ESI Funds’ intervention where the EU equality law would not apply; with regards to 
the second, one could nevertheless argue that, for instance, the non-observance of anti-
discrimination ex ante conditionality, under the waste management objective, would not lead 
to an inefficient and ineffective achievement of the objective’s results. 
Several remarks have to be made vis-à-vis the Commission’s proposed applicability 
questions. 
First, the given questions depart from the CPR legislative text and the ex ante 
conditionalities prescribed therein. As shown in Table III.1 above, in the area of non-
discrimination ex ante conditionality, the applicability exercise limits the criteria from the 
requirement of sound implementation and application of ‘Union anti-discrimination law and 
policy’ to the ‘effective implementation and application of anti-discrimination directives’.272 
In such a way, the scope of EU law and policy in anti-discrimination area is de facto reduced 
to anti-discrimination directives.273 In case of gender equality ex ante conditionality, the CPR 
provisions require Member States to prove sound ‘implementation and application’ of ‘EU 
law and policy’. According to the questions, the applicability is checked solely against the 
‘effective implementation of EU gender equality law’,274 setting aside the EU soft law and 
policy instruments in the area. As well, one cannot objectively justify the asymmetries 
                                                
271 Comission Guidance, Part I, op.cit., note 259, supra, p. 10-13. 
272 Ibidem, p. 11. 
273 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between 
persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, OJ L 180 of 19.7.2000; Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 
November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, OJ L 303 
of 2.12.2000. 
274 Comission Guidance, Part I, op.cit., note 259, supra, p. 11. 
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between the anti-discrimination and gender equality fundamental rights conditionalities. They 
both ask cumulatively for efficient implementation and application of EU law and policy in 
the area. Departing from the legislative text, the guiding applicability questions check in the 
case of gender equality only the implementation and not the application of EU law in the 
area.  
Second, a close reading of the above questions raises a degree of concern. These ask: 
‘Does the achievement of the specific objective require the effective implementation and 
application of anti-discrimination directives?’ or ‘[w]ill ineffective implementation of gender 
equality law and policy lead to a potential risk of not achieving results[?] […]’. In a per a 
contrario reading, they seem to admit that if no risk on the ESI Funds investment is 
identified, the effective implementation and application of EU law is not necessary. Maybe 
from an ‘operational’ point of view the questions are well framed, however, from the point of 
view of their conceptual implications a more cautious formulation could be considered. 
1.1.2. Proportionality test 
The applicability-test described above has to be read alongside other provisions of the CPR. 
In this sense, CPR states that the applicability assessment of all ex ante conditionalities shall 
take into account also the principle of proportionality.275 As a consequence, where an ESI 
fundamental rights conditionality is found applicable, a subsequent proportionality test shall 
be undertaken, with due consideration, to ‘the level of allocated support’ and the ‘overall aim 
of reducing the administrative burden on the management and control bodies’, where 
appropriate.276 
The Commission’s Guidance interprets proportionality requirement in the sense that if 
a ‘relatively small direct impact’ can be proven on the effectiveness and efficiency of one of 
the ESI Funds’ specific objectives, the ex ante conditionality shall not apply.277 This means 
that the ‘direct and genuine impact’ requirement presented above (Section 1.1.1.) must also 
be a considerable one. If a ‘relatively small’ impact is anticipated the conditionality shall be 
found disproportionate, thus not applicable.278 
As to the level of assistance, the Commission Guidance admits that the level of 
support shall be taken into account; however, a low level of support does not attract 
                                                
275 Regulation 1303/2013, CPR, recital  21, Article 19. 
276 Regulation 1303/2013, CPR, Articles 19 (3) and 4(5). 
277 Comission Guidance, Part I, op.cit., note 262, supra, p.8. 
278 Comission Guidance Part I, op.cit., note 262, supra, p.28. 
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automatically the disapplication of conditionality. It is further stressed that the nature of the 
assistance shall still constitute the primary reference in the proportionality assessment.279 
We consider the above interpretation too straightforward. Once an ex ante 
conditionality is found capable of positive impact, not only the level and nature of assistance, 
but equally the actual actions needed to fulfil the conditionality should be taken into account. 
Only if these are found disproportionate should the level of assistance also be called into 
question. That is to say that, once a genuine link is established, even if the ESI Funds 
resources granted are limited, it should be checked if de facto the ex ante conditionalities’ 
fulfilment calls for financially or administrative burdensome actions, as these may well call 
for rationalization of the existing resources, with no need for further financial intervention.
                                                
279 Ibidem, p.9. 
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1.2. Criteria  
Once found applicable and proportionate, the assessment of compliance shall be expressly 
limited to the fulfilment of specific criteria exhaustively laid down in the Annex XI, Part II of 
the CPR (Table III.2, above). 
As already mentioned, ESI fundamental rights conditionalities aim at ensuring the 
existence of ‘administrative capacity’ to effectively implement and apply the EU law and 
policy in the area of non-discrimination, gender equality and disability throughout the ESI 
Funds’ operations. The existence of ‘administrative capacity’ and ‘effective implementation 
and application’ of EU regulatory framework is checked against the fulfilment of expressly 
pre-defined criteria, appreciated crucial for the attainment of the investment result. These 
criteria are: 1) arrangements with the national bodies responsible for promotion of non-
discrimination, gender equality and disability 2) arrangements for training on non-
discrimination, gender equality and disability of staff involved in the ESI Funds management 
and control 3) arrangements for monitoring of accessibility for persons with disabilities in 
ESI co-founded actions.282 
The CPR criteria are further detailed in the Commission’s Guidance (Table III.2, 
above). These demand that the ‘arrangements’ are translated into operational ‘plans’. The 
plans must show that equality bodies and other relevant actors are actively involved and 
consulted during the ESI Funds design and operation, as well as that concrete steps for 
training of staff involved in the implementation of ESI Funds are in place.283 
The fulfilment of a given fundamental rights conditionality implies that all the 
corresponding criteria are completely and cumulatively fulfilled. A partial or non-adequate 
fulfilment shall not be considered satisfactory.284 
1.2.1. Arrangements with the national actors responsible for promotion of equality 
The criterion, common to al three fundamental rights conditionalities, checks first if an 
                                                
282 In the area of gender equality, the CPR proposal called additionally for: ‘effective implementation and 
application of an explicit strategy for the promotion of gender equality’. Equally, the criteria required: “a system 
for collecting and analyzing data and indicators broken down by sex and to develop evidence-based gender 
policies; a plan for the integration of gender equality objectives through gender standards and guidelines”, see: 
COM (2011) 615/2 final, Annex IV, pp. 149-150.  
283 Commission Guidance, Part II, op.cit., note 262, supra, pp, 337-356. 
284 Comission Guidance, Part I, op.cit., note 262, supra, p. 14. 
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equality body has been set-up pursuant to article 13 of Directive 2000/43/EC285 and article 20 
of Directive 2006/54/EC286 in the area of gender equality and non-discrimination. In the 
disability area, it checks whether relevant actors and bodies responsible for the protection of 
persons with disabilities have been identified.  
Once set-up and/or identified, a plan should be put in place to ensure that these 
entities are dully consulted and actively involved during all the stages of ESI Funds 
implementation, especially by providing expert advice during ESI Funds’ design, 
implementation and other related activities.287  
1.2.2. Training for staff 
The second criterion mandates Member States to put in place training arrangements for staff 
involved in monitoring and control of ESI Funds related activities, during all stages of 
implementation and at various levels of competence in the area of non-discrimination, gender 
equality and protection of persons with disabilities. Also in this case a plan has to be drawn to 
show an actual training schedule, including all relevant authorities and corresponding specific 
actions to be taken.288 
1.2.3. Accessibility for persons with disabilities 
In the area of disability, Member States must ensure proper arrangements to monitor the 
accessibility of the disabled persons throughout ESI Funds preparation and implementation, 
according to article 9 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.289 The 
criterion requires the existence of clear monitoring instruments to secure ‘notification’, 
‘problem resolution’ and ‘redress’ in ESI Funds actions. Also precise technical guidance 
documents must be drafted which refer expressly to the applicable EU and national legal 
framework and standards, allowing for a transparent and objective assessment of accessibility 
for persons with disabilities.290 
                                                
285 Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or 
ethnic origin, OJ L 180 of 19.07.2000. 
286 Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation 
of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and 
occupation (recast) OJ L 204 of 26.07.2006. 
287 Commission Guidance, Draft, Part II, op.cit., note 262, supra, p. 337-356. 
288 Ibidem. 
289 Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, CPR, Annex XI, part II, point 3. 
290 Commission Guidance, Draft, Part II, op.cit., note 262, supra, pp. 349-357. 
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1.3. Five stages of ESI fundamental rights conditionalities’ implementation 
The identification, assessment of applicability and finally the fulfilment of the ex ante 
conditionalities, including ESI fundamental rights conditionalities, is the result of close 
cooperation between the Member States and the Commission. It is first for the Member State 
to assess the applicability and fulfilment of all the ex ante conditionalities in accordance with 
the domestic institutional and legislative framework. In subsidiary, the Commission checks 
the self-assessment undertaken by each Member State, subsequently adopting the 
programming documents or suspending the ESI Funds payments. The process comprises five 
stages, which are almost totally carried out during the programming phase, thus ex-ante (see 
Figure III.1. below).  
Figure III.1.: Five stages of ESI fundamental rights conditionality assessment291 
 
                                                
291 Personal adaptation of Annex 7, Commisson Guidance, Part I, op.cit., note 262, supra, p. 25. 
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1.3.1. Self assessment by the Member State  
In the light of the principle of subsidiarity it is first for the Member States to undertake the 
applicability and compliance test presented above (Section 1.1. and 1.2).292 As such, each 
Member State shall assess in accordance with the identified thematic objectives, fund-
specific investments priorities and ultimately specific objectives what are the applicable 
fundamental rights ex-ante conditionalities, which could impact on the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the ESI Funds (Table III.1, above). Once found applicable, Member States shall 
assess whether each criterion of fundamental rights conditionalities is fulfilled (Table III.2, 
above). 
A summary of the applicable ex ante conditionalities, including the ESI fundamental 
rights conditionalities, as well as the data on the fulfilment of the criteria shall be presented in 
the Member State’ Partnership Agreement (PA) as well as in each Operational Programme 
(OP). In doing so, Member States shall take into account the country-specific 
recommendations of the Council, adopted pursuant to article 121(2) on social policy and 148 
(4) TFEU on economic policy,293 as well as the Commission’s country-specific position 
papers for the period 2014-2020.294 As the PA represents the Member States’ overall strategy 
document on the use of ESI Funds throughout the programming period,295 it must contain the 
full list of the applicable ex ante conditionalities at the Member State level. The OPs, on the 
other hand, must mention only the ex ante conditionalities applicable to the specific 
objectives of the OP and its investment priorities.  
If the conditionalities’ criteria are not fulfilled, both the PAs and the OPs must 
mention an action plan for fulfilment, the national bodies responsible and a clear 
implementation timeframe which shall not exceed December 31, 2016 at the latest.296 
1.3.2. Commission’s assessment of the information provided by the Member State 
In the second stage, the Commission assesses the adequacy and consistency of the 
information provided by the Member States.297 If the Commission finds the Member State’s 
                                                
292 Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, CPR,  Article 19 (1). 
293 Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, CPR, Article 15 (1) a) (i). 
294 European Commission 2014-2020 position papers on the development of Partnership Agreement and 
programmes for the period 2014-2020, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/what/future/program/index_en.cfm, consulted on 02.02.2014. 
295 Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, CPR, Article 2 (20). 
296 Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, CPR, Article 19 (2). 
297 Comission Guidance, Part I, op. cit., note 262, supra, p. 18. 
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self-assessment satisfactory it shall adopt the PA by issuing an implementing act Decision298 
and subsequently approving the Member States’ OPs. If, however, the Commission has 
doubts in respect of applicability or fulfilment of the identified ex ante conditionalities it may 
make recommendations or continue the dialogue with the Member State.  
If an agreement is not reached a new stage is launched.  
1.3.3. Resolution of disagreement 
Pursuant to the CPR the Commission shall bear the burden of proof in case of disagreement 
on the applicability or fulfilment of a given ex ante conditionality.299 To operationalize this 
provision, the Commission Guidance suggests that in case of disagreement, the Commission 
shall adopt a resolution of disagreement.300 The document shall have to prove first the 
applicability of the ex ante conditionality and second, the actions which the Member State 
failed to implement.301  
1.3.4. Suspension of the interim payments at the OP approval  
The Commission is entitled to suspend totally or partly the interim payments already upon 
the adoption of an OP, in case it finds that the failure to fulfil the ex ante conditionality may 
significantly hamper the attainment of a given specific objective of an investment priority.302  
It must be stressed however that once a significant prejudice is imminent, in order to 
prevent the suspension, the Member State can still adapt the OP’s investment priorities so 
that the conditionality is not applicable. If that is not possible or desirable, the interim 
payments may be suspended until the complete fulfilment of the ex ante conditionality.  
The Commission shall lift the suspensions ‘without delay’ if the Member State took 
the necessary actions for fulfilment.303 It is worth noting that also here the ‘significant 
prejudice’ shall be assessed in line with the principle of proportionality. As such, the 
prejudice shall be established having regards to the level of risk for the efficient 
implementation of the ESI Funds resources, as well as to the degree of non-fulfilment. 
                                                
298 Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, CPR, Article 16 (1). 
299 Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, CPR, Article 19 (4). 
300 Comission Guidance, Part I, op. cit., note 262, supra, p. 18. 
301 Comission Draft Guidance, op.cit., note 262, supra, p.19. 
302 Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, CPR, Article 19 (5). 
303 Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, CPR, Article 19. 
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1.3.5. Suspension of the interim payment after the expiry of exceptional extension 
deadline  
When the Member State did not fulfil an applicable ex ante conditionality before the adoption 
of the OPs, it shall do so as soon as possible, but no later than 31 December 2016. In the 
meanwhile, as stated above, the interim payments at risk of ‘significant prejudice’ remain 
suspended (Section 1.3.4.).  
The suspension addresses only the amount of funds at risk corresponding to the 
specific objective of the OP’s investment priority. It follows that the payments, which are not 
under a risk of ‘significant prejudice’, shall be disbursed until the end of 2016, even if the ex 
ante conditionality is not in place. Member States must report on fulfilment of fundamental 
rights conditionalities in the annual Report of 1 January 2017 and the 2017 Progress 
Report.304 In case of failure to implement the fundamental rights conditionalities until the 
deadline, the Commission may decide to suspend the interim payments or order the 
continuation of suspension for the ones suspended already upon the OP’s adoption (Section 
1.3.4. above).305  
It must be stressed that once an agreement on ex ante conditionalities has been 
reached there is no possibility to review it. As such, once the Commission and the Member 
States have agreed that an ESI fundamental rights conditionality is fulfilled or on the 
contrary, not applicable as indicated in the approved PA and OP; or if no opposition is made 
by the Commission in 60 days after the 2017 Report, concerning, inter alia, the fulfilment of 
ex ante conditionalities, there will be no possibility to subsequently suspend the interim 
payments.306 
 
1.4. Fundamental rights conditionalities: what applicability? 
The applicability requirements presented above leave the impression of a particularly 
burdensome test on ESI fundamental rights conditionalities. This is especially so given that 
contrary to the thematic ex-ante conditionalities, which are priory attached to a specific 
investment area, ESI fundamental rights conditionalities are general and, their applicability 
                                                
304 Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, CPR Article 50 (4), Article 52 (2) (c) 
305 The suspension shall be ordered based on Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, CPR, Article 142 para. 1 for ERDF, 
ESF, Cohesion Fund; Article 41 CAP horizontal Regulation (EU) 1306/2013, respectively EMFF Regulation 
(EU) 508/2014, Article 102.  
306 Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, CPR, Article 19(6). 
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must be checked on a case-by-case basis. 
Nevertheless, in practice, the applicability of ESI fundamental rights conditionalities is 
well balanced. Member States are in principle the ones to decide on the design and 
orientation of the investment priorities and assess accordingly the applicability of 
fundamental rights conditionalities. Equally, as mentioned above, until the final adoption of 
all OPs, Member States may in principle escape the impediment of a non-fulfilled ex ante 
fundamental rights conditionality by amending accordingly the OPs’ investment priorities.307 
However, even so, Member States do not have a large margin of manoeuvre as the OPs have 
to follow closely the recommendations of the Council, as well as the Commission’s position 
papers.308 Moreover, the ESI Funds programming process is characterised by a continuous 
dialogue and negotiation between the Member States and Commission’s representatives. 
According to the preliminary data of the first thirteen PAs approved by the 
Commission, all have identified the general ex ante conditionalities on non-discrimination, 
gender equality and disability applicable (see Table 3, below).309 As to their fulfilment, it is 
interesting to note that even if ESI fundamental rights conditionalities have been designed to 
restate the existing obligations of the Member States, these are nevertheless not fulfilled in 
six PAs. 
Once again, it must be underlined that the effective applicability of ESI fundamental 
rights conditionalities shall be more visible at the level of OPs, which are still to be 
adopted. 310
                                                
307 Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, CPR, Article 19 para. 7 and Article 30. 
308 European Commission 2014-2020 position papers, op.cit., note 294, supra. 
309 The present thesis analyses the PAs adopted until 20.08.2014. 
310 The first and only OP adopted until 20.08.2014 in the ERDF investment area does not mention any of the 
three fundamental rights conditionalities. See: Operational Programme "Innovation and Sustainable Growth in 
Businesses", Denmark, pp.80-81. 
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Table 3: Fundamental rights conditionalities in adopted 2014-2020 Partnership Agreements311 
Member 
State 
Applicable 
Yes/No 
 
Fulfilled/Partially/Not fulfilled 
 
Bulgaria Yes Fulfilled 
Cyprus Yes Fulfilled 
Denmark Yes Fulfilled 
Estonia Yes All partially fulfilled (deadline 30.09.2014) 
France Yes Fulfilled 
Germany Yes Fulfilled 
Greece Yes 
Partially fulfilled 
- non-discrimination- fulfilled 
- gender equality- fulfilled  
- disability- partially fulfilled (deadline 15.10.2014) 
Latvia Yes Not fulfilled (deadline 31.12.2014) 
Lithuania Yes Fulfilled 
Poland Yes All partially fulfilled (deadline first half of 2014) 
Portugal Yes Fulfilled 
Romania Yes 
Not fulfilled 
- non-discrimination (deadline 31.12.2014 and 31.12.2015) 
- gender (deadline 31.07.2014) 
- disability (deadline 31.12.2014 and 31.12.2015) 
Slovakia Yes 
Not fulfilled 
- non-discrimination (deadlines 01.06.2014; 31.08.2014 and 
30.09.2014) 
- gender (deadline 01.10.2014 and 30.06.2015) 
- disability (deadline 31.08.2015 and 30.06.2015)  
  
                                                
311  According to the PAs adopted until 20.08.2014, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/contracts_grants/agreements/index_en.htm, consulted on 20.08.2014. 
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SECTION 2: ESI FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS CONDITIONALITIES – WHAT 
NATURE? 
Based on the general legislative architecture of ESI fundamental rights conditionalities 
presented above, we shall now try to fit the concept into the conceptual toolkit identified in 
Chapter I. As such, this part tests to which extent the ESI fundamental rights conditionalities 
fit conceptually in the general existent patterns of conditionality. 
2.1. ESI fundamental rights conditionalities – a definition 
The ESI fundamental rights conditionalities feed largely into the definition provided in the 
first Chapter of the present thesis. As such, ESI fundamental rights conditionality may be 
defined as:  
A political requirement with a legally binding nature, pre-established by the ESI Funds 
Regulations and further mutually negotiated and agreed between the European Commission 
and the EU Member States, which is accessory to the agreement on the ESI Funds 
expenditure - as specified in the programming documents - and must be complied with before 
the adoption of the programming documents or, exceptionally, within a precisely agreed 
time-frame, capable of limiting the access or suspending the ESI Funds in case of non-
fulfilment, having as main functions to ensure that the essential regulatory framework and 
administrative capacity are in place before the disbursement of the ESI Funds; secure the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the granted fund resources; ensure compliance or deter non-
compliance of the Member States. 
 
2.2. Type - political, legally binding, negative, ex ante 
Compared to the overall EU conditionality policy, the ESI fundamental rights conditionalities 
are particularly demanding. Not only they require that legally binding, specific conditions of 
political nature are in place ex ante; they also attract negative consequences in case of non-
compliance. Thus, they combine the legally binding, ex ante and negative types of the 
conditionality. 
From a substantive point of view, fundamental rights conditionalities of ESI Funds are 
political as they link conditions of political nature in the area of non-discrimination, gender 
equality and disability to ESI Funds’ pecuniary benefits granted to Member States.  
Normatively, these are established by legally binding provisions of ESI Funds 
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Regulations and are subsequently re-enforced in the country-specific programming 
documents adopted by Commission’s decision, which are equally binding on the Member 
States. 
As to the consequences, ESI fundamental rights conditionalities are negative. The 
failure to fulfil the conditionality criteria may limit Member States’ access to ESI Funds’ 
resources or may attract the suspension of interim payments. No further positive incentives 
are provided in case of timely and complete fulfilment. 
From the temporal point of view, ESI fundamental rights conditionalities are imposed 
ex ante, as they condition the access to ESI Funds, granted subject to prior and cumulative 
fulfilment of the established fundamental rights criteria. Only exceptionally, the agreement 
on ESI Funds shall be concluded even if the fundamental rights conditionalities are not in 
place, subject to sufficient guarantees provided by the Member States, including a detailed 
plan indicating the time-frame and actors responsible for fulfilment of each conditionality.  
 
2.3. Mutual agreement element 
The mutual agreement is the core element of the ESI fundamental rights conditionality 
design. In contrast with the general pattern of conditionality (Chapter I, Section 1.3.), where 
the agreement has been often criticised for being formal and unilaterally imposed by the 
conditionality actor, in the framework of ESI Funds the decision on ex ante fundamental 
rights conditionality is guided by a genuine culture of negotiation and dialogue. Even if the 
act of agreement materialises prima facie in a unilateral EU Regulation and a unilateral 
decision of the Commission adopting the programming documents; in fact, we speak of a 
veritable ‘contractual’ agreement.312  
As such, first, the mutual agreement between the Commission, European Parliament 
and Member States – wearing the ‘hat’ of Council members – intervenes at the moment of 
negotiations of the ESI Funds Regulations. Second, the adopted regulations provide indeed 
for a unilateral list of conditionalities, but these are not automatically mandatory on the 
Member States. The applicability and fulfilment of ESI fundamental rights conditionalities is 
bilaterally negotiated between the Commission and Member States during the programming 
                                                
312 It must be noted that the Commission proposal on the Common Provisions Regulation contained the term 
“Partnership Contract” which was changed to “Partnership agreement” post-negotiations. See: COM (2011) 615 
final/2.  
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period. As such, initially having regards to the Commission’s position, each Member State 
identifies the areas of investment mostly in need for ESI Funds intervention and the 
corresponding fundamental rights conditionalities. Further on, the Commission assesses the 
accuracy of the information provided by each Member State and may recommend further 
adjustments of the programming documents. Moreover, also by mutual agreement, the 
Commission together with the Member State may decide to adapt a specific objective of the 
OP, before its adoption, so that the non-fulfilled conditionalities are not applicable. 
 
2.4. Functions  
As for the functions, the ESI fundamental rights conditionalities follow the general patterns 
underlined in the literature.  
First, they aim to secure the ESI Funds resources in case of the risk of ‘significant 
prejudice’ to the ESI Funds’ efficient and effective implementation. The idea of risk is 
omnipresent in the overall rationale of the ESI Funds’ ex ante conditionalities. Therefore, 
fundamental rights conditionalities aim to lower the risk of inefficient ESI funds expenditure 
by making sure that the pre-requisites are in place ex ante. Thus, ESI regulations presume 
that the effective implementation of EU law and policy in the area of non-discrimination, 
gender equality and disability, together with a sound administrative capacity in these areas 
have the potential to secure a higher impact of the ESI Funds on the ground and lower the 
risk of damages to EU budget resources. 
Second, they pursue a behavioural function of maintaining and possibly enhancing the 
existent status quo in the area of non-discrimination, gender equality and disability. The ESI 
Fundamental rights conditionalities build upon the existent Member States’ obligations. They 
aim to ensure that first the relevant EU regulatory framework is effectively enforced and 
applied; and second, that there is sufficient administrative expertise to mainstream equality 
into all stages of the ESI Funds implementation. 
Third, a coercive and punitive function is present. As such, ESI fundamental rights 
conditionalities aim to induce coercion of the Member State requiring the fulfilment of 
corresponding criteria. If a Member State fails to comply, the punitive function corrects the 
Member State behaviour by limiting access or suspending the interim payments.  
Finally, the ESI fundamental rights conditionalities respond to the effectiveness 
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function – which is the most visible one. In this sense, ex ante fundamental rights 
conditionalities are introduced to Member States by using a pure instrumental discourse of 
‘effectiveness and efficiency’. This is a long-standing feature of equality related action into 
EU policies. As Pollack argues, the preferred term in framing the claim for gender issues 
within the EU policies is rather the ‘efficiency gains’ than ‘equality’ as the former is more 
likely to correspond to the dominant frame. 313  This view is also supported in the 
Commission’s Guidance, where the non-discrimination conditionality is presented as 
intending to: “limit the need to financial corrections, loss of resources and reduced 
effectiveness” of the financial interventions.. 314  The gender equality conditionality is 
supported by empirical ‘strong economic argument[s]’ and is further presented as an optimal 
solution to address the European ‘shrinking labour force’ and ‘underused labour market 
potential’, which is a ‘bottleneck to growth’.315 The social and economic participation of 
persons with disabilities is presented as: ‘essential to achieve the Europe 2020’s objectives of 
creating smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’.316 
 
2.5. ESI fundamental rights conditionalities and the nature of the main agreement 
Building on the analysis of Chapter I, this section intends to assess the implications of the 
main agreement on the overall architecture of ESI fundamental rights conditionalities. To this 
end, the legally binding, enforceable and dominium nature of the agreement shall be 
reiterated below. 
2.5.1. Legal obligation and legal condition 
In line with the general features of conditionality, ESI fundamental rights conditionalities are 
accessory to the main ‘contractual’ agreement (PA and OP) on the implementation of the ESI 
Funds resources. They materialise in legal conditions prescribing for an active behaviour on 
the conditionality recipients – EU Member States – to put in place arrangements and action 
                                                
313 Pollack and Hafner-Burton, op.cit., note 110, supra, p. 440. The authors provide an interesting assessment of 
the theory of social conduct, arguing that the Cohesion policy has enjoyed positive political factors in 
developing a gender mainstreaming perspective, this is not the case for EU Competition policy.  
314 Commission Guidance, Part II, op.cit., note 262, supra, p. 345. 
315 Ibidem, p. 298. See also: OECD, Closing the gender gap- act now, 2012.  
316 Commission Guidance, Part II, op.cit., note 262, supra, p. 303. On this point, one could bring into discussion 
the debate on the need to differentiate between efficiency and equity functions in the frame of EU Cohesion 
policy. In this sense, it has been argued that pursuing the goal of social justice and solidarity, ESI Funds should 
proceed to a redistribution of the fund resources subject to no conditions, similar to other federal systems. F 
Barca, op.cit., note 214, supra, p.17. 
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plans necessary for an effective enforcement of EU law and policy on non-discrimination, 
gender equality and disability in all ESI Funds activities.  
Being attached to the main obligation, they transform the original agreement in a 
conditional one, from fundamental rights perspective. At the same time, the failure to fulfil 
applicable fundamental rights conditionalities may hamper the very efficacy or continuation 
of the Partnership Agreement and OPs, limiting Member States’ access to or suspending the 
ESI Funds payments. 
2.5.2. Legally binding and enforceable conditionalities  
ESI fundamental rights conditionalities are legally binding on the Member States, subject to 
applicability criteria presented above. These are first binding as hard law provisions of CPR 
laying down the general requirement to identify the applicable fundamental rights 
conditionalities and fulfil them before the start of ESI Funds operations. Second, the legally 
binding nature of ESI fundamental rights conditionalities is confirmed in the text of the 
programming documents which indicate a clear list of applicable ex ante conditionalities, the 
level of fulfilment and in case of non-fulfilment the bodies required to take the necessary 
actions in a precisely specified time-frame.  
As well, ESI fundamental rights are enforceable. In case of non-fulfilment the CPR 
prescribes for a clear and transparent suspension procedure at the disposal of the 
Commission. 
2.5.3. More than dominium instruments 
We have already established that ESI Funds are dominium measures by nature. This means 
that EU deploys budget resources towards Member States via ESI Funds to attain the goals of 
Cohesion policy. As fundamental rights conditionalities are included in the structure of ESI 
Funds, these are linked to dominium measures, nevertheless they exceed the pure dominium 
sphere.  
In the context of Cohesion policy and its goal of social inclusion, in line with the 
principle of governance by dominium, the ESI Funds deploy EU budget resources, establish 
thematic objectives, eligibility criteria and set rules for sound expenditure.  
ESI fundamental rights conditionalities take the ESI Funds dominium model one step 
further, linking them to fundamental rights criteria which exceed the strict borders of 
Cohesion policy but are considered essential for its successful operation. The novelty of the 
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ESI fundamental rights conditionality is that starting with the 2014-2020 financial period, 
Member States are, in principle, required to test the applicability and, subsequently, the 
fulfilment of ESI fundamental rights conditionalities in all the ESI Funds investment actions, 
including the ones targeting equality and social inclusion, but not limited to them.  
More than this, by requiring the observance of EU law and policy, the ESI fundamental 
rights conditionalities de facto bridge the ESI Funds with EU imperium legislation and soft 
law instruments in the area of gender equality, non-discrimination and disability. That is to 
say that the ESI fundamental rights conditionalities provide an additional opportunity to 
check the efficient implementation and application of EU regulatory framework. 
 
2.6. Proportionality 
According to the examined legislative framework the overall implementation of ESI Funds 
should be read alongside the proportionality principle.317 As for ESI fundamental rights 
conditionalities, proportionality principle is tested in two instances. First proportionality must 
be taken into account by Member States when assessing the applicability of ex ante 
conditionalities. Onwards, the Commission must observe the principle when deciding on the 
suspension of ESI Funds payments.318 However, in both instances it is not indicated how 
exactly proportionality shall be assessed or applied, in concreto.319 
In the EU legal order, this analysis is largely attributed to the doctrine of 
proportionality as enshrined in the treaties320 and further developed by the Court of Justice of 
EU (the ‘CJEU’). According to the well-established CJEU case-law, proportionality 
principle, as a general principle of EU law, prescribes that the acts of EU legislator must not 
exceed what is strictly necessary and appropriate to achieve a certain aim, choosing the least 
restrictive measure from the ones available so that the ultimate limitations caused do not 
overweight the aim of the legislative action.321  
                                                
317 Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, CPR, Article 4(5). 
318 Ibidem, Article 19. 
319 European Court of Auditors, Opinion 7/2011 on a proposal for a Regulation laying down common provisions 
on ESI Funds, OJ C47 of 17.12.2011, p. 9. 
320 Article 5(1) and (4) TEU: “The use of Union competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality.” 
321 Case C-T-588/10, Greece v Commission [2012], para. 105 and case-law cited: “ Au regard de cette 
argumentation, il convient de rappeler que le principe de proportionnalité, en tant que principe général du droit 
de l’Union, exige que les actes des institutions de l’Union ne dépassent pas les limites de ce qui est approprié et 
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Therefore, in a first instance, the conditionality recipients shall always perform a 
proportionality analysis. As such, ESI fundamental rights conditionalities have to prove as 
appropriate, necessary and least restrictive tools to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of 
ESI Funds investment and ultimately achieve this aim. Also, the identified ex ante 
conditionalities shall not apply if these are found to be excessively burdensome compared to 
the overall agreement and benefits prescribed therein.  
 In a second instance, the principle of proportionality is read as a technique used to 
assess the validity of a limitation of a given right. By suspending the ESI Funds interim 
payments, the enforcement of ex ante conditionalities appears as a limitation to Member 
States’ right to benefit from ESI Funds allocations. In the case of corrections imposed by the 
Commission in ESI Funds’ expenditure, the CJEU has stated repeatedly that infringement of 
rules ‘the observance of which is of fundamental importance to the proper functioning of a 
Union system may be penalised’.322 Applied mutatis mutandis to the suspension of the ESI 
Funds in case of failure to fulfil the ex ante conditionalities, the suspension for failure to fulfil 
the ex ante conditionalities appears legitimate if these are found of ‘fundamental importance’ 
for the functioning of ESI Funds system. Additionally, the level of suspension shall take 
account of the degree of non-fulfilment and impact on the overall ESI Funds’ operation.
                                                                                                                                                  
nécessaire à la réalisation des objectifs poursuivis par la réglementation en cause. Ainsi, lorsqu’un choix 
s’offre entre plusieurs mesures appropriées, il convient de recourir à la moins contraignante et les 
inconvénients causés ne doivent pas être démesurés par rapport aux buts visés.” See also: Case T‑308/05 Italy 
v Commission [2007] ECR II‑5089, paragraph 153 and case-law cited. 
322 T-384/10 Spain v Commission [2013] para. 134; Case T‑308/05 Italy v Commission [2007] ECR II‑5089, 
paragraph 153 and case-law cited.  
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SECTION 3: ESI FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS CONDITIONALITIES IN CONTEXT 
Building upon the prior EU use of fundamental rights conditionalities (Chapter I) and the 
findings on ESI Funds use of equality promotion and conditionality (Chapter II) we shall next 
try to delimit the place of the ESI fundamental rights conditionalities in the overall 
architecture of EU conditionality policy as well as in the context of ESI Funds landscape. In 
doing so, we shall try to highlight the common traits of the new conditionality tool, testing its 
specificity and contribution to the existing arrangements. 
 
3.1. ESI fundamental rights conditionalities in the context of EU external and internal 
conditionality policy  
Comparing the ESI fundamental rights conditionalities to our findings on the EU use of 
fundamental rights conditionality externally and internally (see Chapter I, Section 2), we find 
that ESI Fundamental rights conditionalities, differ but at the same, these endorse important 
common features. From this point of view, they appear as a sum result englobing traits of 
external and internal fundamental rights conditionalities, all adapted to the specificities of 
ESI Funds. We shall develop this idea below. 
3.1.1. External Policy 
Comparing the ESI Fundamental rights conditionalities to the EU use of conditionalities 
externally, several remarks are important. These relate mainly to the form of the agreement, 
the financial link, conditionality type, dynamics and the enforcement procedure.  
Firstly, as to the form of the agreement, externally, fundamental rights conditionalities 
are traditionally inserted in the body of bilateral or multilateral treaties in the form of ‘human 
rights clause’ or promoted via unilateral EU Instruments, such as the GSP schemes or the EU 
financial instruments for external action. From this point of view, ESI fundamental right 
conditionalities embody both a unilateral and bilateral hybrid model. As briefly explained 
earlier (Section 2.3.), they are first enforced via unilateral EU regulations. At the same time, 
each of the ESI ex ante conditionalities are onwards bilaterally negotiated and approved 
between the Commission and each Member States in bilateral contractual agreements on the 
ESI Funds expenditure. This is a peculiar trait of the ESI fundamental rights conditionalities 
when compared to the Financial Instruments for external action, where no subsequent 
negotiation of the ‘human rights clause’ is allowed. Similarly the arrangement differs from 
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the GSP+ ex ante conditionality, where the third country beneficiaries are required to accede 
to the whole block of unilaterally established human right treaties, with no further bilateral 
negotiations on the content of the list. 
Secondly, in line with the external policy pattern, ESI fundamental rights 
conditionalities are linked to financial benefits. Especially similar to Financial Instruments 
for external action, each ESI Fund has a financial portfolio attached to it. Equally ESI 
fundamental rights conditionalities are able to affect Member States’ right to financial 
assistance. However, in the context of ESI Funds, the link between conditionalities and 
financial assistance is particularly strong. Here, conditionalities are not simply linked to 
financial assistance presuming that the respect of fundamental rights is an essential pre-
condition of any EU action. In order to be applicable, ESI fundamental rights conditionalities 
have to prove a genuine and direct link and also a direct impact on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of fund resources, endorsing a utilitarian rationale. This feature is absent in the 
external policy, where fundamental rights conditionalities do not have to endorse a tangible 
direct impact on EU financial allocations. 
Thirdly, ESI fundamental rights conditionalities endorse the finding on the intensity of 
conditionality in EU external policy (see Chapter I). We stated earlier that as the ties with a 
third state get closer the EU conditionalities tend to be more demanding. In the case of ESI 
Funds, fundamental rights conditionalities address the Member States themselves. These are 
only negative, thus penalising the lack of compliance. At the same time, they require Member 
States to adopt an ‘ex ante’ active ‘to do’ behaviour. No further ‘carrots’ or incentives are 
granted in case of good compliance with conditionality criteria. 
On the same note, we found that in external policy, fundamental rights conditionalities 
are more dynamic in relation to close ENP partners or candidate countries (see Chapter I). 
The dynamics is particularly visible in the case of ENI and IPA II financial instruments and 
Copenhagen criteria conditionality. Compared to these, ESI fundamental rights 
conditionalities are even more dynamic. They vary substantially from one Member State to 
another, as well as within the programming documents of the same Member State. The list of 
applicable ESI fundamental rights conditionalities and the actions undertaken to fulfil the 
conditionality criteria may differ considerably based on the investment priorities, institutional 
or administrative framework of each Member State and the particular arrangements 
undertaken to fulfil the conditionality criteria. 
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It must be noted that, in contrast with external policy, here we notice an extremely 
cautious and detailed regulation on fundamental rights conditionalities’ scope of application, 
criteria for fulfilment, enforcement and ultimately, suspension of funds.  
As well, if externally conditionalities tend to be general, the ESI fundamental rights 
conditionalities are rather specific, targeted to the areas of non-discrimination, gender 
equality and disability.323 This development underlines some sensibilities of the Member 
States towards conditionality tool in general. ESI Funds legal framework prescribes for a 
clear definition, an exhaustive ‘to do list’ to be met in order to receive the funding, a limited 
time-frame and pre-defined suspension rules. At the same time, the internal development 
answers the critique of arbitrariness324 and inconsistency of fundamental rights conditionality 
as used externally.325 
Finally, externally third countries do not have the possibility to appreciate which 
fundamental rights conditionalities are applicable. In all cases, they have to fully comply by 
adopting the prescribed active or passive behaviour. As well it is interesting to notice that 
neither unilateral nor bilateral external instruments bring into discussion proportionality as 
the ESI Funds do with regards to applicability and enforcement of ESI fundamental rights 
conditionalities (Section 2.6. above). Equally, none of the external policy instruments 
requiring positive actions to fulfil the fundamental rights conditionalities – as GSP+ scheme, 
ENI or IPA II Instruments - mention proportionality of the criteria having regards to the 
‘level of assistance’, administrative burden or other benefits. Proportionality shall 
nevertheless be observed in external policy as a general principle of EU law. 326 
                                                
323 The CPR also includes other ex ante conditionalities on fundamental rights as in the area of Roma inclusion 
which are not addressed in the present thesis. 
324 K Tomaševski, Development aid and human rights revisted, op.cit., note 68, supra, p. 68. 
325 See: Novak, in: P Alston, The EU and human rights, op.cit., note 96,  supra, p.698. 
326 Article 21(1) and (3) TEU: “The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles 
which have inspired its own creation […]”. 
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3.1.2. Internal Policy  
The 2014-2020 ESI Funds ex ante conditionalities are the most visible, comprehensive set of 
ex ante conditionalities in EU internal policy to address Member States post-accession. As 
opposed to prior arrangements, ESI fundamental rights conditionalities are directly and 
immediately linked to financial resources, which, as seen in Chapter I, is seldom the case in 
internal policy. 
In comparison with Copenhagen criteria, there is a strong legally binding framework, 
a detailed performance grid with exhaustive transparent criteria to be fulfilled and a clear 
enforcement procedure. At the same time, the ESI fundamental rights conditionalities overlap 
with Copenhagen criteria, as these mandate Member States to uphold the achieved acquis and 
maintain the status quo in the area of ESI Funds operations with respect to non-
discrimination, gender equality and disability. The same goes for the emerging ‘ex post 
Copenhagen conditionality’ for ‘new’ Member States. In this cases, the programming 
documents explicitly require channelling the ESI Funds action towards post-accession special 
arrangements and reforms.327 
Analysed against Article 7 TEU ex post conditionality, the ESI fundamental rights 
conditionalities have a higher enforcement potential. These are attached to explicitly clear 
fundamental rights areas and provide for predictable pecuniary penalties. The suspension of 
ESI funds is enforceable at the sole decision of the Commission – with no need for a Council 
decision or European Parliament implication. 
At the same time, the ESI fundamental rights conditionalities borrow the general 
pattern of negotiations and close dialogue as noticed internally. Member States are involved 
in the process on a equal footing, being the first to assess the applicability and fulfilment of 
conditionalities. As seen above, the enforcement of conditionality is carefully shielded by 
preliminary soft negotiation proceedings meant to limit the suspension of ESI Funds only to 
thoroughly justified cases (Section 1.3. above). This recourse to dialogue goes back to the 
very heart of the EU law enforcement specificity328 and more broadly to the heart of EU 
construction, based on the principle of sincere cooperation and respect for national 
                                                
327  See the Commission position papers on Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/what/future/pdf/partnership/hr_position_paper.pdf, consulted on 01.08.2014. 
328 See, Chiti, Edoardo, The Governance of Compliance, in: M Cremona, Compliance and the enforcement of 
EU law, The Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012.  
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constitutional identity.329 
 
3.2. Fundamental rights conditionality: how new in the ESI Funds’ framework? 
We have seen in the previous Chapter that the ESI Funds did not lack fundamental rights 
mainstreaming or specific action (Chapter II, Section 2). Similarly the ESI Funds did not lack 
conditionality (Chapter II, Section 3). Quite the contrary. In this context, this part analyses 
what do fundamental rights conditionalities bring to the policy and how are they different. 
3.2.1. Specific action and fundamental rights conditionality 
With regards to ESI Funds specific action directed to equality promotion, fight against 
discrimination, inclusion of persons with disabilities and more broadly and social inclusion, 
the ESI fundamental rights conditionalities are expected in principle to always apply. As 
such, the main contribution of ESI fundamental rights conditionalities is that additionally to 
prior arrangements, Member States are required to prove ex ante sound regulatory framework 
and administrative capacity in the three areas.  
In conceptual terms, this means that the obligation undertaken by Member States in the 
programming documents to implement the ESI Funds towards the objective of social 
cohesion and equal opportunities is now conditioned also by fundamental rights ex ante 
criteria. Member States are not only required to implement the ESI Funds allocations but also 
are mandated to put in place ex ante specific inter-institutional arrangements with equality 
bodies for assistance and expert advice in the planned ESI Funds interventions; training of 
staff in charge of the ESI Funds implementation. Additionally, in the area of disability, 
monitoring arrangements on accessibility must be ensured.330 
3.2.2. From principles to fundamental rights conditionalities 
In terms of equality mainstreaming, it is interesting to notice that ESI fundamental rights 
conditionalities mirror exactly the general principles of gender equality, non-discrimination 
and accessibility for persons with disabilities as enshrined in prior ESI Funds regulations. We 
argue nevertheless, that they take a substantially different stand from principles, being at the 
same time complementary to them. 
                                                
329 Article 4 (2) and (3) TEU. 
330 Regulation (EU)1303/2013, CPR, Annex XI, Part II, points 1-3. 
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First, from the personal scope point of view, whereas the principles bound both the 
Commission and the Member States, ESI fundamental rights conditionalities have as 
exclusive addressees only the Member States.331 
Second, whereas similarly to the general principles of equality and non-discrimination 
the applicable ESI fundamental rights conditionalities are mainstreamed in the Partnership 
Agreements (‘PA’) and Operational Programmes (‘OP’), in the case of conditionalities there 
is a stronger accountability on the Member States. As such, the documents shall make clear 
statement of the extent to which each of the applicable fundamental rights conditionalities is 
fulfilled and, if not fulfilled, an indication of a limited time-frame332 with the concrete actions 
to be taken and the responsible bodies for their fulfilment shall be submitted.333 Therefore the 
observance of conditionalities is not pure ‘declarative’, but rather a binding contractual 
obligation. 
Third, from the temporal point of view, whereas the principles have to be observed 
during the whole period of ESI Funds actions’ design and implementation, ESI fundamental 
rights conditionalities have to be in place ex ante.  
Lastly, and most importantly, contrary to the principles, the failure to fulfil the ESI 
fundamental rights conditionalities may lead to suspension of ESI Funds.334 Here the genuine 
power of the Commission lies in its capacity to unilaterally suspend, fully or partially, the 
interim payments if the conditionalities are not fulfilled in the agreed time frame.335 Priory, 
the Commission did not have the power to suspend funding in case of failure to mainstream 
the principles of equality and non-discrimination. 
The development could be seen as a response to the weak implementation of the 
equality and non-discrimination mainstreaming mandate. A clear distinction in comparison to 
prior programming periods is observed. Whereas the previous frameworks relied on the 
Member States’ discretion to implement the equality-mainstreaming mandate, the 
Commission supporting these with soft law guidelines and recommendations; the present 
framework limits Member States’ discretion and complements the guiding instruments with 
legally binding fundamental rights conditionalities. 
                                                
331Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013, CPR, Articles 7 and 19.  
332Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013. According to Article 19 (2) CPR, the ex ante conditionalites shall be 
fulfuiled at the latest by 31 December 2017. 
333 Ibidem, Article 19.  
334 Ibidem, Article 142 
335 Ibidem. 
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SECTION 4: WHAT POTENTIAL FOR THE ESI FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
CONDITIONALITIES? Final thoughts.  
Based on the above picture, the present section lays down several final thoughts on ESI 
fundamental rights conditionalities’ potential. The purpose is not to conduct a comprehensive 
assessment exercise, which at this point would be premature, however some preliminary 
remarks are already imminent. 
The potential impact of the ESI Fundamental rights conditionalities is analysed 
primarily at the level of ESI Funds and in subsidiary at the level of EU equality and non-
discrimination law. The question that arises is: what added-value are ESI fundamental rights 
conditionalities bringing on the two levels? and: how fit are these to the context? 
 
4.1. Filling the ESI Funds gap 
The analysis of previous ESI Funds programming periods revealed several challenges 
(Chapter II, Section 2). We have seen that on the one hand, equality specific actions were 
mainly attached to gender equality and ESF resources, the ex post evaluations showed lack of 
consistent, comparable and reliable data.336 On the other hand, equality mainstreaming lacked 
an integrated approach being mostly declaratory in the vast majority of cases. At the same 
time, the equality mainstreaming mandate lacked legally binding enforceability tools, relying 
largely on ‘soft law’ guidance and voluntary compliance of Member States.337 
In the 2014-2020 programming period, fundamental rights conditionalities are in 
principle applicable to all ESI Funds. Currently it is too early to assess what would be the 
specific actions where ESI fundamental rights conditionalities would be found applicable. 
However, given the applicability test presented above (Section 1), it could be reasonably 
assumed that these would continue to be largely attached to ESF actions, where a direct and 
genuine link and a direct impact on the ESI Funds effective and efficient expenditure is more 
likely to be proven. If this presumption is validated, ESI fundamental rights conditionalities 
shall continue the trend of equality related specific action, limited largely to ESF operations. 
                                                
336 Another worth-mentioning ex-ante conditionality is: the ‘existence of statistical and result indicators 
systems’ aiming to facilitate the selection and effective monitoring of the ESI Funds action. See: Regulation 
(EU) CPR, Annex XI, Part II, point 7. The development of statistical bases and systems of indicators have been 
required for a long time in Cohesion policy, yet the requirement has not been satisfactorily fulfiled. 
337 See Chapter II, supra. 
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In terms of equality mainstreaming, the potential of ESI fundamental rights 
conditionalities seems more tangible. The expert advice from equality bodies, training of staff 
holding key positions and monitoring required by fundamental rights conditionalities may 
constitute an effective incentive towards a better incorporation of gender equality, non-
discrimination and disability matters into the ESI Funds design and implementation. Hence, 
these are capable of strengthening the existent mainstreaming arrangements.  
It is also pertinent to remind that the unilateral enforcement power of the Commission 
enhances further the likelihood of compliance.  
 
4.2. Reinforcing EU equality and non-discrimination law 
The principles of equality and non-discrimination are the cornerstones of the Union’s 
constitutional architecture. They are deeply embedded into the constitutional tradition of the 
Union first and foremost as general principles of EU law. The respect for the principles is 
therefore a pre-condition for the legality of any act or action of the EU institutions or 
Member States acting within the scope of EU law. This is also the case for the Cohesion 
policy and ESI Funds operations. 
Moreover, in the light of the Treaty provisions (Article 8 and 10 TFEU), the EU 
legislators have incorporated the principle of equality and non-discrimination into the written 
provisions of ESI Funds as horizontal principles guiding the operation of all ESI Funds 
(Article 7, CPR). 338  The Court of Justice of EU has held in Association Belge des 
Consommateurs339 case that, in the light of the cited Treaty provisions, there is also a duty 
that the adopted measures contribute effectively to the aimed result. Departing from the 
interpretation given by the Court, one may claim that the adoption of the ESI fundamental 
rights conditionalities is in fact a direct response to a Treaty obligation to ensure the 
effectiveness of the adopted measures intended to promote equality in the frame of ESI 
Funds. Whereas the EU legislator has repeatedly confirmed its commitment to promotion of 
equality during the operation of ESI Funds, the achievement of the ‘intended objective’ did 
not sufficiently deliver on expectations. Thus, fundamental rights conditionalities may be 
                                                
338 The Union shall ‘eliminate inequalities and promote the equality between men and women’ in all its 
activities (Article 8 TFEU) and combat any discrimination ‘[i]n defining and implementing its policies and 
activities’ (Article 10 TFEU); CPR, Article 7.  
339 CJEU, Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL and Others v Conseil des ministres, Case 
C-236/09, 2011 I-00773, para. 20-21. 
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seen as tools to correct the underperformance of the prior ESI Funds legislative action in the 
attempt to improve the equality specific action and mainstreaming effectiveness. 
Furthermore, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’) 
is another primary-law instrument of relevance to our discussion. In the context of the ESI 
Funds actions, the application of the Charter cannot be denied.340 The criteria required by the 
fundamental rights conditionalities – sound regulatory framework, training of staff and 
consultation of equality bodies - diminish the risk of fundamental rights violation, raise 
awareness and encourage the observance of the Charter during the ESI Funds related actions. 
Mainstreaming the Charter in ESI Funds operation may constitute ‘a source of institutional 
learning’341 and strengthen the paradigm shift towards the ‘new modes of governance’342 in 
the area of fundamental rights. 
From the point of view of the EU non-discrimination Directives,343 which have been 
the key legal source stressed by anti-discrimination ex ante conditionality, there might be an 
increased opportunity. In line with the findings of the European Commission’s 2014 report 
on the implementation of the EU Equality Directives, ESI fundamental rights conditionalities 
could address the challenges signalled: enhancing equality bodies’ capacity and awareness 
raising.344 
Equality Bodies are most likely to be the main actors engaged in the implementation 
of the fundamental rights conditionalities, being systematically consulted and providing 
tailored advice on the ESI Funds’ implementation process. As the Commission report’s 
conclusions underline, supporting the equality bodies to reach their full potential is a priority 
as it is capable of enhancing equality in an accessible, timely manner, with lower cost 
implications.345 From this point of view, there is undoubtfully an open opportunity for the ESI 
fundamental rights conditionalities.  
                                                
340 Regulation (EU) 1303/2013, CPR, recital 13. However in practice questions may arise as to the universal 
applicability of the Charter as well as to the enforceability of specific provisions enshrined as principles thereof. 
341 De Burca, ‘New Modes of Governance and Protection of Human Rights’, in: Monitoring Fundamental Rights 
in the EU: the contribution of the Fundamental Rights Agency, Oxford, Hart, 2005, p. 26. 
342 Ibidem. 
343 Council Directive 2000/43/EC; Council Directive 2000/78/EC; Directive 2006/54/EC; Council Directive 
2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women in 
the access to and supply of goods and services   OJ L 373, 21.12.2004. 
344 European Commission, Joint Report on the application of Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 
implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin and of 
Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation, Brussels, 17 January 2014, p. 12.  
345 European Commission, Joint Report on the Application of Equality Directives, op.cit., note 344, p. 16. 
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Second, the Commission Report detected low awareness of the EU non-
discrimination law.346 By implementing training activities required by the fundamental rights 
conditionalities the structural incentives are put in place. These could contribute to a greater 
awareness raising amongst both, the managing staff and ESI Funds’ target groups. This 
chain-effect could be mutually re-enforcing and beneficial. 
On a more general and broad note, ESI fundamental rights conditionalities could 
positively contribute the overall EU equality mainstreaming policy, stirring a ‘spill-over’ 
effect also at the national level. From this point of view, they may constitute catalysts for 
equality mainstreaming.347  
Finally, it must be stressed that internally the EU has many more enforcement tools to 
advance equality and combat status discrimination. In this context, ESI fundamental rights 
conditionalities are an additional instrument, able to provide increased scope for dialogue and 
negotiations, thus inducing compliance.348 It would be further interesting to assess how the 
ESI fundamental rights conditionalities tools might interact with other EU hard law and soft 
law instruments in the area. Unfortunately, this analysis exceeds the scope of the present 
thesis. 
 
4.3. Limits 
Generally, conditionalities imposed internally are seen as tools meant to reinforce the 
authority of the EU law and policy. Several scholars have questioned ‘how fit’ are these for 
the purpose349 calling for a careful and thorough analysis of conditionality as a EU law 
enforcement tool.350 On the other hand, European Court of Auditors has welcomed ESI ex 
ante conditionalities as a ‘key development’ and means of integrating the Cohesion policy 
with other core EU policies, able to address the lack of integrated approach noted in the 
past.351  
As shown above, ESI fundamental rights conditionalities seem to enjoy favourable 
                                                
346 Ibidem, p.5.  
347 Monitoring Fundamental Rights in the EU, op.cit., note 340, supra, p. 47. 
348 Bieber and Maiani, ‘Enhancing centralized enforcement of EU law: Pandora's Toolbox?’, in Common Market 
Law Review, vol. 51, 2014, 1057–1092. 
349 Ibidem. 
350 Ibidem. 
351 European Court of Auditors, Opinion 7/2011 on a proposal for a Regulation laying down common provisions 
on ESI Funds, OJ C47 of 17 December 2011, paras. 6 and 16. 
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requisites for a positive impact, however these are not unlimited. It is therefore pertinent to 
ask: what are the limitations of the ESI fundamental rights conditionalities and how much can 
we expect them to deliver in terms of equal opportunities goal?  
First and foremost one should not forget that ESI fundamental rights conditionalities 
are explicitly limited to ESI Funds. Subsequently their application is limited to the extent to 
which Member States’ investment needs coincide with areas where ESI fundamental rights 
conditionalities have a tangible impact on the successful achievement of investment results.  
Secondly, ESI ex ante conditionalities, in general, and fundamental rights 
conditionalities, in particular, have indeed a strong leverage to induce compliance on 
Member States as they are attached to the largest EU budget portfolio. However, as MEP 
Danuta Maria Hübner, the ex Commissioner for Regional Policy, stressed during the 
parliamentary debates: “we strongly oppose[d] the tendency to make cohesion policy 
responsible for checking the implementation of virtually all European laws. Ex ante 
conditionality will have to be truly linked to cohesion policy.”352 The statement reveals a 
legitimate concern. It is not desirable to make Cohesion policy responsible for the 
shortcomings of all other policies, including the EU law and policy on equality and non-
discrimination. The ESI fundamental rights conditionalities aim to do more in supporting the 
equality goal of the Cohesion policy, however they still remain an accessory element to it. 
Thirdly, commentators have raised several concerns related to macro-economic 
conditionality,353 which we find equally pertinent in our discussion on fundamental rights 
conditionalities. The concerns address the subjects targeted by conditionality; legal certainty 
and fairness of suspension as far as final beneficiaries are concerned; and finally, the equality 
between Member States.354 
Concerning the subjects, it has been stated that the conditionalities have a high risk to 
target other actors than those responsible for non-fulfilment of conditionality.355 As such, the 
failure of the central governments (usually responsible for the implementation of EU law and 
                                                
352 European Parliament, session of 19 November 2013, Strasbourg, debates on Common Provisions Regulation, 
available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference=20131119&secondRef=ITEM-
012&language=EN, consulted on 11.01.2014 
353  S Verhelst, Macro-economic conditionalities in Cohesion policy, Note for the European Parliament, 
EGMONT, December 2012, pp. 43-48, available at: 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2012/474552/IPOL-
REGI_NT(2012)474552_EN.pdf>, consulted on 13.08.2014. 
354 Ibidem; see also: European Court of Auditors, Opinion 7/2011, para 19-20. 
355  Ibidem, p. 44. 
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policies) to deliver on conditionalities could be resented also by regions or final beneficiaries, 
constituting a ‘prejudice par ricochet’. The suspension of ESI Funds resources would also 
call into question fairness, legal certainty and reliability of Cohesion policy in terms of 
delivering the expected outputs.356 In external policy, the problem has been addressed by re-
directing the funds from central governments to civil society organisations. A similar solution 
seems to be taken into account by the Commission in case of macroeconomic 
conditionality. 357  No alternative route is previewed for ESI fundamental rights 
conditionalities. 
On Member States’ equality, it has been claimed that poorer regions and countries as 
primary beneficiaries of Cohesion policy would be at the same time the primary targets of 
macroeconomic conditionality.358 This means that the impact of suspension would be much 
higher on eligible ‘poor’ regions as compared to the phasing-out ones, questioning the 
principle of equality between Member States. When transposed to ESI fundamental rights 
conditionalities, this point is equally valid. According to the adopted PAs, we see that 
Member States falling short in fulfilment of conditionality criteria - and by consequence at a 
higher risk of ESI Funds suspension - are also the ones most in need of ESI Funding (Table 
III.3. above). 
On the other hand, fundamental rights experts have welcomed the new ESI 
fundamental rights conditionalities and even suggest a systematic enlargement of 
fundamental rights conditionalities’ reach towards other EU core policies, especially internal 
market.359 
In the end, what impact should we expect from ESI fundamental rights conditionalities? 
It is visible from their overall architecture and rationale behind that they have not been 
conceived as dismantling tools, meant to radically change the existing arrangements. ESI 
fundamental rights conditionalities are rather directed at maintaining and enforcing the EU 
status quo in the area of equality promotion and non-discrimination in the specific area of ESI 
Funds. Moreover, the Sixth cohesion report confirms this finding, stating that the ex ante 
                                                
356  Ibidem, pp. 46-48. 
357 European Commission, Communication on enhancing economic policy coordination for stability, growth and 
jobs, COM (2010) 367, 30.06.2010, p.10. However one must stress that the solution of redirecting the funds has 
been taken into account by the Commission only with regards to macro-economic conditionality, not 
fundametnal rights conditionality's and no further details are established under the CPR Regulation (EU) 
1303/2013. 
358 Macro-economic conditionalities in Cohesion policy, op.cit., note 353, supra, p. 45. 
359 I Butler, A Fundamental Rights Strategy for the European Union, Open Societies Institute, May 2014, pp. 8-
9. 
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conditionalities intend to make sure that the gaps in EU law and policy implementation do 
not adversely affect the ESI Funds investment and that the ‘the minimum requirements’ in 
the respective areas are in place.360 
Lastly, but equally important it must be stressed that one of the most powerful ‘limit’ in 
ESI fundamental rights potential are the Member States themselves. Much shall depend on 
their willingness to make use of the given tools. Unless Member States take real ownership of 
conditionalities, there is a risk that these are downgraded to a routine administrative exercise. 
From this point of view, one should be careful on the intensity of conditionality; as a too 
intrusive conditionality policy might ‘backfire’ both in the present, but notably in the next 
financial period. 
Important questions as to the appropriateness of conditionality tool in the long run to 
advance fundamental rights goals, as well as the appropriateness of conditionality to 
determine compliance of Member States remain pending.361 The Commission recognises that 
the implementation process of ex ante conditionalities ‘has not been easy’ and that there is 
still substantive space for improvement.362 Meanwhile, the ‘battle’ for the fundamental rights 
conditionalities is still taking place as the dialogue on PAs and OPs between the Member 
States and Commission is underway.363 
                                                
360 European Commission, Sixth Report on economic, social and territorial cohesion, 23 July 2014, p. 243.  
361 Bieber and Maiani, op.cit., note 348, supra, p. 1057. 
362 European Commission, Sixth Report on Economic, Social and Territorial Cohesion, p. 265. 
363 By the 1st of September 2014, sixteen Partnership Agreements and one Operational Programme have been 
adopted by the Commission.  
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INTERIM CONCLUSIONS 
The third Chapter has analysed the scope of the ESI Fundamental rights 
conditionalities, their conceptual nature and specific features as compared to prior EU 
external and internal conditionality arrangements, as well as to prior ESI Funds regulatory 
frameworks.  
The overall findings show that fundamental rights conditionalities are ‘new yet old’ 
tools. These differ from the prior arrangements, but at the same time feed harmoniously in the 
overall EU modus operandi in the area of conditionality.  
Compared to conditionalities as employed externally, ESI fundamental rights 
conditionalities are particularly dynamic and state-tailored, designed to address the specific 
institutional and financial needs of the Member State. Their application and fulfilment is 
fenced against the discretion of the Commission by detailed legislative provisions, principle 
of proportionality and operational guidance. 
Compared to conditionality employed internally, ESI fundamental rights 
conditionalities are distinguished by a genuine, intrinsic link to financial resources; 
exclusively ex ante and legally binding nature, coupled with a clear and accessible 
enforcement procedure. 
As to their potential, we have showed that there is important open opportunity for ex 
ante fundamental rights conditionalities both in the area of ESI Funds, as well as on the 
broader level of reinforcing EU equality and non-discrimination law and equality 
mainstreaming.  
Nevertheless, thoughtful consideration has to be given to the signalled limitations and 
intensity of the tool. It should be acknowledged that even if the ESI fundamental rights 
conditionalities aim to outreach policy areas beyond ESI Funds, it is still a primary attribute 
of Cohesion policy. At the same time, a balance in enforcement must be observed. 
As it is too early in the programming period, it remains to be seen how ESI 
fundamental rights conditionalities will effectively shape in practice following the adoption 
of all Partnership Agreements and especially Operational Programmes. 
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CONCLUSION  
The research addressed the ex ante fundamental rights conditionalities as a novel tool of 
2014-2020 ESI Funds programming period. The topic feeds into the broader and 
continuously extending problematic of EU use of conditionality. The present contribution 
intended to illustrate how exactly the conditionality in fundamental rights operates in the 
most recent 2013 Cohesion policy reform in the areas of anti-discrimination, gender equality 
and disability.  
This thesis embraced a legal approach to fundamental rights conditionality, which - 
with a few exceptions - has been a very little explored subject in the legal scholarship. As 
explained earlier, ESI Funds are government by dominium measures, falling in the scope of 
law. They materialise in legal acts by witch the government prescribes in principle a social 
behaviour; however without attaching a stricto sensu sanction to the opposite conduct, but 
deploying budgetary resources towards tailor-made actions and goals capable to attain the 
result. The examined ESI fundamental rights conditionalities are attached to dominium 
instruments, however they make an important step beyond, facilitating the link between the 
dominium sphere, one the one hand and EU law and policy, on the other. 
As the subject of research represented an ‘unknown’, novel concept, it was tested 
against proxy, ‘known’ areas capable to reveal important data on the architecture of the new 
tool. Accordingly, the point of departure was an analytical inquiry on the nature of 
conditionality. Secondly, we embraced a historical road and looked at what has been the prior 
EU ‘modus operandi’ in dealing with fundamental rights conditionalities until present. 
Thirdly, we undertook a comparative evolutionary research of the ESI Funds legislative 
frameworks as of 1988 to detect the ESI Funds’ prior action in fundamental rights. 
Based on the data revealed, we were able to put together a comprehensive image of 
the ex ante fundamental rights conditionalities in the area of anti-discrimination, gender 
equality and disability.  
The findings show that ESI fundamental rights conditionalities follow the general 
pattern of EU conditionality policy, but, at the same time, they stand out as robust, well 
developed and maturated tools as compared to the prior arrangements. They are an important 
gravity centre of EU fundamental rights conditionality as employed towards Member States 
post-accession. Moreover, these are differentiated by their intensity, as they prescribe for a 
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legally binding active conduct on Member States, are imposed exclusively ex ante and attract 
solely negative consequences in case of non-compliance. 
Substantively, ESI fundamental rights conditionalities feed into the political 
conditionality type; but, as opposed to external policy, the fundamental rights criteria is 
specific rather than general, targeting three key areas: non-discrimination, gender equality 
and disability.  
From the normative stand, we find a legally binding arrangement accompanied by 
sound and credible enforcement mechanisms. However, the actual applicability does not 
operate directly; it is shielded by applicability and proportionality tests. Building on this 
point, we notice that ESI fundamental rights conditionalities continue the evolution from pure 
political to legally binding conditionality. However, the distinctive trait in ESI Funds’ context 
is that beyond the legally binding nature, these pursue a law enforcement logic. Compared to 
the legally binding conditionality externally, the ESI fundamental rights conditionality is 
found both in unilateral and bilateral normative instruments: first, unilaterally prescribed by 
the ESI Funds regulations and subsequently enforced in the bilaterally agreed programming 
documents, leaving a large scope for dialogue and negotiations. 
The examined fundamental rights conditionalities endorse the dynamism and pecuniary 
link characteristic found in the external policy, notably when employed towards close 
partners or candidate countries. However, in case of ESI fundamental rights conditionalities 
as applied towards Member States these characteristics are taken one step further: 
The dynamic feature is particularly visible as the ESI fundamental rights conditionality 
may differ from one Member State to another, based on the identified investment priorities, 
designed Operational Programmes and national legal and administrative arrangements.  
The pecuniary link is a genuine, intrinsic one, additionally complemented by the direct 
impact assessment, meaning that the ex ante conditionalities must prove a tangible impact on 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the ESI Funds allocations. The strong financial link is 
highly peculiar, especially when compared to the fundamental rights conditionality 
mechanisms priory used internally. 
When analysed against the ESI Funds legal framework and operation, the ESI 
fundamental rights conditionalities endorse the novelty claim. However, as we have seen, 
fundamental rights related action and conditionality, separately, were common features of the 
ESI Funds. Thus, the examined conditionalities sum the two existing concepts in one - 
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fundamental rights conditionality tool. At the same time, these build harmoniously on the 
prior arrangements in fundamental rights specific action and equality mainstreaming, adding 
potentially to their enforceability and actual applicability. 
Contrary to the conditionalities imposed on the economic crisis background, the ESI 
fundamental rights conditionalities do not raise stringent legitimacy questions. The three 
conditionalities are the result of the co-decision legislative procedure. Onwards, they are the 
object of equal footing negotiation and agreement between the Member States and 
Commission, having a strong treaty basis and most importantly re-stating the already existing 
obligations on the Member States. Moreover, ESI fundamental rights conditionalities mirror 
the general principles of equality and non-discrimination, which have been a long-standing 
concern of ESI Funds in general. 
It is difficult to draw a clear assessment picture of the ESI fundamental rights 
conditionalities. Nevertheless we have underlined several possible opportunities as well as 
limits. The present work brought a preliminary theoretical analysis of the ESI fundamental 
rights conditionalities tool based on previous arrangements and lessons learned from the ESI 
Funds’ operations. From the practical perspective, we established that all thirteen examined 
Partnership Agreements found the fundamental rights conditionalities applicable. One the 
other hand, the preliminary fulfilment picture shows a ‘variable geometry’: several Member 
States have completely fulfilled the conditionalities; others have done so partially or not at all 
(Table III.3., above). At this point is premature to draw a conclusion in this respect. We stress 
again that the effective applicability and fulfilment of fundamental rights conditionalities 
shall be visible after the adoption of all Operational Programmes. The practical impact, 
however, shall be sizeable after the mid-term and ex-post evaluations. 
It will be highly interesting to observe how the examined new tools will actually shape 
in practice. Future research on the interplay between the ESI fundamental rights 
conditionalities and other available EU tools to advance fundamental rights goals would 
make an important contribution to the examined topic. As well a thoughtful analysis on the 
opportunity of linking foundational EU values, as fundamental rights to budgetary resources 
could be further considered. Regretfully, we have not been able to address these issues in the 
present research. 
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